The army of the Netherlands. ¹

Introduction.

Though the army as it took place in the campaign of 1815 is often referred to as the Dutch / Belgian army, there is no reason to call it that way, as it suggest as if they were representing two territories. ²
In reality, since the middle of February 1815 both the Dutch and the Belgians lived in one country, which one month later became the kingdom of the Netherlands under king Willem. In my mind, therefore, there is only one correct name for the army dealt with in this brief chapter and that is the one of the Netherlands, and which was in turn composed of a Dutch and a Belgian part (which were merged on the 21st of April 1815 into one actual army).

The Dutch army 1813-1815.

After the defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig and as he was falling back to France, the united provinces of the Netherlands, which hitherto formed part of the French empire, declared itself independent in November 1813. Right after, a triumvirate consisting of Van Hogendorp, Van der Duyn van Maasdam and Van Limburg Stirum took up the temporary administration in name of Willem Frederik van Oranje, the oldest son of Willem V. The need for an army was clearly felt, not only to protect the newly acquired sovereignty, but foremost as an essential instrument to liberate Holland from the remaining French occupation forces. Additionally, it would allow the Dutch diplomats to gain some role in the political scene which now ensued during and after the fall of Napoleon. The regular troops that made up the army of the Republic of the United Provinces prior to 1795 did not exist anymore. At the incorporation of the kingdom of Holland into the French empire in 1810, its regiments had been transformed into French regiments and were used in the wars all over Europe and as a result sources were depleted. Although it had already been in September 1813 that first attempts were made to organise units for an army by the princess widow of Orange-Nassau, by November of that year there was virtually no army and for what was there it lacked money, experience and equipment of all sorts (guns, uniforms, arms etc.). Additionally, many officers were either still serving in the French army, were returning or adopted an awaiting attitude. Resulting, there was only a small Dutch army contributing to the expulsion of the French. By the 22nd of November 1813, on behalf of the prince sovereign (who returned to The Hague about one week later), the triumvirate made a general call to arms. This call was based upon voluntary enlistment; only in case this would not prove to be sufficient, a ballot would be held. In using this system it was hoped the voluntary element would attract men, instead of by enforcing them by conscription, a method which had been used by the French and which had resulted in a strong hatred against it. Eventually, those volunteering for the regular army decreased the number of men available for the militia. In the call to arms, a distinction was made between a regular army, a regular militia and a local militia (“landstorm”). The local militia was designed for the local defense of districts etc. and was meant for men between 17 and 50 years of age. In this type of militia the local citizen soldiery also found their place. The regular militia, which was supposed to count 16,000 men infantry and 4000 men artillery, was to share in the same status as the regular army, and was meant to support the regular army
in the defense of the Dutch soil. The establishment of both militias was formalized on the 20th of December 1813.
Not long after, on the 9th of January 1814, Willem, the prince sovereign, issued a formal decree for the establishment of the regular army and in which its organisation was described. It proved to be the first general disposition for the establishment of a regular army. It was to be composed of 6 battalions of light infantry, 16 battalions of line infantry (all each of about 990 men), 4 regiments of cavalry (each regiment of about 800 men), 4 battalions of foot artillery (each about 800 men), a corps of horse artillery, (about 980 men) a battalion of pontoneers, sappers and miners (about 300 men) and a train-battalion (about 750 men) – making up a total of about 30,000 men (excl. general staff and garrisons).
At this time it was still assumed that there would be a separate army for the Dutch and the Belgian provinces, whose fate had yet to be decided upon by the allied powers. It was to be in June 1814 that the basic arrangement for the junction of both territories into one realm was made in Vienna.
By March 1814, a corps of 15,000 men was sent to the south to support the British troops, led by sir Thomas Graham, in their struggle against the local French resistance at the Scheldt river, Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom.
Still, by the spring of 1814, the recruitment posed serious problems. By the 1st of April 1814 about 28,000 men had enlisted (of which 22,000 infantry, 2400 cavalry and 3500 artillery), while of the last weapon 6500 men were needed. As a backup, ranks were filled with foreigners who enlisted and as mercenaries (those from Nassau). In the diocese of Liège a unit of Belgian troops was set up by the Prussians, while in this same area the Dutch tried to recruit Belgians.
When it came down to the enlistment of officers, many of those with military experience were scattered over Europe in exile, as prisoners of war or still serving in French or Allied armies. For that reason, refuge had to be taken to three sources of officers. There were officers of the former army of the Dutch Republic from before 1795, who had not seen much or no active service since then. Due to their age, however, they had to be considered for high commands.
The other group were those who were released from Allied imprisonment, having served in the French army, particularly after the treaty of Paris (30th of May 1814). And then there were those, though often inexperienced, who had taken the lead in the rising against the French in 1813 and who somehow had to be rewarded for their actions. At least the return of officers who had been in French service gave the army of the Netherlands a core of experienced officers and NCO’s, while at the same time officers that had not the right qualities for a field command were pensioned or received posts in fortresses.
Meanwhile, general Vincent, commissary of the Belgian provinces, handed over the administration of these provinces to Willem, the prince sovereign, who accepted its rule the day after. As a result he became general governor of the Belgian provinces. At that time, these didn’t yet comprise those of Liège and those at the right bank of the river Meuse; these were still under Prussian control. Both territories, Holland and Belgium, however, for the moment were still kept as separate administrative entities.
It was during the summer of 1814 that a military commission, led by general Janssens, worked on a new disposition for the field army. Resulting, on the 23rd of September it was revised for the infantry. Additional dispositions were set up for the cavalry, the artillery and the engineers by mid-November. The overall result was maintained until April 21st 1815, the moment the numbering of all units was changed.
After the Dutch regular army was mobilised by mid-March 1815, its composition was established on the 25th of that same month, to be complied with on the 1st of June. In general
it was composed of 3 divisions of infantry, each with its own artillery, a brigade destined for the colonies, 3 brigades of cavalry, with its horse artillery. By the 1st of April this force was merged with the Belgian army.

When it came down to the quality of the Dutch mobile army, late March major Colborne described the situation as that the Dutch could easily send a disposable force of 35,000 but that not more than 30,000 were to march to Brabant, from which number the garrisons of Maastricht, Venloo and some other places would have to be deducted. In his expectation the Dutch army would eventually consist of about 20,000 “good troops” in the field. Some days later, on the 2nd of April, it was probably Colborne again who wrote a memorandum about the situation of the army of the Netherlands; he may have done so for Wellington, but this is not sure. Overall he sketched the army is of a good quality:

“L’armée Hollandaise peut mettre en campagne 30 mille hommes, et garder encore une réserve pour mettre dans les forteresses de 15 à 18 mille hommes. Sa force effective est actuellement de 42 mille hommes. Par un décret du Roi du 27 Février, la milice, qui manque sept mille hommes, doit être mise de suite au complet; et comme le recrutement de la milice se fait par conscription, la réserve sera dans peu de temps au delà même de 18 mille hommes. Le recrutements dans les régiments de ligne, étant volontaire, va plus lentement, et la composition des troupes de ligne n’est pas si bonne que celle de milice. L’esprit de l’armée Hollandaise est très bon: on peut être assuré qu’elle fera son devoir. Beaucoup de chefs et d’officiers subalternes ont à la vérité servi la France, mais généralement ils étoient si mal traité, et puis l’idée d’être sous un joug étranger, de ne plus faire une nation, a produit sur eux un très bon effet. J’excepte de ceci quelques méchants, tels qui ont donné par goût dans la révolution. Toute l’armée est enthousiasmée du lord Wellington, et aussi du prince Hériditaire d’Orange. Le lord Wellington prenant le commandement général de toutes les troupes dans la Belgique et le prince Hériditaire celui de l’armée Hollandaise, on peut être assuré d’heureux résultats. L’esprit public est dans toutes les provinces si bon, si prononcé contre la France, qu’on peut en confier la garde sans le moindre risque à la bourgeoisie armée dans toutes les villes. Il y a aussi un Landstorm dans les villages; et si on travaille un peu l’esprit du peuple, je suis assuré qu’une grande quantité de la garde bourgeoisie et du Landstorm se joindront à l’armée et marcheront contre l’ennemi. […] Le corps d’artillerie est très bon, très bien composé; le corps des ingénieurs offre moins de ressource.

Shortly after, the duke of Wellington entertained his own thoughts about the Dutch army, as he wrote to lord Bathurst on the 6th of April on his “very bad account of the Dutch troops and [that] king William appears unwilling to allow them to be mixed with ours, which, although they are not our best, would afford a chance of making something of them.” So, though his impression was not too well, he still thought he could use them if they would be properly mixed with the other forces of his army.

On the 30th of March, Von Müffling expressed himself in more or less the same way by stating to sir Hudson Lowe: “ Persistez au nom de Dieu, cher général , que l’armée Hollandaise se rassemble sur la champ dans un bivouac afin que ces paysans et bourgeois [sic] deviennent des soldats...”
The Belgian forces 1813-1815.

Immediately after the expulsion of the French, in March 1814, the provisional government of the southern provinces started attempts to form an armed force. The purpose was to form four regiments of line infantry, two regiments of light infantry, two regiments of cavalry and a corps of artillery – named the Légion Belge. In the formation of the armed forces private initiatives played an important role. The process proved to be a difficult one, both in enlisting of men and in equipping them. By the 9th of April the legion counted about 2500 men (1800 men infantry, 350 men cavalry and 400 men artillery). The problems were such that by the end of April 1814 the formation of the legion was stopped. Yet, not long after, general Vincent, who had taken over the former provisional government, retook the initiative to complete the project. By late May, the forces counted about 4000 men, of whom about 1500 did not have proper uniforms. Despite Vincent’s attempts, things were not developing as they were supposed to be and the project dragged on until the summer when the establishment of the Légion Belge was finally taken up by the Dutch the moment Willem had become prince sovereign of both the Dutch and the Belgian provinces.

By the 1st of August 1814, the organisation of the Légion Belge (by now 5000 men strong) was taken over by the Dutch in the sense that both commissions working on the establishment of armed forces in both territories were supposed to cooperate. To strengthen their bonds, they were both led by general major Constant Rebecque. As stated before, the organisation hadn’t seen much progress due to the political and financial situation. Other than that, the corps of officers was in most cases young and inexperienced. As a result, also Belgian officers were enlisted who had seen former service in the French army.

In the general administration of the armed forces, general Tindal was appointed as general inspector of the Belgian forces, while lieutenant general Janssens became general commissary at the ministry of war in the southern provinces. Later, however, by December 1814, when Janssens was called to The Hague to become minister of war, Tindal succeeded him. At the same time, on the 4th of August, Willem, the prince of Orange, was appointed commander of the British-Hanoverian forces in the southern provinces. The Dutch government, aware of the forthcoming unification with the Belgian provinces, had appointed prince Frederik as commander of the Dutch forces which were supposed to be cantoned there (12th June 1814). As a result, it was in July and August 1814 that Dutch forces – after having been assembled at Den Bosch, Maastricht and Bergen op Zoom by the end of June - were garrisoned in several Belgian towns and cities.

By now, the Belgian legion was put under the same administrative and organisational system as the Dutch army. Having the Dutch involved, however, things did not move that swiftly as expected. By February 1815, the Belgian army counted seven incomplete battalions and three weak regiments of cavalry. By the 21st of April, all Belgian units were merged with those from Holland, to form the army of the Netherlands.

The core of the Belgian army was formed by those – both officers and men – who had served in the armies of Napoleon, some of them in his imperial guard. It was just this which made other allies, particularly the British, very suspicious about their reliability for the allied cause. Late March, major Colborne wrote to lord Bunbury: “I would not trust the Belgian troops an inch, some of the men of the two regiments at Mons began the cry of Vive Napoleon on the first arrival of the news. However, their numbers are inconsiderable.” And: [...] “The Belgian
troops I know to be disaffected officers and men [...] nothing good can be expected from the soldiers who have served with Bonaparte. But perhaps a militia might be raised from the remaining who are uncorrupted.”

And on the 2nd of April he wrote: “Les troupes Belges sont mauvaises: on ne doit pas y compter. Le meilleurs parti à prendre est de les mettre en seconde ligne le plus que possible. Quel fond faire sur le général Evers, aussi sur tout le corps d’officiers, qui sont de système Français par goû et par habitude ?
Je crois qu’il y a des exceptions à faire, mais bien peu. En général on ne doit compter sur aucune ressource dans la Belgique; on veut y lever 20 bataillons de milice. Si l’on en confie le commandement à des officiers sortants du service de la France, cette formation ne produira que du mal. On devroit y placer d’anciens officiers de service d’Autriche et d’Hollande; il y en a un assez grand nombre; et puis des jeunes gens du pays. Dans les provinces de Luxembourg, de Limbourg et dans les environs de Maestricht, le peuple est bien disposé, mais toute la Flandre est mauvaise.”

The situation had not gone unobserved by Von Röder who wrote on Gneisenau around that time: “Die Stimmung der Belgischen Truppen besonders der Offiziere spricht sich immer lauter auf die nachtheilhafte Weise aus, und man traut selbst einigen ihrer Generale nicht. Dieses Misstrauen, welches vorzüglich die Engelländer zu laut werden lassen, macht das Übel noch ärger, und ich glaube, dass man wirklich in Verlegenheit ist, was man mit ihnen machen soll. Schade ist es besonders um ihre Cavallerie, welche rechts schön ist.”

On the 19th of March, Von Kleist, the commander of the Prussian forces on the Rhine, qualified the Belgian forces simply as “miserables, zusammengelaufenes Gesindel.”

On the 19th of April, Von Brockhausen wrote to Hardenberg: “[..] mais il y a tout à craindre des corps belges dont les intentions sont les plus équivoques. On a été obligé des les retirer dans la seconde ligne, de les mettre dans les places fortes de la Hollande.[..]”

The general mental background of the Belgian forces was one of a lack of identification due to a disruption of interests. Though the fall of Napoleon had in the southern provinces generally been received with approbation, a pro-French attitude could still get a foothold, not so much because of the French system as such, but as a reaction against the total political situation of the moment.

By 1792, the French were received as liberators from the Austrian government which had ruled these provinces for so long; yet, the French annexed the territory and when they were chased out by 1814, no proper leadership was there to defend any “Belgian” interests at the congress of Vienna. To make matters even worse, the Belgian provinces were merged with the Dutch ones, and it was in this sense that this junction was regarded as one with a different system in language, religion and politics. At the same time, there was also a resentment against the excesses of the French system such as the centralisation, the conscription, the continental system and the terror.

This disruption led, at least in the army, to an indifference, which made it - particularly in the eyes of the British – suspect to the allied cause.

As a matter of fact, the Belgian legion in particular had suffered from a high degree of desertions between June 1814 and June 1815, which was mostly due to a lack of clothing and pay.
The army of the Netherlands in general.

Qualifications about the army of the Netherlands in general have often been coloured by the conceitedness of the British towards it, as being inexperienced and simply unreliable. Yet, the army merits a proper assessment in itself. However contradictory this may seem, in this context, I first would like to cite from the following three reports.

On the 21st of March 1815, major Von Röder wrote to Gneisenau:

“Neither the Dutch nor Brabancons will be displeased to see the duke of Wellington, the commander in chief. But I am convinced it will be necessary to give the prince of Orange the immediate command of them, and should that be the case, they may be turned to made useful. The Dutch have the highest opinion of the skill and experience of the Prince, and are quite proud of him and I am told in many parts of Holland he is considered to have been the great advisor and the chief cause of the duke of Wellington’s success in the Peninsula. In fact, no one should command them but him, if it is wished to make them hearty in the cause. His father and the ministers have flattered him so much, that he believes himself not one of the worst generals of the age. I dread the Dutch bureau de la guerre, Jansens is a sensible man, but he is surrounded by a shocking set of rogues.”

And a memorandum dated 2nd April stated:

“Le Ministère de la guerre, à la tête duquel se trouve le général Janssens, est mal composé. La conduite passée de ce général ne sauroit inspirer une grande confiance, surtout puisqu’il est si mal entouré. Tous les chefs des différents bureaux sont connus pour être des gens attachés au système révolutionnaire et à la France. L’administration militaire dans la Belgique, sous le lieutenant-général Tindal, n’est pas moins mauvaise.

Il seroit difficile de changer tout cela dans le moment actuel. Le seul moyen de prévenir que ces administrations ne nuisent pas beaucoup, c’est de tâcher d’empêcher que ni les généraux Janssens et Tindal, ni le colonel Briatte, chef de l’état-major du général Janssens, ni un nommé Pipers, chef de l’administration, ne soient point placés à l’armée mise en activité; et puis de remettre le plutôt possible le commandement général au prince Hériditaire. Directement sous ses ordres, tous ces employés feront par crainte leur devoir. Mais je le répète, il est essentiel de les tenir éloignés de l’armée. […] Les généraux à employer sont le prince Hériditaire; le prince Frédéric d’Orange; le lieutenant général du Pont; les généraux-majors Perponcher, actuellement ministre à Berlin; Panhuys, destiné pour Surinam; Anthing, destiné pour Batavia; Stedman, Van Merle, et Tripp pour la cavalerie. Tout le reste est trop vieux, ou sans moyens. Constant de Villars trop vieux, de même que Cornabé, Fandyck, Stirum, etc. etc. Il y a quelque colonels qu’on peut avancer au grade de général, tel que Guillaume Byland, Van der Wyck, Van Houy, Van Ostrée. Le général-major Constant de Rebecute, quartier-maître-général, est un homme non seulement bon pour ses principes, mais très actif. C’est le meilleur choix qu’on pouvoit faire pour cette place importante.

[…] Le plus grand inconséquence seroit de remettre le commandement des places dans la Belgique à des officiers Hollandais. On ne doit céder aucune de ces places, surtout pas Anvers. Pourquoi ne pas éloigner ces généraux inutiles et dangereux, tel que M.Chassé, Storm de Grave, Matuschwitz, gens sans moyens, et des plus mauvaises principes ? A quoi bon ces commandants de places Hollandais dans les forteresses de la Flandre ? On peut actuellement dire qu’on n’en a pas besoin dans ces places, et que le roi pourra les employer ailleurs, soit pour le commandement des dépots, du recrutement. Quelques uns peuvent même
commander des bataillons de milices: partout il seroit mieux, et moins dans le cas de faire du mal, que sur la frontière de la France, où ils se trouvent actuellement.

Si le prince héréditaire place un officier Belge à l’état-major de sa personne, on doit être prudent sur le choix, prendre un jeune homme de famille, et plutôt regarder sur son opinion que sur ses talents. Prenant un bon officier, le choix doit tomber sur quelqu’un qui vient du service de la France, ce que seroit dangereux dans ce moment, où l’on ne peut être trop circonspect. En général il seroit à désirer qu’on agisse avec plus de prudence.

La trop de confiance dans le moment actuel à l’égard des personnes dont la façon de penser n’est ou n’a pas toujours été bonne, peut avoir les plus malheureuses suites. […] 11

After having inspected parts of the army of the Netherlands, Wellington himself wrote on the 28th of April to earl Bathurst:

“The Nassau troops are excellent; and the Dutch militia are a very good body of men, although young. The Belgians young, and some very small. The cavalry remarkably well mounted, but don’t ride very well. The whole well clothed and equipped for service; and, as far as I could judge from what I saw of their movements, well disciplined. They are completely officered by officers who have been in the French service. It was an extraordinary circumstance that the only corps cried “Vive le roi” were the Belgians, which appears in these good days to be the common cry of treason. […] In consequence of the arrangement for the defence of his country he will take away from the operating army about 7000 to 8000 men, which he proposes to place under the command of prince Frederick, a very fine lad of eighteen years old. He then intends, as I understand, that all the remainder should be under the prince of Orange, notwithstanding the remonstrances I before made with the prince’s consent against this arrangement, as placing in too great a mass all the youth and treason of the army. […] He [the king] is surrounded by persons who have been in the French service. It is very well to employ them, but I would not trust one of them out of my sight, and so I have told him.” 12

First of all, it should be stressed that these comments should be seen within the context of the moment they were written and that they do not fully reflect the situation of mid-June 1815. For instance, by the time he wrote his report, Wellington still had no direct command over the army of the Netherlands, a circumstance he deemed extremely frustrating. Written in spring 1815, however, these documents contain elements upon which the blueprint of the quality of the army of the Netherlands as it was by June 1815 can be established, even though the very development between these moments may have been stimulated by the British.

In general, by mid-June 1815, the army was young and built from scratch, but at the same time most of the cadre was experienced. To start with, to ensure a well-disposed body formed of these raw men, the prince of Orange had been appointed as their general commander, while he was assisted by a man who was equally well chosen for his duties, general major Constant Rebecque. Their relationship was good, as well as the one with the other commanding officers. At the same time, as other higher (and experienced) officers had been appointed, those - whose credentials in the current situation were doubtful – had no longer been allowed to or dismissed from the mobile army and put into secondary positions. It should be noted that two out of the three Netherlands divisional commanders (Chassé and Collaert), plus all three of the cavalry brigade commanders, were experienced soldiers.

Of the infantry, in general, the battalions of national militia were better composed as those of the line. In the cavalry, there was a lot of difference in quality between the various regiments, but most of them were well led and well mounted.
The artillery improved when better officers were appointed, but yet its equipment was in some respects old and insufficient, especially in the trains.

**Organisation.**

The infantry of the army of the Netherland was formed into three divisions, each consisting of two brigades, and a separate (Indian) brigade. In its turn, each brigade was composed of 5 or 6 battalions. Each battalion contained six companies of fuseliers and two of light infantry. Two of these divisions (the 2nd and the 3rd) each had two batteries of artillery, one of horse artillery and one of foot artillery. Each of these units possessed six 6-pounders and two 5 ½ inch howizers. The 1st division of infantry and the Indian brigade each had one battery of foot artillery.

The cavalry was established according to the British model: an absence of lancers, but the presence of hussars, light dragoons and carabineers. The division of this arm was organised in three brigades, while each brigade was composed of two or three regiments. A regiment formally comprised four squadrons, each sub-divided into two companies and four platoons (or half companies). The cavalry division was not attached to any army corps, nor division. They were part of the reserve cavalry corps at the exclusive disposition of lord Uxbridge.

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This chapter is for the most part based upon the following publications:

Löben Sels, E. van – Bijdragen etc. p.350-401
Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 etc. Vol.I p.95-241
Vels Heijn, N. Glorie zonder helden p.66-68
Adkin, M. The Waterloo companion p.183
Navez, L. - Les Belges à Waterloo
Logie, J. Waterloo, l’évitable défaite p.23


Detailed accounts about the formation of the cavalry and artillery of the army of the Netherlands can be found in the publications of Dellevoet and Uythoven respectively. Cf. Dellevoet, A. – The Dutch / Belgian cavalry at Waterloo
Uythoven, G. van – “Netherlands artillery in the Waterloo campaign. Part I. The creation of an artillery arm.” In: First empire (2003), nr.71 p.4-11
Uythoven, G. van - “Netherlands artillery in the Waterloo campaign. Part II. The Netherlands artillery-officers.” In: First empire (2003), nr.72 p.28-35,38-39
Uythoven, G. van - “Netherlands artillery in the Waterloo campaign. Part III. The Netherlands artillery batteries in the Waterloo campaign.” In: First empire (2003), nr.73 p.31-38

The confusing element here is that Wellington himself uses several designations, such as the troops of the Netherlands, or the Dutch army, even after the union of both terrritories. The prince of Orange, for instance in June 1815, mentions the army of the Netherlands. By using the designation “Dutch / Belgian” it would mean that for instance king Willem would have been the “Dutch / Belgian king” – in my mind a most unlogical description.

The memorandum is in French which is rather odd in this argumentation. Yet, my reasoning for the fact that it might be from Colborne after all is the strong similarity to his report as he wrote it to lord Bunbury on the 21st of March. The fact that it was written by a British and not by for instance a Prussian, is the strong importance which is attached to the possession of Antwerp.

De Bas erroneously dates the document on the 30th of May. In: La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.257-258

On the 6th of April, major Dumoulin wrote to Gneisenau: “Der Geist bei den holländischen Truppen ist ziemlich gut, auf den belgischen Truppen darf man sich aber gar nicht verlassen.”
These qualifications were uncritically forwarded by Gneisenau to his king in writing on the 14th of April: “[..] Der Herzog von Wellington ist sehr dankbar für die Bewegung, die Euer K.M. hiesige Armee zum Schutz der englisch-belgischen gemacht hat. Diese ist übel zusammengestellt; die holländische Truppen noch neu, die belgischen höchst verdächtig. Es ist nun durch den Herzog eine neue Eintheilung dieser Armee in 4 Divisionen und zwei Armeekorps, befehligt durch den Erbprinzen von Oranien und den General Hill, durchgesetzt worden, wobei die belgischen Truppen auf eine solche Art eingetheilt sollen, dass ihre verdächtige Treue nicht schädlich wirken kann.”

9 Cf. his report of the 19th of March to the Prussian king. In: Pflugk Harttung, J. von Das Preussische Heer und die Norddeutschen Bundestruppen unter General Von Kleist p.4
From here on, this title will be referred to as “Bundestruppen”

10 Colenbrander, H.T. Gedenkstukken etc. Vol.VII p.317

11 HL, nr. 1.454 WSD Vol.X p.15-17

12 WSD, Vol.X p.167-168