The last Anglo-Netherlands-German reinforcements and the Anglo-Netherlands-German advance.

It was after 7 p.m., shortly after the charge of the cuirassiers, that the last Brunswick units arrived at Quatre Bras. They were the 1st and 3rd battalion of light infantry, plus the complete artillery of the corps, in total about 1800 men. Both battalions supported the Brunswick line-battalions which were at Quatre Bras, while both batteries took up positions in rear of the Namur-road, on a short distance to the left of Quatre Bras. At the same moment, the section of Bijleveld’s battery, led by 2nd lieutenant Koopman, still in position between the Namur and the Brussels road (facing west) and having nothing to do there, now linked up with the Brunswick artillery and joined it to Quatre Bras. There, however, Koopman met captain Bijleveld who instructed him to join him in rear of the farm of Quatre Bras.

Right at the time of the charge of Guiton, Lloyd’s battery was united west of Quatre Bras and as soon as the cuirassers fell back, the battery must have advanced over the Brussels road to a position about 600 meters south of the crossroads, and 400 meters east of the Bois de Bossu. The situation was that the Brunswickers, near the edge of the wood, were seriously suffering from French guns which must have been firing at them from close range and which had their positions very near the skirt of the wood, a bit further south. Colonel Kelly ordered captain Lloyd to take up position and this the battery did under heavy fire and before it unlimbered some three or four horses of each gun and waggon were killed, some wheels disabled and gunners killed. However, Lloyd succeeded in silencing the French guns and even obliged a mass of French infantry which must have been moving out from the wood to return there very soon after. Being without any support (except for a few Brunswick uhlans), however, captain Lloyd ordered to limber up and return to Quatre Bras.

It must have been by 7 p.m. as well that lieutenant Von Wussow, from Prussian headquarters, dropped in at the crossroads. He was sent around 6 p.m. by Gneisenau to Wellington to inform him about the situation of the Prussian army at Ligny and to enquire about Wellington’s situation as well. After Von Wussow had reported to Von Müffling first, he then told Wellington: “Zur Zeit meines Abreitens vom Schlachtfelde waren sämtliche Dörfer der von uns besetzten Stellung hinter dem Lignebach, von Sombreffe über Ligny, St. Amand la Haye und Wagnelée, trotz der unausgestezten Angriffe der Franzosen und des wechselnden Verlierens und Wiedergewinnens, von uns behauptet worden. Indessen stelle es sich je länger je mehr heraus, dass die Verluste sehr wüchsten, und da die Aussicht auf eine Unterstützung durch das Korps Bülow’s gänzlich geschwunden sei, so werde es höchstens möglich sein, das Schlachtfeld bis zum Eintritt der Nacht zu behaupten: ein grösserer Erfolg stehe nicht zu erwarten.”

Von Wussow also would have expressed the following request on behalf of the Prussian staff: “Vielleicht könne die kräftige Offensive der Engländer den Kaiser Napoleon verhindern, seine Streitkräfte nachhaltig gehen die preussische Armee zu verwenden.” After that, Wellington would have asked Von Wussow to inform Gneisenau “dass es ihm bis jetzt zwar sehr schwer geworden sei, dem heftigen Angriff der überlegenen Franzosen Widerstand zu leisten, dass er aber mit der jetzt eingetroffenen Verstärkung – er glaube circa 20.000 Mann zur Stelle zu haben – doch eine kräftige Offensive zu Gunsten der preussischen Armee versuchen werde.”
By 7 p.m., Cooke’s division arrived over the Nivelles-road. The battery of Kühlmann had preceded the division. With the arrival of this division, Wellington now had (excluding casualties) about 34,500 men and 70 guns. The division halted for a short time at Hautain-le-Val to have the strugglers catch up. On the way to Quatre Bras, the men were instructed to prepare 10 rounds, to check their flintlocks and to fix bayonets. At the same time, as they approached the field of action, they encountered numerous wounded. One of them was major Jessop, member of the staff of De Lancey, who claimed help was urgently needed.

As the division reached the western edge of the Bois de Bossu, the prince of Orange was there to receive them. He had the men halt and sent both light companies of the 1st brigade, led by Lord Saltoun, into the wood. At that time the French had not taken the wood completely (see below). The 2nd battalion followed both companies, with two companies at a time. Further to the rear of the 2nd battalion, the 3d battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards followed, but this battalion took a direction more through the extreme east part of the wood and along its edge here.

While Maitland’s brigade advanced through the wood, it was Byng’s brigade which was kept as a reserve in a position immediately north of it, along the Nivelles-road. It were just the two light companies of this brigade which advanced to turn the wood near Quatre Bras while bringing forward their left shoulders and then to advance through the fields between the wood and the Brussels road.

The Foot Guards succeeded in driving back the French through the wood, up to its southern edge, in an hour, though they suffered high casualties by the fact that units got scattered in the thickness of the (under) wood and that men by mistake shot at each other. Additionally, the French musketry- and artillery fire must have taken its toll, either by direct fire or by branches falling down. Within a short time, Maitland’s brigade would have suffered a high loss.

As a result, the Foot Guards were forced to fall back to the low ground of the stream of Gémioncourt which runs through the wood to restore order. Very soon after, however, the battalion was ordered to extend to the left of the wood and form a line; at the same time, the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards joined in to do the same.

As the men emerged from the wood, they did form a line towards the Brussels road, although it must have been a somewhat irregular one as all order had been lost in passing through the wood. Also some other (foreign) units coming from the wood which had been engaged before must have joined in. At least Brunswickers did so, coming from the edge of the wood to take up a position on the left flank of the line; they may have been both the 2nd battalion of the line and the Leib-battalion, or one of them. The light companies of the 2nd brigade of Byng formed up to the right rear of them.

Further to their rear in the field must have been the 30th and the 73rd regiment of the brigade of major general Halkett. The 33rd was then still in the edge of the wood. Soon after the arrival of the Foot Guards, however, the 33rd must have pulled to the rear through the wood to a position on the Namur-road immediately north of it.

The 92nd, which was then in the elbow and on the edge of the wood, now went to the rear as soon as the Foot Guards arrived. It pulled back through the wood to a position immediately north of Quatre Bras.

As soon as the line had been formed it advanced over a short distance, but was soon faced with a strong fire of French infantry and stranded. Additionally, French cavalry (probably those of Piré) was hovering around to take its chance to charge in the right moment. And soon after it did on the Anglo-Netherlands-German left flank, thereby trying to roll up the
line from there. It worked for the 2nd and 3rd battalion of 1st Foot Guards as they got into a temporary confusion and retired back into the edge of the wood, where they took up a position in and in rear of the hollow roads which lines it. This left the Brunswickers – still manoevring to the left of the line- facing the cavalry, but they succeeded in forming square in time and repelled the French successfly. 29

Meanwhile, Byng’s brigade – covered by its light companies- had advanced in line through the Bois de Bossu from its position north of it. After it had emerged, it advanced while bringing its left shoulders foward in order to drive back the French infantry, but as these were already in full retreat, the Guards were ordered to return to their former position. 30 The light companies however, continued their advance along the road, along the farm of Gémioncourt and probably took a course a bit further to their right. In this situation, while being in pursuit, they also formed square as French cavalry was constantly menacing them, but without actually charging. Meanwhile, it must have been bombarded by French gunfire, but not with too much of a loss as the officers had the men try to avoid the fire as much as possible. 31 The Foot Guards of the 1st regiment, now in position along the wood, held back the French horsemen with a destructive fire. 32 At the same time, the 30th regiment must have been charged, though slightly, by the cavalry of Piré. 33

All the French cavalry actions to the west of the Brussels road were intended to cover the slow retreat of the French infantry on the French left wing and in the centre. 34 One of Foy’s divisions was used in the centre to cover the French retreat. 35 This cavalry probably was from Piré, which must have been drawn there from the centre and right wing -where it had been menacing Picton’s battalions for some time- around 8 p.m. 36 In this centre, at least the 30th regiment was ordered to retake the farm of Gémioncourt. 37 Eventually, the farm fell to two companies of this regiment, both led by major Chambers. Initially they were able to run into the courtyard of the farm but there they got under a hail of musketry fire. Having recoiled, the men turned the buildings, reached the orchard and then tried to penetrate into the buildings from there, which they did by battering open the door and aiming the muskets into the windows. Shortly after the French evacuated the farm. Howard got the instruction to hold the farm at all costs, even though the action was drawing to and end. 38 The situation of the 73rd at this moment is not entirely clear, but it can be assumed that it was still around its former position. By now, the 33rd and the 69th regiment advanced through the Bois de Bossu or east of it to follow the general advance and so they finally joined the remaining battalions of their brigade. 39

The French retreat was also covered by the French artillery. It was against this artillery that three guns of the battery of Von Kühlmann had now advanced over the Brussels road, while duelling with the French until it got dark. 40

Of the 5th British division, right after the charge of the cuirassiers, both the 42nd and 44th regiment were very much exposed and had spent most of their ammunition. For that reason they were taken back in rear of the farm of Quatre Bras, where they lay down. 41 The other regiments of the division, however, must have been kept more or less stationary in their positions in front of the Namur road, until the close of the action., though data for the 28th are lacking. 42

On the extreme left flank, the units of Kielmansegge and the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment had gained Piraumont and its surroundings and from that time on they must have been able to keep their positions until it grew dark and bivouacs were established. Later that evening, the
Riflemen left their positions here and pulled further to the centre to the other battalions of the 5th division. ⁴³

By now it was almost 9 p.m. and although the rattle of musketry of the skirmishing still could be heard here and there, the action was running to an end. ⁴⁴
By then Wellington had his front-line stretching out from the southern edge of the Bois de Bossu, along the farm of Gémioncourt and as far as the hamlet of Piraumont; the line was covered with outposts in front. ⁴⁵
Ney had pulled back his troops on the heights in front of Frasnes. ⁴⁶ By the time the action came to an end, around 9 p.m., the units of the 1st corps (three divisions of infantry plus a regiment of cavalry) were arriving on the field of action and they relieved those of the 2nd corps in the first line. ⁴⁷
Though the French outposts were near the Anglo-Netherlands-German ones, the night passed quietly, until some before daybreak, when a skirmishing fire started. ⁴⁸

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1. In case these troops left Laeken at 11 a.m. they cannot possibly have been at Quatre Bras before 7 p.m. The total distance is about 37 kilometers.

In this group was surgeon Drude of the 1st light battalion of infantry. According to Drude the battalion marched through Waterloo at 4 p.m. and underway he met a lot of stragglers and wounded, some of whom he treated. That night, he treated a lot of Brunswickers too (mainly of the 2nd line battalion and the advance guard battalion) in the vicinity of Quatre Bras. Later that night, while looking for his unit, he fell in the hands of patroles of Piré.

He thinks the Brunswickers were at Waterloo at 4 p.m. Then they would have covered 20 kilometers in 5 hours time; the remaining 17 kilometers to Quatre Bras would then have been covered in about three and a half hours time.


Ensign Lindwurm (2nd battalion of the line), however, claims that the Brunswick artillery reached the field before the cuirassiers attacked his battalion without success. Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, nr.249 AN 190

For 7 p.m. also see:

Charras, la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.208
Houssaye believes it was between 6 and 7 p.m. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.217
Siborne states it was 6.30 p.m. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.152

2. Wachholtz, F. von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.32
Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55
Surgeon Schütte (battery Heinemann). In: VPH-LBA, nr.95 Schütte, however, is quite erroneous about the times in his account. In general he is about two hours too early. Initially, Schütte was with his battery, but soon he was instructed by major Mahn to install himself in one of the houses of Quatre Bras. Schütte returned to his battery in the evening.

3. Surgeon Schütte (battery Heinemann). In: VPH-LBA, nr.95
Wachholtz, F. von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.32-33
Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

4 2nd lieutenant Koopman. In: VLS, nr.II.4.9

5 Captain Rudyard (Lloyd’s battery). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.473-478
Rudyard shows in his sketch two batteries, each of four guns, which is actually similar to one French battery. He also shows them too much in the skirt of the wood, a highly improbable position for guns. Additionally, I believe these guns must have been a bit further south as he shows them in relation to the position of the 33rd and the 92nd which battalions must have had to do with these guns (see above). Also the French column of infantry could not have advanced from where he shows, being too far north in relation to the Anglo-Netherlands-German position. On top of that, the 400-500 yards he mentions for his battery puts it far more towards the Brussels road as he shows as well.

Lieutenant Wells (Lloyd’s battery). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.259-261
Both guns which were left on the field were recuperated and remounted during the night of
the 16th or possibly on the early morning of the 17th of June. Cf. Sir A. Frazer. In his letters
dated 17th and 18th of June 1815. In: Letters etc. p.540, 545

The two major Brunswick accounts about the action of Quatre Bras (and which are very
similar), those of von Wachholtz and of colonel von Herzberg, both state that this support of
these guns took place much earlier, towards 5 p.m.
However, at that time and under those circumstances as described (about one hour after the
advance of the Brunswick units into the frontline), there was simply no artillery available to
accomplish this mission. The only one which could have done so was the one of captain
Lloyd and from the British accounts mentioned above it can clearly be derived that Lloyd
supported the Brunswickers right after the charge of Guiton. The Brunswick accounts for
instance also mention the loss of two guns of the battery involved – another proof that we
have to do with Lloyd.
Cf. Wachholtz, F. von  Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28  Clearly, colonel Von Herzberg
copies most details from him. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

6 Von Wussow himself confirms he left Bussy the moment most of the villages, apart from
Saint Amand and part of Ligny, were in Prussian hands and that he returned to Bussy just
before Ligny fell to the French.
This, in combination with the fact that he reached Quatre Bras the moment Wellington
received more reinforcements (which was the 1st division of Cooke), makes me conclude he
got at Quatre Bras around 7 p.m. (taking it took him about an hour to cover the distance
between Bussy and Quatre Bras, including a detour).
Von Damitz claims Wellington received news from Blücher by 8.30 p.m. that he “die
Hoffnung aussprach die Schlacht halten zu können”. As this is basically the same message as
I have described above, I believe this message was the one carried by Von Wussow.
In: Die Geschichte etc. p.214

Colonel Hervey, assistant quarter master general at Wellington’s staff in 1815, translates what
I believe must have been the same message in a more positive way, as: “Just before dark an
officer came from the Prussians to inform the duke that they had retaken Ligny and Saint
Amand, from which they had been driven in the morning, and that everything was going
well.” In: A contemporary letter etc. p.432
Houssaye interprets this time as 8.30 p.m. In: 1815. Waterloo p.259

Bleibtreu believes Wussow reached Wellington by 6.45 p.m. In: England’s grosse Waterloo-
Lüge p.121

7 Account of Von Wussow himself. In: Ollech, Von  Geschichte etc. p.139-140
Von Wussow must have been able to speak French, otherwise he wouldn’t have turned
himself directly towards Wellington.

8 Von Ollech cites this passage after having stated that Von Wussow didn’t know about the
agreement between Gneisenau and Wellington for the last one, if possible, to come to the
Prussian’s direct assistance, and for that reason Von Ollech claims these words express Von
Wussow’s opinion. In: Ollech, Von  Geschichte etc. p.140
Though the account of Von Wussow, unfortunately, is not integrally available, I do not think this last request was Von Wussow’s opinion. Cf. my observations in the evaluation of the cooperation between Blücher and Wellington on the 15th and 16th of June.

9 Account of lieutenant Von Wussow. In: Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.140

10. Account of lieutenant Von Wussow. In: Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.139-140

As with other reinforcements, the times of arrival differ amongst eye-witnesses and historians.

Captain Von Kühlmann (battery Kühlmann) states it was 4 p.m. that his division arrived. In: VPH-LBA, nr.14

Also see: MacKinnon. The origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

Others claim it was 5 p.m. Cf. Captain Powell (1st regiment Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Lord Fitzroy Somerset. In: NAM, nr.6507-1

Siborne believes it was around 6.30 p.m. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.152

Ensign Short (2nd battalion Coldstream Guards) believes it was at 7.30 p.m. In a letter dated 19th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.7702-5

Gomm believes it was 6 p.m. In: Gomm, W.M. Letters and journals etc. p.354

For this same hour, see private S.Green (3rd battalion / 1st Foot Guards) in a letter to his brother, dated 12th July 1815. In: Chambers, B.J. - The men of the 1st Foot Guards at Waterloo and beyond Vol.I p.351

The same hour is confirmed by ensign Wedgwood (3rd Foot Guards) in a letter dated 19th June 1815 to his mother. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regiment Headquarters Scots Guards.

11. Lieutenant colonel May claims the other divisional battery (Sandham’s) was at Quatre Bras. I have no further proof for that; at least, there is no information available about the way it would have been involved in the action. Cf. his letter dated 5th april 1816 to captain Whinyates. In: RAI, MD1438

His presence is also confirmed by colonel Sir G.Wood in a letter to the master-general of the ordnance dated 24th June 1815. In: Duncan, F. History of the royal regiment of artillery Vol.II p.421

12. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148


According to ensign Standen and Lord Saltoun most Dutch and Belgian troops they saw retreating were doing so over the Brussels road and not the Namur-road. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-335

Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) tells us there were also a lot of British wounded. Cf. letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection

14. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

16. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148
Ensign Standen (2ns battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334
Lord Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

17. Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-335
In this last letter Standen cites Lord Saltoun saying that at that moment there were no more Dutch or Belgian troops in the wood, but about 50 French.
According to ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) the whole wood was in French hands. Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection p.3-4
Another anonymous officer of the Foot Guards claims the French were already coming out from the wood. Cf. account in: The battle of Waterloo, or a faithful and interesting history etc. p.95

18. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148


Ensign Short (Coldstream Guards) in his letter dated 19th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.7702-5
Captain Mackinnon. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211
Account of an anonymous officer in the Foot Guards. In: The battle of Waterloo, or a faithful and interesting history etc. p.95
Houssaye incorrectly says both brigades entered the wood. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.217

Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-334
Also in a letter to his mother, dated 27th June 1815. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.
Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148
Captain Mackinnon. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

He claims the division lost 30 officers and 500 men.
Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148
Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327
Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection p.4
He confirms the Foot Guards had a tremendous loss.

Major Van Gorkum, of the Dutch staff of the general quartermaster, joined in with the advance of the Foot Guards; he claims that the French had taken a part of the wood but fell back without offering any serious resistance; no shot was fired by the British. In: Mijne staat en militaire herinneringen etc. In: Family archive van Gorkum.
23. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704.39
Here, Houssaye gives a complete false representation of the situation, depicting the Foot Guards as trying to take the farm of Grand Pierrepont and then being charged by Piré and being bombarded. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p. 218

24. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704.39

25. Captain Powell (1st regiment of Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p. 143-148
Lord Saltoun. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p. 431-434
Colonel Von Herzberg (of the Brunswick general staff). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p. 23-55
Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p. 324-327
According to captain Mackinnon there were detachments from the battalion companies of the 3rd Guards led by lieutenant colonel Home to the right of the light companies of the 2nd brigade, led by lieutenant colonel Macdonnell. Lieutenant colonel Mackinnon went in support with 4 companies of the Coldstream Guards. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol. II p. 211

26. Captain Saltoun (1st regiment of Foot Guards) describes the situation as he left the Bois de Bossu and went in an eastern direction, initially; in this he refers to the low ground of the stream of Gémioncourt on his right and the 33rd about 135 meters to his left and about 70 meters in his rear, behind a hedge – this position must have been in the edge of the wood. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.118
Ensign Standen (light company 2nd battalion, 3rd Foot Guards) claims Halkett was on the right of his men and to the left of the 1st Foot Guards. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.708 p. 269-271
Siborne says the brigade of Colin Halkett, after the charge of the cuirassiers, had gone back into the north-east part of the Bois de Bossu (and that it advanced later, with the units of Maitland), but we have no supporting evidence for this. In: History of the war etc. Vol. I p. 147

27. Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd). In: Personal recollections p. 9
Private Hemingway (33rd). In a letter to his father dated 16th August 1815. In: Waley, D. A new account of Waterloo etc.
Ensign Ch. Lake (3rd Foot Guards), in his journal. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.
Hope Pattison claims his battalion met the Foot Guards when they entered the wood, but I cling to the account of captain Saltoun (see above).

28. Sergeant Robertson (92nd regiment). In: The journal of sergeant D. Robertson p. 149
Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p. 252-256
Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706 p. 242-247
Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment). In: Letters from Portugal etc. p. 236

29. Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p. 143-148
Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p. 324-327
Two Brunswick eye-witnesses do not mention a cavalry charge on both battalions, but merely mention their advance by the bayonet. Cf. Wachholtz, F. von Geschichte des herzoglich etc.
Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55
Siborne believes it was the Guard-battalion. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.156


31 Private Clay (light company, 2nd battalion /3rd Foot Guards). In his recollections etc. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

32 Captain Powell (1st regiment of Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704.39

33 Ensign Macready, E. In his diary. Cited in: History of the 30th regiment p.322
Also in: United Service Magazine, 1845 I p.390

34 Ensign Macready expresses his admiration for the way French skirmishers and columns kept their distances and formation while retreating. Cf. his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.322

35 Lemonnier-Delafosse. Souvenirs militaires p.207

36 However, lieutenant Henckens doesn’t enter into any detail about any actions of his division after about 7 p.m. in his memoirs. Cf. Mémoires p.229

37. Wellington would have considered to take the farm the same day or the next morning; Von Müffling would have convinced him to do it right away. Cf. Von Müffling, The memoirs of etc. p.239
According to an anonymous informant of lieutenant Gawler the brigade of Colin Halkett advanced to the farm in columns at quarter distance. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.389-399

38. Ensign E. Macready. In his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.322-323 and in BL, Add.ms.34.708.83
And in: On a part of etc. In: United Service Magazine 1845 I p.391.
Macready was there and tells he saw about a hundred French wounded in the farm.

39 Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections etc. p.9
Private Hemingway confirms his battalion had to cover a long distance before it halted: he mentions a mile and a half, but it must have been about 1500 meters.
Hope Pattison gives the impression that the whole brigade was reorganized north of the Bois de Bossu after the charge of the cuirassiers, preparatory to its advance, but we believe the battalions involved only have been, at least, the 33rd and the 69th. As the 30th took Gémioncourt some time later (having been so near to the Brussels road), it can be assumed that this battalion did not fall back at all after the charge of the cuirassiers. The same probably applies to the 73rd as there is no mention of this.

40. The section of two guns which had been at Quatre Bras plus a gun from the other four further
Another source claims the whole battery advanced. Cf. Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4

41 Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington’s men p.295
Captain Campbell (42nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.451-454
Lieutenant Riddock (44th) doesn’t mention any retreat. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

42 Captain Macdonald (1st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6
Major Calvert (32nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258
An anonymous officer of the 32nd claims that at least his battalion was taken back to the Namur-road by 6.30 p.m., to be relieved by Pack’s brigade, until the battalion was called up again at 9 pm. to assist the 28th. Cf. account of an anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. Historical records of the 32nd etc. p.116
Sir Wm.Gomm claims units of Alten’s division relieved several regiments of the 5th division, whose ammunition was totally exhausted and which now fell back to the Namur-road. However, these units were those of Best (Verden and Lüneburg) and those didn’t actually relieve them but had taken up positions to their right and right rear. Cf. Sir Wm.Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.179-184 and 34.705 p.144-145
In: Letters and journals etc. p.354
In his accounts Gomm mixes up the Hannoverian units of Best and Von Vincke, and here he mixes up Best with the one of Kielmansegge.

43 Lieutenant Kincaid (1st/95th regiment). In: Adventures etc. p.321
Caldwell, G. and R.Cooper. Rifle green etc. p.41
Captain Leach (1st/95th regiment). In: Rough sketches etc.p.377
The Lüneburg battalion spent the night at Piraumont. Cf. Lüneburg journal. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in NHA, Hann.48A I, nr.368
Houssaye gives the impression that the complete brigade of Kempt gained Piraumont, but this is not correct. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.217


Captain F.von Jeckeln (2nd battalion Orange-Nassau). In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: HSD, nr.1041 nr.1

Major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nr.8
Major Forbes (79th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.314
The official Brunswick report. In: VPH-LBA, nr.1
Assistant surgeon D.Finlayson (33rd regiment) in his letter to Mr.Somerville, dated 25th June 1815. In: NLS, MS 9236 p.46

Lieutenant McKenzie (42nd regiment) claims the action ended by 10 p.m. Inb: BWRA, nr.414

45 For the Anglo-Netherlands-German extreme left wing this is confirmed by Lieutenant Pensman Gairdner (95th regiment). In: NAM, nr.6902-5
Colonel Trefcon. In: Mémoires etc. p.184
Captain Von Scriba (battalion Bremen) confirms the French outposts were just on the other side of the low ground of the stream of Piraumont, on the north of the Bois Delhütte. In:
The French then may have been in the farm of Lairalle that night. The outposts in front of the Bois de Bossu were formed by the light companies of the 3rd regiment of Foot Guards. Cf. Ensign Standen. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327

Houssaye believes the French were in the farm of Grand Pierrepont and this is very well possible. In: 1815.Waterloo p.218

46 Chef de batallion Puvis of the 93rd regiment of the line situates the bivouac of his regiment near a large village where also the ambulances were. This village must have been Frasnes. In: Souvenirs p.116

47. Reille. Notice historique etc. In: Duc d'Elchingen. Documents inédits p.60
Ney in his letter to Fouché, 23rd June 1815. In: LMB, nr.AS1301
Drouet d’Érlon. Le maréchal Drouet, comte d’Erlon etc. p.96

According to brigade-general Schmitz (division Donzelot) the battery of his division must have had a small share in the action; if it had, it must have been firing to cover the French retreat. This is confirmed by gunner Veillard of the 10th company 6th regiment of artillery (division Donzelot).
In: Brouwet, E. Mémoires et documents etc. In: Revue des études Napoleoniennes.1932
Un canonnier de Napoleon. Mémoires de Jean-Baptiste Veillard 1807-1815. In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1957), nr.46 p.370

48. See chapter about 17th of June.