

## **The situation on the Prussian right wing.**

While Wagnelée was in Prussian hands, St.Amand-la-Haye was at least for a part kept by Von Krafft and possibly units of Pirch II. General Zieten decided to take the offensive with this brigade, as well as Tippelskirchs, which was in position just in rear of Wagnelée.

Von Tippelskirch formed his brigade in two columns. The first one was led by major Von Witzleben (commander of the 3rd battalion 25th regiment) and was composed of the 3rd battalion 25th regiment and the 3rd battalion of the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1). It was directed towards St.Amand-le-Hameau.

The second column was composed of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1), the 3rd battalion of the 5th regiment Westphalian Landwehr and the remainder of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 25th regiment. They advanced in a southward direction, passing to the right of St.Amand-la-Haye.

The 6p. foot battery no.10 (in front of Wagnelée) and the 6p. footbattery no.37 (near St.Amand-la-Haye) supported the attack with their fire. <sup>1</sup>

Inspired by this action, Von Krafft retook the offensive at St.Amand-la-Haye. It must have been about 6 p.m. <sup>2</sup> As the fusilier battalions of the 9th and 26th regiment had just evacuated the village, they were now joined by the 5th, 7th and 8th company of the 2nd battalion of the 26th regiment. Now they attacked St.Amand la Haye again. The French had not succeeded in taking the most eastward edge of the village and now they fell back towards their positions on the central street; it was here that the fighting reached a bloody climax. Major Von Ciesielski of the 2nd battalion 26th regiment succeeded with a part of the 7th company to penetrate as far as the extreme southwest side of the village, but he fell. The French, using the moment of hesitation, however, were immediately repelled by a platoon of the 9th company of the 2nd battalion led by lieutenant Weigelt and by the 5th company led by 2nd lieutenant Von Seydlitz II, which was held back so far. <sup>3</sup>

It may have been at this stage of the fighting here that the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian nr.1) was taken back in rear of the village, though its 2nd battalion must have yet done another attempt as well to retake it. While driving back French skirmishers from the hedges and taking some houses, it had to detach men to the left and right by which the battalion got very much elongated and by the combination of a lack of ammunition supply it had not the strength to resist the French pressure. <sup>4</sup>

Major Von Helmenstreit, commander of the 1st battalion of the 25th regiment of infantry (Tippelskirch) did not want to wait for the return of his units after their first attack and decided to move along in this second attack right away; as a result he did not take the trouble to make a full rally of his battalion. <sup>5</sup>

While they were covered to the right by the hussars of the 11th regiment, the fusiliers of the 3rd battalion of the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1) (brigade Von Tippelskirch), led by Blücher himself, retook St.Amand-le-Hameau by storm. <sup>6</sup> The fusiliers established themselves in the hamlet, while having skirmishers led by captain Von Goszicki on their right. <sup>7</sup>

As major Von Witzleben, commander of the fusilier battalion of the 25th regiment received

orders for this second attack, he immediately led his battalion, plus the one of the 2nd regiment of infantry nr.1 successfully against Saint-Amand-le-Hameau. After its occupation, Von Witzleben immediately ordered the occupation of the edge of the hamlet by four platoons of Schützen in such a way that two of them came to the right and the other two to the left of the road which led from l'Alouette to Brye.<sup>8</sup>

In the meantime, the 1st battalion of the 25th regiment had advanced between the fusilier battalion which was in action at Saint-Amand-le-Hameau and the 2nd battalion to a position covering the foot battery nr.10 (to the extreme left front of Wagnelée). From there, its commander, captain Von Machnitzky, saw that more French were threatening to pour into the hamlet, just at the time the 2nd battalion started its storm attack upon the plateau between Wagnelée and the hamlet. Von Machnitzky led his battalion up to 100 paces from the French battalion and a strong mutual fire was the result. In doing so, it succeeded in diverting the French away from the hamlet. Having its mission accomplished, the battalion then moved back towards Wagnelée and here it replenished its ammunition. It was also here, at the edge of the village, that it attached itself to the detachment of Jäger led by lieutenant Luckow. By that time, the village was still shelled by the French.<sup>9</sup>

In general, the troops of Von Tippelskirch's brigade were able to penetrate into the French position of Girard, despite a French counter-attack, as they were secured on their right flank by cavalry and to the left by Von Krafft and Pirch II.<sup>10</sup> French chasseurs à cheval must have charged the Prussians of the 2nd regiment but this charge failed, the more as they were pushed back by cavalry.

The result was that after the action, both the plateau between Wagnelée and Saint-Amand-le-Hameau and this last hamlet itself were firmly in Prussian hands.

At the same time, the Prussian artillery was reinforced by the horse battery no.6 (Von Jürgass). It took up a position to the left of the battery nr.10 and opened fire.<sup>11</sup>

Of the division of Von Wahlen Jürgass, both the 11th hussars as well as the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlans were suffering from the french artillery. At that moment colonel Von Thümen was killed by a cannonball and lieutenant-colonel Von Schmiedeberg (commander of the 2nd regiment Silesian uhlans) succeeded to his command.<sup>12</sup>

Having been instructed to do so by general Jürgass, the cavalry of Von der Marwitz (nine squadrons) took up a position in two lines between Wagnelée and the Roman road.<sup>13</sup> It was here that Von der Marwitz was faced by some french artillery and cavalry, which didn't seem to be very threatening. On one occasion, however, some french dragoons attacked, but were repulsed by 2 companies of the 7th and 8th regiment of uhlans.<sup>14</sup>

The instruction for Von der Marwitz was to hold the area and not to charge in his own. Though the French cavalry was superior in numbers, Von der Marwitz was able to fulfill his task because of the favourable ground and position. Apart from that, Von der Marwitz had deployed a strong line of flankers led by captain Von Behr.<sup>15</sup>

It was also from his position that Von der Marwitz sent patrols towards Mellet, where they only found some scattered and isolated French.<sup>16</sup>

Being instructed to do so by Jürgass, Von der Marwitz sent out some reconnaissances towards

the corps which appeared further to the west. One of these patrols, consisting of six uhlans and led by sergeant Rosenburg, of the 2nd squadron of the 8th uhlans brought in a French staff officer and his batman stating that the 1st French corps was approaching.<sup>17</sup>

At the same time the cavalry of this corps, of Jaquinot, now appeared between Mellet and Villers Perwin. Now, Von der Marwitz, meanwhile being reinforced by two squadrons of the 1st regiment Pommeranian hussars nr.5, changed his front, deployed his squadrons with large intervals in two lines and started to go back slowly towards the Namur-road as the French cavalry and horse artillery advanced. During these manoeuvres, some skirmishing took place. Here, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd regiment of Elbe Landwehr infantry moved up to Von der Marwitz' support; the 3rd battalion of the 22nd regiment did the same (see below).<sup>18</sup>

Apart from Von der Marwitz, colonel count Von Nostitz must have been sent out by Prussian central headquarters towards the French column with a detachment of one officer and 20 men of the 11th regiment of hussars. As soon as Von Nostitz was able to determine the strength and direction of the column, he returned to Blücher leaving back the detachment with orders to observe the enemy column and to send in regular information about it to the general headquarters.<sup>19</sup>

The Prussian success so far had not only been caused by the measures taken at Prussian side, but also by the panic which spread through the French left wing, after the appearance of the corps of d'Erlon.

By now, the division Girard had evacuated St.Amand-le-Hameau, while at least parts of the one of Lefol must have been panicking.<sup>20</sup>

By 6 p.m. the situation was that at Ligny the struggle was still hanging in a stale-mate, especially in the centre. From Saint Amand, being in French hands, the enemy couldn't emerge because of the strong Prussian presence immediately behind it, while Saint-Amand-la-Haye was for the most part in Prussian hands, as was Wagnelée.

It must for the Prussian general staff have been a moment of an evaluation of the situation. Looking back to the results of the actions so far, the losses suffered and the absence of reinforcements of Von Bülow and Wellington, the expectation was no longer that a victory could be gained that day, but that yet the army would be able to hold the battlefield until the next day, the moment the expected reinforcements would drop in, at least from Von Bülow directly and probably of Wellington indirectly.

In what way remains unclear, but it must have been at some point of time late in the afternoon that Blücher was informed about the French attack upon Wellington's forces at Quatre Bras and that he was not able to send in any reinforcements along the Namur-road towards the Prussian army.<sup>21</sup>

After this evaluation, lieutenant Von Wussow was sent by Von Gneisenau to the duke of Wellington at Quatre Bras to inform him of the situation of the Prussian army and probably to inquire about his situation at Quatre Bras.

In riding from Bussy to Quatre Bras, von Wussow evidently used the Namur-road, where the 2nd regiment of Silesian hussars had a chain of posts towards Wellington's forces. Warned by the commander of the post which stood in the vicinity of the Bois Delhütte about the enemy's presence further down along the road, Von Wussow decided to make a detour to the right

towards Thyle. In doing this, he succeeded in penetrating to Quatre Bras itself, where he found Wellington and Von Müffling.<sup>22</sup>

The time had come for Vandamme to send the Young Guard, sent as a reinforcement, into battle. It must have been towards 7 p.m.

Some time before the division of Delort was ordered to advance towards Ligny, there must have been an order of Napoleon to general Milhaud to send his division of Wathier and its artillery to the left wing to rally a division of infantry, which apparently must have been in some kind of trouble.<sup>23</sup>

By now, the Young Guard advanced in a *pas de charge* through the area in front of St.Amand-la-Haye, passed the division of Habert and vigorously pushed back the Prussian troops of Von Tippelskirch back into St.Amand-le-Hameau and Wagnelée.<sup>24</sup>

During the same action St.Amand-le-Hameau now fell in the hands of the Young Guard.<sup>25</sup> The only thing the cavalry of Von Jürgass could do was to cover the Prussian retreat as they themselves were paralyzed by the presence of the cavalry of Domon and Colbert. Still, the skirmishers of the right wing of the fusilier battalion of the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1) must have been threatened by Domon or Colbert; they, in their turn, however were held back by the officers of the 12th company, like lieutenant Von Priesdorf and nco Floegel.<sup>26</sup>

Wagnelée was now threatened, but the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1) still held out.

The units of the division Girard and the 3rd corps were inspired by the success and now were thrown again into action.<sup>27</sup>

Also at St.Amand-la-Haye the Prussians held out, the more as they had been supported by the last reserves of the 6th brigade, the 6th company of the 2nd battalion and the complete 1st battalion of the 26th regiment.<sup>28</sup> Blücher decided to support them with two battalions (the 1st and the 2nd) of the 14th regiment, in position near Brye and placed there by Von Brause.

The moment Von Brause did so, he also sent forward his 3rd battalion of the 14th regiment, the 3rd battalion of the 22nd regiment and the 1st battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehrregiment. The remaining four battalions of the brigade were posted as a reserve in rear of the Namur-road.<sup>29</sup>

As Von Brause approached the frontline he approached the 3rd battalion of the 9th regiment infantry (brigade Von Krafft) which had run out of ammunition. He now replenished their ammunition and sent the battalion, together with the 2nd battalion of the 14th regiment forward. The 1st battalion of the 14th regiment relieved the 2nd regiment of infantry (Pommeranian nr.1) (brigade Von Tippelskirch).<sup>30</sup>

Initially, Von Brause held the fusilier-battalions of the 14th and 22nd regiment and the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment Elbe Landwehr in reserve. Soon after, however, all, except for the 3rd battalion of the 22nd regiment, were involved in the battle.<sup>31</sup>

The battalion covered the horse battery no.5 of the reserve-artillery of the 2nd corps. Initially, this battery was placed in reserve, but now got a position in rear of St.Amand-la-Haye. As the brigade of Von Brause got involved, Von Tippelskirch went back to a position in rear of Wagnelée, where the brigade was being collected. Its losses had been severe: 1858 men and 43 officers (the brigade had about 7000 men).<sup>32</sup>

It was about 7 p.m. and by now Blücher had 30 battalions on his right wing. These were: two battalions of the brigade of Von Steinmetz (3rd battalion 12th regiment, 3rd battalion of the 24th regiment), which both had been between Brye and Sombreffe, having gone back from St.Amand, and which were now in action west of St.Amand-la-Haye.

Then there were eight battalions of the brigade of Pirch II. Though the brigade had just been pulled out from Saint-Amand-la-Haye towards Brye to recollect and to replenish its ammunition, it was now supposed to advance again.<sup>33</sup>

Thirdly, there was the brigade of Von Tippelskirch (nine battalions) which had gone back from its positions at St.Amand le Hameau and west of St.Amand la Haye behind Wagnelée as its had used most of its ammunition.<sup>34</sup> At St.Amand-la-Haye four battalions of the Von Krafft (the 3rd battalion of the 9th regiment and the whole 26th regiment) were now deployed.

Of the brigade of Von Brause four battalions were committed: the 1st battalion of the 14th regiment to St.Amand-le-Hameau and at St.Amand-la-Haye the 2nd and 3rd battalion of the 14th regiment and the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment Elbe Landwehr.

At St.Amand-la-Haye, the 2nd battalion of the 14th regiment had been able to support the units there and to chase some french units out of the village; in doing so they reached the southern edge of the village. In front of them were french masses of infantry. In his boldness, major Von Mirbach now launched a frontal attack with two companies, while two other ones tried to turn the french. However, as the french superiority here was too strong, they had to pull back into the village. Pursued by the french, these started to penetrate into the village again, but soon the situation was restored by the fusilier battalion of the 14th regiment.<sup>35</sup>

Of the fusilier battalion of the 24th regiment, the 11th and 12th company, led by major Von Blücher, were deployed on the right side of Saint Amand-la-Haye where they advanced in line through the fields in front of the village. Here they fired upon the enemy who was barely visible in the corn and the retrun fire was that strong that they suffered high casualties and as they were almost turned on their right flank. As a result, Von Blücher had his men form column and led them towards the right part of Saint Amand where he entered the village, crossed it, and emerged from it on the other side.<sup>36</sup>

Of the brigade of Von Langen Blücher committed the 3rd battalion of the 23rd regiment and the 1st and the 3rd battalion of the 3rd regiment Elbe to the right of St.Amand-la-Haye. The 2nd battalion of the 23rd regiment was held in reserve at Bussy.<sup>37</sup>

On his right wing Blücher also had several units of cavalry at his disposal.

Of the cavalry of the brigade Von Treskow only the 3rd regiment of uhlans was present. The other ones (the 5th regiment Brandenburg Dragoons and the 2nd regiment of dragoons (West-Prussian dragoons no.1) were in rear of Ligny.

Of Lützow's brigade, on the right wing was the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry; the other two regiments (the 6th regiment of uhlans and the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry) were in rear of Ligny as well.

Further, there were four squadrons of the 1st regiment Silesian hussars which were attached to the brigade of Von Steinmetz.

Attached to the brigade Pirch II there were four squadrons of the 1st regiment Westphalian Landwehr cavalry.

There were the nine squadrons under Von der Marwitz (the 7th and 8th regiment of uhlans, plus two squadrons of the 5th regiment of hussars (Pommeranian nr.1).

The brigade of Von Schulenburg numbered ten squadrons (the 4th and 5th regiment Kurmark Landwehrcavalry).

The brigade Von Sohr had six squadrons, four of the 3rd regiment of hussars (Brandenburger no.2) and two of the 5th regiment of hussars (Pommeranian nr.1).<sup>38</sup>

Von Thümen had on the right wing: the regiment Königin Dragoons no.1, the regiment Neumark Dragoons no.6 and the regiment Silesian uhlans no.2 (twelve squadrons).

Attached to the brigade of Von Brause were the 1st and 3rd squadron of Elbe Landwehr cavalry, as well as the 2nd and 4th squadron of the Elbe Landwehrcavalry, attached to the brigade Von Langen.

Finally, also the 11th regiment of hussars was placed on the right wing.

In massing a high number of units on his right wing so as to maintain his front there, Blücher had weakened his centre.

On this right wing, the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 14th regiment took hold of St.Amand-le-Hameau, but they were brought to a halt by some units of the Young Guard which had been left in reserve.<sup>39</sup>

Though the fusilier battalion of the 23rd regiment (brigade of Von Langen) had been placed in reserve in rear of St.Amand-la-Haye, soon after, the commander of the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian infantry nr.1), major Von Stach, requested it to advance and support him. The battalion took its direction upon a lane which led from the extreme right flank of the village towards Fleurus. As the lane was occupied by french infantry, the battalion soon came under their fire and now it extended two platoons of skirmishers which forced the french back. As the fusilier battalion turned towards the village, two battalions of french infantry came up and major Von Haas chased them away from the village by a bayonet charge as far as St.Amand-le-Hameau. In the meantime, two platoons of the battalion, led by lieutenants Reiche and Hattig, penetrated deeper into the lane. In this they got the support of about 200 volunteers and fusiliers of the 25th regiment ((Tippelskirch).<sup>40</sup>

At St.Amand la Haye, colonel Von Reuss had pushed his fusilier-battalions of the 26th and the 9th regiment forward onto the heights bordering the west-side of the village as this side was due to its lower position not very suitable for defence. Apart from that, the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 26th regiment was sent to the left into the front line, while the 1st battalion of the 26th regiment remained further to the rear in second line as a reserve.

While these Prussian battalions started to get short of ammunition, the french intensified their fire and increased their superiority; now they advanced again to the village, in front and to their right, out of St.Amand.<sup>41</sup> Now it was the time for colonel Von Reuss to act and he was about to launch a counter-attack with the 1st battalion of the 26th regiment, but this was countermanded by the order to evacuate the village, as a result of the french irruption through the Prussian centre at Ligny.<sup>42</sup>

The two battalions of the 3rd regiment Elbe Landwehrinfantry and the fusilier battalions of the 12th and 24th regiment were launched to the right of St.Amand-la-Haye. Habert recoiled under the huge pressure.

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<sup>1</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.12

Wagner, Plane etc. p.38

Damitz, K.von Geschichte etc. p.148

Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.62-63

Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.327-328

2.Houssaye, H. Waterloo p.177

Cf. Eck, Von Geschichte des 2.Westfälischen Husaren Regiments nr.11 p.142

<sup>3</sup> Stuckrad, B.von Geschichte etc. p.107

Stuckrad believes Pirch II was to the rear, but that remnants of the brigade of Von Steinmetz were still in St.Amand la Haye as well as three battalions of the 8th brigade, of which I think came later. By leaving out Pirch II it seems as if Stuckrad wants to give the idea as if the village was only held by the battalions of the 26th regiment.

<sup>4</sup> Cf.Conrady, E.von Geschichte des Königlich etc.p.248

The fact that the regiment was at St.Amand la Haye for the third attempt to take it, is confirmed by colonel Von Stack, commander ad interim of the brigade. Cf. his report in KA, VI.E.7.I.80 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.64

<sup>5</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.61

6. Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.12

The fire of these skirmishers must have been that intense that they had ran out of ammunition within a very short time; hussars of the 11th regiment then replenished them again by giving them theirs, thereby suffering severely. Cf. Cf. Eck, Von Geschichte des 2.Westfälischen Husaren Regiments nr.11 p.142-143

Damitz, Von Geschichte etc. p.149

Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.328

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.177

Eck, von Geschichte des 2.Westfälischen etc. p.143

Von Nostitz confirms that Blücher led the attack of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2, but situates it at Wagnelée. Cf. Nostitz, Von Das Tagebuch etc. p.25

According to the regimental history of the 25th regiment (Von Tippelskirch) at least the Jäger detachment of the 25th regiment assisted in taking Hameau, which fell after several attempts. It would have been occupied by 1 company of voltigeurs and 2 companies of grenadiers of the 70th regiment of the line (division of Habert). Cf. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie Regiments etc. p.22-26



<sup>7</sup> Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.328

<sup>8</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.61

<sup>9</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.63-65

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie Regiments etc. p.21-25

As I have stated before, Von Mach describes the situation at Saint Amand le Hameau as being at Saint Amand la Haye, but the fact there was Prussian cavalry on the right of the Prussian infantry here proves once more that actually Saint Amand le Hameau is meant. It was Pirch II who fought at Saint Amand la Haye. Cf. Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.328

<sup>11</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.13  
Wagner, Plane etc. p.38

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Lieutenant colonel Von Schmiedeberg (commander of the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlands) in his report . In: Dziengel, J.D.von Geschichte des Königlichen Zweiten Ulanen-Regiments p.386

13. Wagner, Plane etc. p.38

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.149

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.208

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.180

He mentions here the brigade of Von Brause, but this brigade wasn't involved yet into the battle.

<sup>14</sup> Wagnern Plane etc. p.40

Epner & Braun. Geschichte des Ulanen etc.p.8-9

<sup>15</sup> Förster, Von Geschichte des königlich preussischen Ulanen-Regiments Graf zu Dohna nr.8 p.66

<sup>16</sup> Account of colonel Von der Marwitz himself. In: Aus dem Nachlasse etc. Vol.II p.117

<sup>17</sup> Förster, Von Geschichte des königlich preussischen Ulanen-Regiments Graf zu Dohna nr.8 p.66

18. Wagner, Plane etc. p.40

Cf. chef d'escadron Dupuy (7th regiment of hussars). Dupuy speaks here about Hannoverian

hussars and British dragoons. In: Souvenirs militaires etc. p.287-294

<sup>19</sup> Nostitz, Von Das Tagebuch etc. p.25

20. According to Houssaye both the divisions of Berthézène and Lefol only left the northern part of St.Amand. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.177

Napoleon claims the corps of Vandamme was wavering. In: Mémoires etc. p.96

In his description, colonel Fantin des Odoards writes about St.Amand, but he probably means St.Amand la Haye as having been taken by the brigade and being charged several times on the other side of it by Prussian cavalry. In these actions, once the 70th regiment of the line (one of the regiments of his brigade, the one of Dupeyroux, would have wavered. Cf. Fantin des Odoards. Journal du général Fantin des Odoards p.430

<sup>21</sup> Blücher states in his official report: “Es ging die Nachricht ein dass die zu unserer Unterstützung bestimmte Abteilung des Englischen Heeres selbst von einem Französischen Heere heftig angegriffen worden ist [...]”. In: Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom, F. La campagne de 1815 - Vol.III p.448

<sup>22</sup> Account of Von Wussow himself. In: Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.139-140

It is unclear from where Ollech got this account, possibly from the Kriegsarchiv in Berlin.

For more background information on the communication between Blücher and Wellington during the battle of Ligny, see note nr.4

23. Petiet, A. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.197

Report of Milhaud, written after the 18th of June. In: Stoff, L. Essai etc. p.131

According to Petiet, who was the messenger of the order, the moment the movement was no longer necessary it was withdrawn, but for the artillery this came too late: it had already been put into action

<sup>24</sup> Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.329

Eventually, the 25th regiment (Von Tippelskirch) was collected in rear of Wagnelée, near a haystack. Cf. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie Regiments etc. p.27

25. Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.327

According to Houssaye it was the division of Girard which retook the hamlet.

Von Damitz has his own version: according to him the Prussians kept the area of Wagnelée-St.Amand and that they advanced east of St.Amand-le-Hameau. Cf.

Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.178

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.149

<sup>26</sup> Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.329

27.According to Houssaye, Lefol and Berthézène then took St.Amand. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.178

<sup>28</sup> Stuckrad, B.von Geschichte etc. p.107

<sup>29</sup> Wagner, Plane etc. p.38-39

30. Wagner, Plane etc. p.39

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.151

According to Von Damitz colonel Von Schon would have placed this battalion between 6 and 7 p.m. at St.Amand-le-Hameau, but this hamlet then was in French hands.

<sup>31</sup> Geschichte des 1.Oberschlesischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr.22 p.113-114

According to Wagner the fusilier-battalions of the 14th and of the 2nd regiment Elbe Landwehr were committed in the village and the gardens respectively. In: Plane etc. p.39

32.Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.152

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In:

Pflugk Hartung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.17

The fact that brigade would have gone back to the rear because of its lack of ammunition around 7 p.m. is confirmed by the regimental history of the 28th regiment. Cf. Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.24

<sup>34</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.13

<sup>35</sup> Geschichte des 3.Pommerschen Infanterie Regiments nr.14 p.55

Wagner, Plane etc. p.41

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Zychlinski, F.von Geschichte etc. p.272

<sup>37</sup> Report of colonel Von Langen. In: KA, VI.E.15.117. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.24

Busse, Von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 23.Infanterie Regiments p.166

Report of Pirch I. In: KA, VI.E.15.2 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.7

Wagner, Plane etc. p.39

<sup>38</sup> The 1st regiment Pommerian hussars nr.5 was initially used to cover some artillery and later to link up a communication towards Wellington's army. Cf. Schöning, K.W. Geschichte etc. p.489

39. Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.160

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.393

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.180

Von Mach claims here the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 (brigade of Von Tippelskirch) retook Saint Amand le Hameau [he writes Saint Amand la Haye] and that they were relieved here later that evening by the 14th regiment, then to fall back to a position in rear of Wagnelée. Cf. Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.330

<sup>40</sup> Busse, Von Geschichte des königlich Preussischen 23.Infanterie Regiments p. 173-174  
Von Busse erroneously situates the battalion on the left hand side of the village.

<sup>41</sup> Report of colonel Von Stack (commander ad interim 2nd brigade). In: KA, VI.E.7.I.80 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.65

<sup>42</sup> Stuckrad, B.von Geschichte etc. p.108