

## **The attack on Saint Amand and Saint Amand la Haye.**

Saint Amand. The French attack.

In reading Napoleons order to Ney dated 2 p.m one can derive that the battle would start at about 2.30 p.m. The order dated 3.15 p.m. to Ney matches with this hour as is states "en ce moment l'engagement est très prononcé " which makes it very well probable that the battle started around 2.30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

The battle would have been opened by a round of three shots given off by a battery of the imperial guard, placed in the vicinity of the mill of Naveau.<sup>2</sup>

What followed was an attack of the division Lefol (3rd corps) on Saint Amand. The division was launched against the village without a preparatory bombardment as by that time Vandamme still did not have his artillery available.<sup>3</sup> Having held a short speech, Lefol launched his troops against the village in three columns; each of them was preceded by a swarm of skirmishers.<sup>4</sup> The high corn made the advance extremely difficult; the skirmishers could hardly be seen by the enemy.<sup>5</sup> During the advance the musicians of the 23rd regiment of the line played music.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the Prussian gunfire which came from the heights north-east of St.Amand, the French continued their advance and the moment they approached the entrances of Saint Amand, the few Prussian troops which were there fired from behind walls, hedges, ditches etc.<sup>7</sup>

Within a short time, the French drove these few Prussians out of the village with their bayonets<sup>(8)</sup>.

As the French had crossed St.Amand and now were about to emerge from it, Von Steinmetz launched the skirmishers of the 12th and 24th regiment to drive them back into the village but this was in vain.<sup>9</sup> The French troops now reached the valley of the Ligne in rear of Saint Amand and it was here that they stranded due to the presence of the Prussian reserves, posted behind the stream. They were also received by the heavy fire of footbattery nr.7<sup>10</sup>

The musketer battalions of the 12th (to the right) and 24th regiment (to the left) were now led forward by colonel Von Hoffmann, commander ad interim of the brigade.<sup>11</sup> Foot battery no.7 kept supporting them with canister fire.

Though they tried to get hold of the road to Brie, the French were now pushed back into Saint Amand. To their left they were pursued by the 12th regiment and to their right the 24th regiment advanced in wings of battalions, the 24th in line and the 12th in column.<sup>12</sup> A major detachment of the 12th regiment now approached the chateau St.Amand-la-Haye and was about to turn St.Amand; it was here that a part of a detachment of sharpshooters and skirmishers of the 1st battalion 1st Westphalian Landwehrregiment managed to cross the Ligne and get a foothold here. Meanwhile, the main body (probably one battalion of the 12th regiment and both musketers battalions of the 24th regiment) retook most part of the village of St.Amand.<sup>13</sup> On the left hand of the village skirmishers of the fusilier battalion of the 24th regiment, led by captain Von Knappe and captain Von Rathenow supported the action.<sup>14</sup>

As a reaction to the manoeuvre, Vandamme put forward his division of Berthézène, to the left of Lefol. Both brigades of this division did not act together however, as the 12th regiment of the line and behind it the 86th regiment of the line were advancing to St.Amand itself, while the

56th regiment of the line advanced towards the Prussians who debouched through St.Amand-la-Haye. The 33rd regiment of the line was kept in reserve.<sup>15</sup>

The French pressed the Prussians very hard, as by now they were also supported by artillery fire. Both the formations of the 12th and 24th regiment were disrupted by the buildings, hedges and ditches, suffered heavy casualties and retreated.

Von Steinmetz now launched his last battalions, the 1st and 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment Westphalian landwehr (these battalions had had their positions in reserve behind St.Amand).<sup>16</sup>

The 1st battalion advanced in the centre in column and initially was successful in throwing back the French with the bayonet. The 3rd battalion advanced to the left rear of the 1st. To the right of the 1st battalion was a detachment of sharpshooters.

Soon after however, the 1st battalion lost its commander and fell back; the 3rd battalion now advanced and was also greeted by a heavy fire from the village; its commander, plus several officers fell, and the battalion got in disorder and fell back too, but order was soon re-established by lieutenant adjudant Vorster II. Both battalions must have kept a position in rear of the heights in rear of St.Amand.<sup>17</sup>

Von Steinmetz recollected his troops behind St.Amand. The remnants of the 24th regiment were gathered in the rendez-vous which was a hollow hidden by the northern slope of the higher ground there where the roads from Ligny to Saint Amand la Haye and from Saint Amand met; here they were sometimes hit by the French artillery. Lieutenant Von Wulffen was decapitated, while major Von Laurens, commander of the regiment, was blown into the air and bruised. Captain Von Blankenstein took over the command of the 2nd battalion when its commander, major Von Löwneclau, was wounded. About 5 p.m. the regiment was moved to another position, just north-east of Brye, between this point and the point where the roads from Ligny to Marbisoux and from St.Amand to Sombreffe met.<sup>18</sup>

Lefol and Berthézène were however unable to penetrate any further due to the strong Prussian artillery-fire and the uneven ground.<sup>19</sup>

Having recollected his troops, Von Steinmetz immediately launched another, second attack but this counter-attack stranded on the church-yard of St.Amand and now his troops assumed defensive positions. Meanwhile, several fires had broken out in the village.<sup>20</sup> By now, Von Steinmetz had lost about 2300 men and 46 officers.<sup>21</sup>

Saint Amand la Haye.

Not long after the French had penetrated into Saint Amand, the French started on their left flank a strong skirmishing fire on the Prussians in the south part of Saint Amand la Haye; these were particularly the sharpshooters of the 2nd battalion of the 29th regiment led by captain Von Rohr, and the men of the Jäger-detachment of the 3rd brigade led by 1st lieutenant Von Geissler. Now, major Von Chevallerie pulled back his skirmishers platoons on his battalion.

These platoons were able, though suffering terribly, to withstand the French fire for about half an hour and then had to withdraw to the main body of the battalion, deeper into the village. Here

they were joined by the skirmishers of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, led by captain Von Wenzel.

Von Wezel had been forced, in conjunction with the 1st company of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, to fall back deeper into the village.<sup>22</sup>

The moment Von Chevallerie retired, the skirmishers of the 1st battalion of the 29th regiment, led by captain Von Bismarck, maintained their positions at the edge of the village. At the same time they were reinforced by two companies of the 1st battalion, under the command of major Von Hymmen. Lefol's men, pushing back the 2nd battalion, were now halted by these companies and the left wing of Von Bismarck skirmishers.<sup>23</sup>

In the left part of the village, the 1st company of captain Bergius and the skirmishers of captain Von Wenzel (both of the 2nd battalion 3rd regiment of Westphalian regiment) had succeeded in driving back the French again, thereby supported by 1 ½ company of its reserve, now also extended as skirmishers. The remaining 1 ½ company were left in reserve immediately in rear of the village, shouting, as if more men were approaching.<sup>24</sup>

Von Steinmetz' retreat had also been caused by the fact that, meanwhile, to the left of the division of Berthézène, the one of Girard had been engaged by Vandamme towards St.Amand-la-Haye and St.Amand-le-Hameau. Napoleon would have ordered Vandamme to do so.<sup>25</sup>

The brigade of De Villiers advanced to the right and Piat's to the left, at brigade's distance and both in closed columns of divisions (<sup>26</sup>), along St.Amand-le-Hameau towards St.Amand-la-Haye. In this manoeuvre, the 11th regiment of light infantry under colonel Tiburce Sébastiani and the brigade commander Desvilliers, led and was soon followed by the 82th regiment line infantry.<sup>27</sup>

The French pressed hard, particularly on the Prussian right flank, and as a result it was this wing which recoiled in good order towards the left wing, covered by the strong fire of this wing. Attempts to withstand the French force deeper into Saint Amand la Haye failed.<sup>28</sup> As soon as his right wing had reached positions in rear of village, major Von Hymmen evacuated it. In this action, only the left wing of major Von Neumann's light troops to the north of the village had seen some action. Soon, Von Neumann too was forced to go back as far as the chateau de l'Escaille.

By this manoeuvre, captain Von Ripperda of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Westphalian regiment in the sector to the left, was also forced to fall back to a position in rear of the village.<sup>29</sup>

However, at the same time Von Steinmetz launched his first counter-attack on the French who were emerging from Saint Amand, Von Hymmen seized the opportunity to retake Saint Amand la Haye as well.

In this, he was supported by the two companies of Silesian sharpshooters, led by major Von Neumann. Von Neumann was able to re-establish his former positions north of the village and penetrate even further on the French left flank.<sup>30</sup>

Also the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Westphalian infantry led by captain Von Ripperda advanced.<sup>31</sup>

Major Von Hymmen, though wounded, was able to retake the village, but the French still held out in the strong position of the chateau de la Haye. Soon after however, Vandamme retook the

village again, after which the Prussian units were received by the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehr (1st brigade).<sup>32</sup> By now it must have been 4 p.m.

Three quarters of an hour before, at French headquarters another, far more urgent order was sent out to Ney by 3.15 p.m. It read:

*En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin, à trois heures un quart*

*Monsieur le Maréchal, je vous ai écrit, il y a une heure, que l'empereur ferait attaquer l'ennemi à deux heures et demie dans la position qu'il a prise entre le village de St. Amand et de Bry. En ce moment, l'engagement est très prononcé. Sa Majesté me charge de vous dire que vous devez manoeuvrer sur-le-champ de manière à envelopper la droite de l'ennemi et à tomber à bras raccourcis sur ses derrières. Cette armée est perdue si vous agissez vigoureusement. Le sort de la France est dans vos mains. Ainsi n'hésitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que l'empereur vous ordonne, et dirigez vous sur les hauteurs de Bry et de Saint Amand pour concourir à une victoire peut-être décisive. L'ennemi est pris en flagrant délit au moment où il cherchera se réunir aux anglais.*

*Major général, duc du Dalmatie*<sup>33</sup>

The order may have been carried by colonel Forbin Janson.<sup>34</sup> Some time later, at 3.30 p.m., a copy was sent out which may have been carried by colonel Laurent.<sup>35</sup>

It may have been around the same time that Napoleon received the report of Lobau (see above) in which he mentioned the mission of Janin. This report was most probably written around 1 p.m. and read:

*Sire,*

*En conformité des ordres de Votre Majesté, j'ai envoyé l'adjudant commandant Jeanin au corps commandé par M.le maréchal Prince de la Moskowa. Cet officier a trouvé ces troupes échelonnées depuis les environs de Gosselies jusqu'au-delà du village de Frasnès. Il a beaucoup d'habitude de la guerre et croit que l'ennemi n'est pas en très grande force; mais il est difficile, en raison des forêts, de juger avec précision.*

*Le colonel précité a causé avec plusieurs officiers supérieures, et il a enfin interrogé des déserteurs, et aucun des individus questionnés n'a porté le nombre de l'ennemi au-delà de vingt-mille hommes; quand cet officier a quitté le terrain, il n'y avait que des tirailleurs engagés, même en assez petit nombre.*

*Je suis toujours en position en avant de Charleroi ou je resterai jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Il serait bon que Votre Majesté voulut bien faire remplacer le bataillon que j'ai en ville pour la police et pour un assez grand nombre de bagages; protéger les blessés etc.; ce point ne pouvant, ce me semble, rester totalement dégarni des troupes.*

*Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815*

*Le lieutenant général, l'aide de camp de l'Empereur, commandant en chef du 6e corps*

*Lobau*

*P.S. Le colonel Jeanin rapporte que le colonel Tancarville, chef d'état major du Cte de Valmy, lui a dit que des émissaires venus au Cte D'Erlon lui auraient déclaré que l'ennemi devait aujourd'hui marcher de Mons sur Charleroi. Votre Majesté sera sûrement à portée d'apprécier cet avis.* <sup>36</sup>

The distance between Frasnes to Lobau's headquarters in front of Charleroi is about 15 kilometers. In case the report was written around 1 p.m. then Janin must have arrived at Charleroi towards that hour. In that case he must have left from Frasnes around 10 a.m. At that moment there was no corps of 20.000 men of the enemy present, but only the division of Perponcher. <sup>37</sup>

From the report it becomes clear that during the early morning hours Napoleon had instructed Lobau to send an officer to the left wing to find out about the situation there, apart from the fact that he sent colonel Bussy there himself.

Whatever impression this report may have made upon Napoleon, it only caused him to draw the 6th corps towards Fleurus, thereby moving this general reserve to his right wing. Sout accordingly wrote to Lobau:

*En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815 à trois heures et demie*

*A.M.le comte Lobau,*

*Ordre au comte Lobau de se rendre à Fleurus; il laissera un bataillon à Charleroi pour conserver la place et protéger le parc.*

*Le major général, duc de Dalmatie*  
*Sout* <sup>38</sup>

Pirch II's first attack.

By now, the artillery of Vandamme had come into play and replied with success to the Prussian gun-fire. The situation at Blücher's right wing now became very delicate: an attack on Brye through St.Amand would threaten Blücher's communication with Wellington and at the same time the troops at Ligny ran the risk of being taken in the back. Immediately Blücher took his precautions.

Blücher decided to send out the brigade of Pirch II to support Von Steinmetz. This brigade was near the mill of Bussy, with one battalion in the farm adjoining this mill. The battalion there was now relieved by the 2nd battalion of the 23rd regiment (brigade Langen). <sup>39</sup> The footbattery nr.3

of Pirch II was also assigned a new position near the foot battery nr.38, north of Ligny.

Around 4 p.m., at the same time as the counter-attack of Von Steinmetz (which stranded on the churchyard), Pirch II's brigade was directed against St.Amand-la-Haye.<sup>40</sup> The brigade advanced in eight columns of battalions, in two lines. The first line was composed of the two battalions of the 28th regiment (1st and 2nd) and the three of the 2nd regiment of Westphalian Landwehr infantry. The second was formed by the three battalions of the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian infantry nr.1).

The Westphalian Landwehr cavalry was kept in its old position near Bussy.<sup>41</sup> The 12th regiment covered its left flank.

Initially, Pirch II penetrated deep into St.Amand-la-Haye under French fire with his first line. Encouraged by the success, colonel Von Othegraven led his 12th regiment back to St.Amand where he got hold of a part of it, despite heavy losses.

The 1st battalion of the 28th regiment advanced along the sunken road which runs into St.Amand-la-Haye from the north-east, while the 2nd battalion advanced frontally against the village. In this they drove back the French, but deeper into St.Amand-la-Haye, however Pirch II's columns, being unable to deploy in the narrow streets, recoiled for the strong French fire which came from the farm of de la Haye in particular, where the brigade Desvilliers (division Girard) had its position.

Apart from the strong French musketry-fire and artillery-fire, the Prussians suffered losses and were not so much experienced as the French.<sup>42</sup> Major Von Brockhausen, commander of the 2nd battalion 28th regiment, fell.<sup>43</sup>

By now the other brigade of Girard's division, the one of Piat, must have been committed in the action as well.

The 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian nr.1) was now called up from the second line, in an attempt to storm the farmhouse and take it. Though the attack was a strong one, it failed. Now, the Prussian fell back to the edge of the village and it was here that the colour of the battalion was almost taken by French cavalry, but the colour party managed to hold them off.<sup>44</sup>

At that time of the fighting, Girard himself, being amongst his skirmishers, got mortally wounded. Motionless he fell from his horse and was led to the rear by four grenadiers. He was succeeded by the commander Desvilliers. But shortly after, as both Desvilliers and Piat were struck down, colonel Matis, of the 82nd regiment of the line, got the command of the division.<sup>45</sup>

Now, Pirch II launched forward the second battalion of the 6th regiment of infantry (1st West-Prussian nr.1) in order to penetrate into the village and take the farm. In this it failed: it had to fall back but at least it prevented the French from debouching from the village. However, the French tried to get onto its flank, but they in their turn were prevented from doing so by the crossfire given by the 1st and 8th platoons of the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian nr.1)

Further to the right, major Von Haine of the fusilier-battalion had been ordered to advance through the hedges and gardens with his skirmishers to delay the French advance; these were led forward by captain Von Wohlgemuth but he didn't succeed in this task.<sup>46</sup>

Eventually, the Prussian brigade had to disengage from the village. This it did in good order.

Pirch II's second attack.

Blücher saw the situation and decided to act. He rode in front of the remaining troops of the 2nd brigade and led them forward shouting: " Kinder, haltet euch brav ! Lasst die Nation nicht wieder Herr über Euch werden ! Vorwärts, vorwärts in Gottes Nahmen ! "

The attack which followed was a very powerful one: after strong fights for practically every building, the remaining French troops of Girard were now thrown out of St.Amand-la-Haye.<sup>47</sup>

While the 6th regiment of infantry (West-Prussian nr.1) threw the French out of the higher part of the village, the 2nd battalion of the 28th regiment (under major Reitzenstein) attacked the ground and the small wood between St.Amand la Haye and St.Amand.<sup>48</sup> Now, colonel Matis reunited the remainder of the division near St.Amand-le-Hameau, while going back very slowly. The 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of infantry ( West-Prussian nr.1) emerged from Saint-Amand-la-Haye while driving away the French, but they went back in time, before they could be received by French artillery fire.<sup>49</sup> Its skirmishers now firmly occupied the edges of the village. And while the 2nd battalion of the 28th regiment retook the chateau and occupied the flank towards St.Amand, the 1st battalion of the regiment as well as the Westphalian Landwehr followed as a reserve.<sup>50</sup> By now, Girard had lost about a thousand men.<sup>51</sup>

By that time, general Domon had moved his chasseurs à cheval to a position west of St.Amand-la-Haye.

A short fight ensued with the vanguard of the 3rd regiment Brandenburger uhlands, a regiment of the brigade of Von Treskow (division Von Röder, 1st corps) which had been detached out there, as well as the 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehrcavalry (brigade Von Lützow, division Von Röder). Shortly after, both regiments took up positions east of St.Amand-la-Haye, in a hollow in rear of the artillery.<sup>52</sup>

It must have been from here that both regiments were very succesful in driving back and scattering numerous French skirmishers who were advancing here on the left side of the village.<sup>53</sup>

Of the 3rd regiment of Brandenburg uhlands, the 2nd and 3rd squadron, led by captain Von Stülpnagel and 1st lieutenant Von Grodzki, succesfully charged the French skirmishers. In this action lieutenant Von Thein of the 2nd squadron was killed, while lieutenant Tägen of the 3rd was wounded; first lieutenant Von Grodzki, whose horse had been wounded, was saved by uhlan Grosschupf.<sup>54</sup>

They could only be stopped by the close fire of French formations, probably of Vandamme.

Of Von Röder's cavalry, the 5th regiment of Brandenburg dragoons must have been ordered to take up a position north west of Ligny near the chateau, to cover some artillery.<sup>55</sup> Here it suffered severely under the French artillery fire for almost six hours.<sup>56</sup>

Having the 6th regiment of uhlands, the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry and the 1st regiment of West-Prussian dragoons still in rear of Ligny, Von Röder had his regiments scattered over a wide area. These three regiments moved to support the infantry which fought at Ligny, and suffered under the French artillery fire, until they came into action in the evening (see below).<sup>57</sup>

Von Tippelskirch's and Von Jürgass' actions.

During the second action of Pirsch II, the brigade of Von Tippelskirch (nine battalions), approached Wagnelée, coming from Les Trois Burettes.<sup>58</sup>

Von Tippelskirch was meant to take up a position in rear of Wagnelée and from there to attack the French left flank at St.Amand la Haye by Wagnelée and to support the Prussians there. Von Brause would follow in reserve. Because of this, Von Brause took up the former position of Von Tippelskirch. As Tippelskirch advanced upon Wagnelée, Von Brause sent both fusilier battalions of his 14th and 22nd regiment of infantry towards Wagnelée so as to connect his brigade to the one of Tippelskirch.<sup>59</sup>

The action would be supported by the regiments of Von Wahlen Jürgass.

Von Tippelskirch himself had to act under the temporary orders of major general Von Jürgass.<sup>60</sup>

His orders were to pass through Wagnelée as fast as possible and, on reaching its far side, to act according to instructions from general Von Jürgass with regard to the actual point of attack.<sup>61</sup>

It was the intention that the French would be taken by surprise in their flank, but it turned out the other way around.

Tippelskirch had just about reached his position in rear of Wagnelée and was barely ready to develop his brigade when he got the order to advance for the attack to St.Amand la Haye.

The village of Wagnelée being between the centre and right wing of the brigade, Tippelskirch moved a part of his brigade through the village, while the remainder passed it to its left, pivoting on the 3rd battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian landwehr.

In his advance towards Wagnelée, Von Tippelskirch had in front the fusilier-battalion of the 25th regiment to the left and the same of the 2nd regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.1 to the right – both were led by major Von Witzleben. In the first line, which was commanded by major Von Röbel, were from left to right the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, the 1st battalion of the same regiment, the 2nd battalion of the 25th regiment and the 1st battalion of the same regiment. Of this first line, the two first-mentioned battalions advanced to the left of the hollow road which leads towards Wagnelée, while the other two did to its right. The advance was hindered by the low grounds and hedges which caused the 1st battalion of the 25th regiment to move in rear and not next to the 2nd battalion.<sup>62</sup>

In the second line, which was commanded by major Von Castell, Von Tippelskirch had from left to right the 3rd battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, and the 2nd and 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.1. To the rear was the foot battery nr.10 All battalions advanced in columns.

During their advance, however, the formation changed: both musketer battalions of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr pulled from the first line to the front, i.e. to the left of the fusilier battalion of the 25th regiment, while both musketer battalions of the 25th regiment took up their former position in rear of the fusilier battalion of the 25th regiment.

The fusilier battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian regiment came in rear of the 2nd battalion of the same regiment, while both musketer battalions also wheeled more to their left, to get in rear of the new position of those of the 25th regiment. This change gave a strong left wing and centre, while the right wing was now only formed by the fusilier battalion of the 2nd

regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.1 <sup>63</sup> Due to the terrain, the heat and the speed of the advance it had been hard to collect the battalions sufficiently; yet, Von Tippelskirch, in coming out of Wagnelée, intended to wheel sharply to his left so as to attack the enemy in front of Sant Amand la Haye.

Vandamme may have seen the Prussian movement, but fact is that he had placed troops "en potence" of the division of Berthézène. This was a brigade of the division Habert, as well as 8 guns (loaded with canister) and two battalions used as skirmishers, all well hidden in the high corn. <sup>64</sup>

The French skirmishers fired a sudden round on about 100 paces distance by which the Prussians of the 2nd battalion 25th regiment were completely surprised. Though terribly shaken, the battalion continued its advance and its commander began a deployment. To their right, however, the 1st battalion was doing the same but had misjudged the distance: initially, it had kept to its far right but because of the corn it had failed to maintain the distance necessary to deploy and now, having deployed, masked the right front of the 2nd battalion for several platoon-fronts and thereby blocking its line of fire. Now, major Von Helmenstreit, commander of the 1st battalion, ordered captain Von Machnitzky to move further to the right to complete the manoeuvre. <sup>65</sup>

So, despite the terrible shock the 1st and 2nd battalion managed to deploy, but as the French launched a bayonet-attack, the Prussian skirmishers fled back to the 25th regiment and caused a panic amongst the still young soldiers, which could not be stopped by the officers. All in all, the Prussian units retreated. The 3rd battalion had suffered in the same way, but yet managed to give a short round of fire, despite the loss of three higher officers (captain Von Vietinghoff, captain Von Holleben and first lieutenant Von Lüttwitz) and the following disorder. Finally it had to go back too.

At least the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr had been suffering from the rapid advance through the heat, the high corn and the broken terrain. The result was that officers lost touch of each other, which hindered a rapid deployment. As a result, both battalions were checked by strong French shell and canister fire in which major Röbel was wounded. <sup>66</sup> All in all, both remnants of the battalions were forced to retreat as well towards Wagnelée, as were the ones of the 25th regiment. <sup>67</sup>

The retreating units fell back through Wagnelée in rear of which were the three Jäger detachments of the brigade Von Tippelskirch, as well as the foot battery nr.10, all near a haystack.

At least the Jäger detachment of the 25th regiment, led by lieutenant Luckow, now occupied the village and at the same time Luckow was ordered by major Von Helmenstreit (1st battalion) to hold his position, which he did by advancing with his detachment in two platoons. The right one, led by lieutenant Hochstein, advanced in a southwest direction through the village to the edge of it and took up a position there, thereby driving away the French skirmishers.

The left platoon, led by lieutenant Luckow, emerged from the main street of the village further to the right into the fields south of it, where they bumped into French forces to the left of them, which left as soon as the Jäger appeared. <sup>68</sup>

Meanwhile, the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 had advanced from its reserve position and gave the remaining battalions the chance of getting back by checking the French

advance; in this it was supported by the fire of the foot battery nr.10. <sup>69</sup>

In checking the enemies advance, Captain Von Goszicki passed through Wagnelée with the skirmishers of the fusilier battalion, while major Von Witzleben drove back the French towards Saint Amand le Hameau. <sup>70</sup>

During this action several officers fell. Major Von Donap, commander of the 1st battalion was wounded, but captain Von Wittke was able to restore order. Also the commander of the second battalion, major Von Reitzenstein got wounded. Now, captain Von Korth took command of the 1st battalion, while captain Von Kleist (in absence of captain Von Collignon who led the actions of the skirmishers) did so for the 2nd. <sup>71</sup>

The 2nd regiment had to give way by the approach of a French column to the left, but yet it did not fail to maintain its ground at the southern entrances of the village. In the meantime, the remains of the brigade of Von Tippelskirch were collected in rear of Wagnelée. <sup>72</sup>

The situation of the fusilier battalion of the 25th regiment was that it took Saint-Amand-le-Hameau without any difficulty. Having done so, its commander, major Von Witzleben, posted here four platoons of Schützen in order to create a rally-point in case of misfortune. As the battalion emerged from the hamlet, it was received by a French volley but yet the Prussians were able to drive the French battalion away with the bayonet. As a second French battalion approached, Von Witzleben was forced back to Saint-Amand-le-Hameau and received by the skirmishers he had left behind. Yet, also due to the presence of enemy cavalry, Von Witzleben was forced to evacuate the hamlet and to continue his retreat towards Wagnelée. <sup>73</sup>

Von Tippelskirch, who advanced too late in relation to Pirch II towards the front line of the French, was supported by the cavalry of Jürgass to the right of Wagnelée in order to operate on the French extreme left flank. The movements of this unit, however, are obscured by clouds. <sup>74</sup>

Jürgass was ordered (through lieutenant colonel Von Lützow of the general staff) to advance with the majority of his division to attack the French left flank and the French near St.Amand la Haye. Three regiments he had to hand over to the 1st corps – these were the 1st regiment of Königin dragoons and the 4th and 5th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry. They kept their positions in rear of St.Amand la Haye.

Soon after, Jürgass was reinforced by the cavalry of Von der Marwitz and the horse battery nr.6 To support the action of Tippelskirch, Jürgass sent colonel Von Thümen with the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlans and the 11th regiment of hussars through Wagnelée to take up a position on its other side; they were followed by the horse battery nr.6 which opened a fire from there on St.Amand la Haye. Here, the hussars to the left and the uhlans to the right, they came under a strong French artillery fire and were faced with French cavalry (Domon). <sup>75</sup>

In all probability, both regiments of cavalry here were reinforced by two squadrons of the 5th regiment of Pommeranian hussars nr.1, of the brigade of Von Sohr. <sup>76</sup>

Jürgass kept the remaining regiments of his division to the left rear of Wagnelée; these were the 6th regiment of Neumark dragoons, the 3rd regiment of Brandenburg hussars nr.2 and the 5th Pommeranian regiment hussars nr.1

The regiment of Königin Dragoons nr.1, in rear of St.Amand la Haye, at some point of time, came under fire of French skirmishers which had reached the northern edge of the village. As they began to advance from this village they were driven back by the dragoons twice. <sup>77</sup> At some

point of time, however, the dragoons here must have been relieved by the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry (Von Lützow) which had been in rear the dragoons all the time under a French artillery fire, yet which had for the most part passed over the regiment. Initially, its commander major Von Folgersberg sent forward his flankers but this was not enough to stop the French skirmishers from advancing. Von Folgersberg had then lieutenant Von Bülow charge with his 1st squadron and this proved to be a success. It did not last long however: as French forces reinforced the French skirmishing line, Von Folgersberg had to take back his men. After that, it advanced one more time to support some infantry which advanced and was then taken back again, now as far as the mill of Bussy.<sup>78</sup>

In case the other cavalry-brigades were not engaged, their positions must have been:

The brigade Schulenburg to the left rear of St.Amand-la-Haye (<sup>79</sup>), Von Sohr between St.Amand-la-Haye and Wagnelée, to the left rear of Wagnelée (<sup>80</sup>), the brigade of Von der Marwitz was on its way to the right flank of the army (<sup>81</sup>).

Of the cavalry of Von Röder (brigade Treskow and Von Lützow) three regiments must have been in the rear to cover the infantry which had its positions between Brye and Ligny. These were the 6th regiment of uhlans, the 1st regiment of West-Prussian dragoons and the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr.

Of this division the 3rd regiment of uhlans and the 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr were to the left rear of St.Amand-la-Haye, while the 5th regiment of Brandenburg dragoons was to the rear right of Ligny (see above). In what way the cavalry of the brigade of Von Tippelskirch has been engaged remains unclear; the same applies to her position.

Though the French had got hold of St.Amand (with Lefol and Berthézène) and St.Amand-le-Hameau (with Girard), they were not able to emerge from those villages.

*First version: 22nd June 2005 - Last revised: 30th January 2011 - Copyright © Pierre de Wit*

1. For 2.30 p.m., also see:

Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185 In another account he says it started at 2 p.m. Cf. Report of lieutenant colonel Von Reiche. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.1 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.57

Report of Henckel von Donnersmarck. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.144 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.,VII.5.p.107

Report of baron Van Panhuys to baron Van der Capellen, dated 17th of June, In: NA, 2.02.01. nr.6585

Report of baron Van Panhuys, the representative of the Netherlands at Prussian headquarters, to baron Tindal, dated 17th of June. In: NA, 2.02.01 nr.6585

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc.p.130

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.189

Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleons Untergang p.327

According to Wellmann it was between 2 and 3 p.m. Cf. Wellmann, R. Geschichte des etc. p.85

Aerts and Charras state it was after 2.30 p.m. In:

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.377

A report of the 3rd brigade of Von Jagow confirms it was after 2 p.m. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.128 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3D.p.3

Yet, some other witnesses and historians say it was at 3 p.m. that the battle started.

Cf. Lieutenant Von Gerlach, of the general Prussian staff in a letter to his mother, dated 17th June 1815. In: Aus den Jahren preussischer Not etc. p.545

Report of lieutenant colonel Lehmann. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.197 / II.199 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII,3 E.p.25 and VII.5.p.2

Report of major general Von Wahlen Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.26

Gneisenau in his report to Von Knesebeck, dated 17th of June. In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleons Untergang p.526-528

Blücher to his wife, dated 17th of June. In: Original in family-archive Von Colomb. In:

Unger, Von (ed). Blüchers Briefe p.283

Blücher to the Prussian king, dated 17th June. In: KA, VI.E.3.II.144 In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleons Untergang Vol. p.524-525

Von Weyrach (of the general Prussian staff). In: MWB, 1861 p.343 Major  
Jardin,  
member of the imperial stables. In: Beaucour, F. La campagne de Waterloo vue etc. In:  
Bulletin of the SBEN, (1992) nr.14 p.30

Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée. Vol.II p.60  
Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.94

Wagner, Plane etc. p.32

Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.10

Gourgaud. Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.48

Fantin des Odoards. Journal du général Fantin des Odoards etc. p.429

Martin, lieutenant J.F. (45th regiment line, division Marcognet) Souvenirs d'un ex-officier p.276

Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.167

Von Plotho, Der Krieg etc. p.38

Clausewitz, Von – Hinterlassene Werke p.45, 58

Marchand and Drouot claim it was noon.

Cf. Marchand, L.J.N. Mémoires de Marchand. p.161

Drouot in his speech to the Chambre des Pairs, 23rd June 1815. In: Coppens, B. – Waterloo. Les mensonges etc. p.484

Also see: Notes of colonel Simon Lorieère on the 15th and 16th of June. In: SHAT.

Lieutenant Desnoyers (of the artillery of the 3rd French corps) says it was 1 p.m. Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815, cited by Sonmereyn, A.Ch. Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 juin 1815. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. p.66

Others claim the battle started at 2 p.m.

Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16

Report of the two musketer battalions of the 29th regiment from former Kriegsarchiv. In: Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.623

Report of the 4th brigade. In: KA, VI.E.II.152 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.90

Diary of the 19th regiment of infantry (4th brigade). In: Henckel, count – Erinnerungen etc. p.641

According to captain Von Bismarck, of the 1st battalion of the 29th regiment (brigade Von Jagow) the first skirmishing fire started around 1 30 p.m. In: Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.627

2.Pontécoulant, F.G. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.92

Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.167

3.Lefol, M. Souvenirs sur le retour de l'empereur etc. p.61 These memoirs are not of general Etienne-Nicolas Lefol himself, but of his aide camp and nephew, Charles Lefol.

Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.167

Aerts, W. Etudes relatives etc. p.378

The diary of the 1st corps mentions the fire of French artillery, but this was during the action.

Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16

4.Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185

Lefol, M. Souvenirs sur le retour de l'empereur etc. p.61

Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs d'un officier sur la campagne de Belgique en 1815 p.10-11

Gerbet claims Napoleon himself rode to his division Lefol as to give the order to attack.

5. Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.156-157

Wellmann, R. Die Geschichte etc. p.85

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo. p.168

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.378

6. Lefol, M. Souvenirs sur le retour de l'empereur etc. p.61

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.167

7.Gerbet, Ph.Souvenirs d'un officier sur la campagne etc. p.11

8.Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs d'un officier sur la campagne etc. p.11

Petiet, A. Souvenirs militaires de l'histoire etc. p.196

In this action, the 37th regiment of the line (under brigade general Corsin) must have played a very prominent part. Cf. Lefol's report, 17th June, SHAT. C15, nr.5

According to Von Reiche the Prussians had to get to the rear not so much of the strength of the French attack, but more because of the strong losses, the lack of ammunition and the fatigue of the troops. Strange arguments for the resistance against the very first French attack.

Cf. Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185

Another source indicates that the first French attack failed. In the second – the one described – the French skirmishers would have been driven back, but not the columns which followed in their rear. Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16

9. Wagner, Plane etc. p.32

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.131

F.Harkort. Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen Landwehrregiments p.44

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.189

Erroneously, Hofschröder situates this action against St.Amand-la-Haye. Cf. Hofschröder, P. 1815.The Waterloo campaign. Wellington etc. p.270

The skirmishers in front of the 24th regiment were led by captains Knappe and Rathenow. Cf. Hofschröder, P. 1815. The Waterloo campaign. Wellington etc. p.269

<sup>10</sup> Wagner, Plane etc. p.32

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16

Account of an anonymous member of the regiment. In: Dresdner Blätter, 1849. Cf. [www.societyofcontrol/library/history/dresden.txt](http://www.societyofcontrol/library/history/dresden.txt)

<sup>12</sup> According to Wagner, each battalion had one half in line and the other in column as a reserve. In: Plane etc. p.33

13. Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.131  
Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.189  
Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185  
Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.168  
Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.378  
F.Harkort. Die Zeiten des ertsen Westphalischen Landwehrregiments p.44-45  
The fact that the French had to leave the village is confirmed by Ph.Gerbet, a member of the 37th regiment of the line. Cf. Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs d'un officier etc. p.10-11

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Zychlinski, F.von Geschichte etc. p.265-266

15.Report of Berthézène (17th June). In: SHAT. C15, nr.5  
Finally, the 33rd regiment was also involved in the action and was badly mauled. Cf.  
Putigny, B. Le grognard Putigny baron d'Empire. p.169-170  
Captain Putigny himself got wounded at the shoulders by artillery-fire. Von Reiche confirms the French reinforcements. Cf.Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185  
Charras confirms part of Berthézène was put forward to the left of Lefol. In: Histoire de la campagne etc. Vol.I p.157

16. Wagner, Plane etc. p.33  
Von Clausewitz also mentions the 2nd battalion. Cf. Clausewitz, C.von – Hinterlassene Werke p.58  
Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16  
Report of major general Von Steinmetz. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.26 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.61

<sup>17</sup> Report of major general Von Steinmetz. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.26 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.61-62  
Report of captain Von Grolmann (3rd battalion 1st Westphalian Landwehr infantry regiment). In: KA,VI.E.7.I.50 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.69-70  
Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16  
F.Harkort. Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen Landwehrregiments p.45 Harkort isn't very clear about the retreat of the 1st battalion, except for the fact that it lost its commander. Captain Mueller took over the command of the 1st battalion.  
Wagner, Plane etc. p.33

<sup>18</sup> Zychlinski, F.von Geschichte des 24.Infanterie-Regiments p.271  
Account of an anonymous member of the regiment. In: Dresdner Blätter, 1849. Cf. [www.societyofcontrol/library/history/dresden.txt](http://www.societyofcontrol/library/history/dresden.txt)

19. Berthézène, P. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.363-364

20. Lefol, M. Souvenirs sur le retour de l'empereur etc. p.62

Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs d'un officier etc. p.11-12

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.131

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol. I p.192

Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.378

According to Von Reiche the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment Westphalian landwehr played a prominent part during the temporary re-occupation of St.Amand. The loss of Prussian officers must have been high. Cf. Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.185

However, it must have proven impossible to get the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehr to the front again; its commander, captain Von Grolmann, left it and joined a battalion of the 1st WestPrussian regiment of infantry nr.6 (2nd brigade), together with lieutenant Busch, several subaltern officers and 30 men. Von Grolmann only joined the battalion (led by lieutenant adjudant Vorster) on the 17th of June.

Cf. Report of captain Von Grolmann (3rd battalion 1st Westphalian Landwehr infantry regiment). In: KA, VI.E.7.I.50 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.69-70

21. Report of major general Von Steinmetz. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.26 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.62

Wagner, Plane etc.p.33

Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.63

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.192

Harkort, F. Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen Landwehrregiments p.47

According to D.d'Héralde the front of the division was struck by a strong mitraille-fire which caused the troops to panic but which soon changed the moment reinforcements came up. Cf.

D'Héralde, D. Etat de mes services etc. In: Delloye, S. Les mémoires du chirurgien D. d'Héralde p.27

<sup>22</sup> Report of captain Von Ripperda. In: KA. VI.E.7.II.141 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.100

<sup>23</sup> Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.86-88. His account is based on the report of captain Von Bismarck (former Kriegsarchiv).

<sup>24</sup> Report of captain Von Ripperda. In: KA. VI.E.7.II.141 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.100

25. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.168 He uses Lefol as a source but he doesn't mention this, however.

Charras believes it was Vanamme who gave the order. Cf. Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.157

26. Arvers, P. Historique du 82<sup>e</sup> régiment d'infanterie de ligne p.161

According to the surgeon d'Héralde, attached to the 12th regiment light infantry (division Girard) Girard deployed his troops and set the attack in in two lines. The 11th regiment light infantry was in front in the brigade of De Villiers. The troops must have attacked with great impetuosity. Cf. D'Héralde, D. Etat de mes service etc. p.26

Before his actual attack Girard would have sent one of his aides de camps, Koffe, to Napoleon in order to be sure whether he really had to attack or else make a demonstration only. The reason he did so was that he thought the Prussian position to be a very strong one and he didn't feel very confident about the attack. Cf. D'Héralde, D. Etat de mes services etc. In: Delloye, S. Les mémoires du chirurgien D. d'Héralde p.26

<sup>27</sup> Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.71

<sup>28</sup> Report of major Von Hymmen from former Kriegsarchiv. In: Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.77,80,626

Diary of captain Von Bismarck, 1st battalion 29th regiment. In: Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.627

<sup>29</sup> Report of captain Von Ripperda. In: KA. VI.E.7.II.141 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.100-101

<sup>30</sup> Report and diary of major Von Neumann from former Kriegsarchiv. In: Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.622,624

Otto, F.von Geschichte des 2.Schlesischen Jäger Bataillons nr.6 p.79-80

For the actions of major Von Hymmen, se his report. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.132 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.75-76

<sup>31</sup> Report of captain Von Ripperda. In: KA. VI.E.7.II.141 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.100-101

<sup>32</sup> Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.89-91. According to Wellmann the Prussians took the village and lost it again, to attack it again before Pirch II intervened. Apart from the fact that Wellmann gives no details about these actions, I think this is not possible within the frame of time until 4 p.m. the moment Pirch II was launched .

33. Original in: AN, fonds Ney 137 AP18

In this document it is clear that the last sentence (“L'ennemi est pris en flagrant délit au moment ou il cherchera se réunir aux anglais.”) has been added after the signature had been written as there is barely any space between this line and this signature.

Copy in register of staff. In: BNP, FR.Nouv.acq.4366

The copy evidently doesn't have this last line added after the signature had been written.

In: SHAT. C15, nr.5

Also in:

Pontécoulant, F.G. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.99-100

Grouchy. Mémoires. Vol.IV.p.103-104

Duc d'Elchingen. Documents inédits p.42

Pollio, A. Waterloo p.626

34.Colonel Forbin Janson. Cf.his letter dated december 1817 to R.Wilson. In: Sir R.Wilson, Correspondence. British Museum. Department of manuscripts, nr.30.147 p.15-18.

35. Original copy in: AN, fonds Ney 137 AP18

Copy in register of staff. In: BNP, FR.Nouv.acq.4366

36. Original in: SHAT. C15, nr.5

Lobau spells the name of his adjudant as "Jeanin" while it was "Janin" – Cf. Janin, M.E.J.

Campagne de Waterloo, ou remarques critiques et historiques sur l'ouvrage du général

Gourgaud. Paris, Chaumerot, 1820

37. It would mean, in relation to the distances involved, that Janin may have left from Mont-sur-Marchienne (where Lobau had his headquarters) towards 7 a.m. This would mean that central headquarters sent out the instruction to Lobau around dawn or somewhat later.

In all, Janin must have spent his time along the Brussels road between roughly 8 and 11 a.m., a time that parts of the 1st corps were still heading from the Sambre for Jumet.

According to Houssaye, Janin left Frasnes at 12.30 o'clock and that he rode with a speed of 10 kilometers per hour. He dates the report at 2 p.m. and believes Janin was misled concerning the strength of the enemy at Quatre Bras by their extended frontline. Cf. Houssaye, H.

1815.Waterloo p.166

38. Copy in: SHAT. C15, nr.5

Copy in register of staff. In: BNP, FR.Nouv.acq.4366

Also in: Grouchy, E.de Mémoires. Vol.IV p.167

39. Busse, Von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 23.Infanterie Regiments p.166

Report of colonel Von Stack (commander ad interim of the brigade). In: KA,VI.E.I.7.80 in

GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.63

Wagner, Plane etc. p.34

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.194-195

40. Reiche, L. von Memoiren etc. p.186

Wagner, Plane etc. p.34

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.379

According to Houssaye and Von Ollech it was between 4 and 5 p.m. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.172

Ollech, Von. Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.148

Wellmann claims it was 5 p.m. Cf. Wellmann, R. Geschichte etc. p.92

41. Reiche, L. von Memoiren etc. p.186

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. Vol.I p.132-133

The history of the 28th regiment states there were five battalions in the first line (of the 28th regiment and the 2nd regiment Westphalian Landwehr) and three in the second line (of the 6th regiment). Cf. Die Geschichte des 28. Regiments, in: Special ABN, nr.65 p.21

<sup>42</sup> Report of colonel Von Stack (commander ad interim of the brigade). In: KA, VI.E.I.7.80 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.64

<sup>43</sup> Neff, W. Geschichte etc. p.27

<sup>44</sup> Cf. separate note.

45. Memoirs of colonel Matis, as cited by Quinet. In: Histoire de la campagne de 1815 etc. p.413

As colonel Mouttet of the 12th regiment of light infantry had got wounded, he was succeeded by commander Berlier, but as he got wounded as well he was succeeded by chef de bataillon Chaunac. Cf. D'Héralde, D. Etat de mes services etc. p.27

Mauduit, H. de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.72-73 He erroneously claims colonel Tiburce Sébastiani succeeded to Girard and that he led the division on the 17th of June and after.

Cf. Arvers, P. Historique du 82<sup>e</sup> régiment d'infanterie de ligne p.161

General De Villiers had broken his arm and Piat had one of his legs shattered. Cf.

Pontécoulant, F.G. de Souvenirs militaires etc.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Conrady, E. von Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.245-246

47. According to Hofschröer, Pirch II was launched against St.Amand twice. Additionally, he believes St.Amand was taken by Pirch II in his second attack and to lose, to be retaken and relost by Krafft accordingly. The fact is, however, that Pirch attacked St.Amand la Haye and that St.Amand was only taken from the French around 6 p.m.

<sup>48</sup> Die Geschichte des 28. Regiments. Special ABN, nr.65 p.22

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Conrady, E. von Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.247

Wagner, Plane etc. p.35 He informs us major Von Rohr, commander of the battalion, fell at this moment.

50. Die Geschichte des 28. Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.22

Harkort, F. Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen landwehrregiments p.47

Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I. Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In:

Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.17

Again, this document mentions here Saint Amand only, while it should be Saint-Amand-la-Haye (including the grave-yard).

It also mentions the support here of battalions of the 7th brigade, but these came in later. It also gives the overall impression that the French gave a strong resistance.

In similar terms is colonel Von Reiche. In: Memoiren etc. p.186-187

51. Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 etc. Vol.I p.159

Houssaye claims there were by now 2500 losses (of the 5000). In: 1815. Waterloo p.174

Martinien gives the losses in officers for the different regiments:

12th regiment light infantry: 23

4th regiment of the line: 25

86th regiment of the line: 7

Cf. Martinien, M. Tableaux par corps et par batailles etc. p.421, 127 and 300

52. Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.136-137

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.198

Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I. Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In:

Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.17

This action may have been the action to which captain Aubry (12th regiment chasseurs à cheval) refers in his memoirs. According to Aubry the French horsemen advanced to a body of Prussian lancers who came too close.

During most of the battle, the 12th regiment of chasseurs à cheval was stationary behind the infantry and suffered now and then from the Prussian artillery-fire. Both Aubry himself and the brigade general Vino got hit and were carried to Fleurus later on. Cf. Aubry. Souvenirs du 12e chasseurs p.187-197

Von Reiche mentions the fact that both both regiments were engaged but doesn't mention any French cavalry. He believes French skirmishers, followed by columns, advanced. As by that manoeuvre the brigade of Pirch II and the artillery (in position between Ligny and St.Amand) were in danger, the cavalry made a dash forward and rolled up the French skirmishers; the Prussian artillery fired at the French columns and Pirch II retook St.Amand-[La Haye] Cf. Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.187

<sup>53</sup> Conrady, E.von Geschichte des Königlich etc.p.247

Report of Von Zieten about the cavalry of the 1st corps. In: KA, VI.E.3.15 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.4

Report of major Von Folgersberg (1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.179 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.45-46

Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.17  
Wagner, Plane etc. p.35

<sup>54</sup> Report of captain Von Wildowski (3rd regiment of Brandenburg uhlands). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.172 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.53-54

Goltz, G.F.G. Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.164

Von Treskow believes the regiment was used to drive away the skirmishers from the foot battery nr.3 (2nd brigade). Cf. report in KA, VI.E.7.II.162 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.67

Cf.Goltz, G.F.G. Geschichte etc. p.164

Wagner, Plane etc. p.35

<sup>55</sup> Report of Von Röder. In: KA, nr.VI.E.7.I.156 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.74

Kraatz-Koschlau, M.T. Geschichte des 1.Brandenburgischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.2 p.102

<sup>56</sup> Report of the 5th regiment of Brandenburg dragoons. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.166 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.31

<sup>57</sup> Report of lieutenant colonel Von Woyski (1st regiment of WestPrussian dragoons). In: KA, VI.E.7.I.164 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.34

Major general Von Röder. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.156 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.74-76

Von Treskow believes the 1st regiment of WestPrussian dragoons supported the 5th regiment of Brandenburg dragoons to the right rear of Ligny. In his report. In: KA, VI.E.7.II.162 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.66

<sup>58</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA, VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.10

Wagner, Plane etc. p.34, 36

<sup>59</sup> Wagner, Plane etc. p.34

Stawitzky, L. – Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.51

60. Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. (Kriegsarchiv VI.E.13) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny In: Die Armee 1.Jg.1902 nr.2 p.16

Report of Pirch I. In: KA, VI.E.15.2 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.6

Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA, VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.10

Report of major general Von Wahlen Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.26

Report of colonel Von Schön (7th brigade). In: KA, VI.E.15.93 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI

nr.VII.5.p.19

Wagner, Plane etc. p.34

Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleons Untergang p.328

<sup>61</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.51

<sup>62</sup> Stawitzky, L. – Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.52

<sup>63</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.10-11

<sup>64</sup> Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 etc. Vol.I p.159 He gives no source for this claim.

<sup>65</sup> Report of major Von Helmenstreit, in: Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.55  
Wagner, Plane etc. p.37

<sup>66</sup> Report of major Von Röbell, in: Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.56-57

<sup>67</sup> Wagner, Plane etc. p.37

According to Stawitzky, both the musketeer battalions of the 25th regiment were able to maintain their positions, despite the strong French fire. It would have been the precipitate retreat from Saint-Amand-le-Hameau of the skirmishers of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr which would have caused them to fall back, the more as they lacked support and leadership. In: Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.54-56

<sup>68</sup> Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie Regiments etc. p.14-15  
Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.57

<sup>69</sup> Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.12  
Wagner, Plane etc. p.37  
Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.57

<sup>70</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.57

Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.327-328. Vom Mach's account is hard to understand as he claims the regiment took part in the struggle in and for Saint Amand la Haye, while it didn't. In describing the actions I have come to the conclusion that he must be meaning Saint Amand le Hameau instead, though even then his description is not always very clear.

<sup>71</sup> Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.327

72. Report of major general Von Tippelskirch. In: KA. VI.E.15.12 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.12

This brigade would have prevented the French from advancing any further out of Wagnelée. Cf.

Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.152

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.199-201

Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleons Untergang p.329-330

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.173

Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.172

Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.187

<sup>73</sup> Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte etc. p.58-59

74.According to Von Zieten the cavalry of Jürgass was successful but he doesn't specify in what way. Cf. report of Von Zieten, dated 8 July 1815 in: Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.418

Though Von Damitz indicates the intention of the action, he cannot provide any details about its execution. In: Damitz, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.134

The diary of the 1st corps – which is in its description of the battle of Ligny most confusing in a lot of details and its arrangements (like for instance mixing up St.Amand and St.Amand-la-Haye) – describes as if Von Jürgass advanced between Mellet, St.Amand and Heppignies, but that it had no success due to the fact that the enemy advanced from Mellet towards Wagnelée ! Cf. Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps etc. In: Hafner, D. Hans Carl Ernst Graf von Zieten, Königlich Preussischer Generalfeldmarschall p.255

Wagner states Jürgass posted his cavalry in such a way so as to be able to fall upon the enemy in case he might emerge from Wagnelée. In: Plane etc. p.35

Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.188

Ollech, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 etc. p.149

<sup>75</sup> In: Dziengel, J.D.von Geschichte des Könighchen Zweiten Ulanen-Regiments p.386

Eck, Von Geschichte des 2.Westfälischen etc. p.142-144

Major general Von Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.26

76. Count Von Wedel of the 1st regiment of Pommerian hussars nr.5. In: Geschichte eines Offiziers etc. p.250 Von Wedel claims he fought against the 8th hussars, but this regiment didn't form part of the French army.

<sup>77</sup> Ravenstein, H. Historische Darstellung etc.p.122

<sup>78</sup> Report of major Von Folgersberg (1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.179 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.45-49

79. Report of major general Von Wahlen Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.26

80. Report of major general Von Wahlen Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.26

Ollech, Von. Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.150

The 1st and 4th squadron of the Neumark Dragoon regiment nr.6 of the brigade Von Thümen were so well covered that they had very few casualties even though they were under heavy French artillery fire. Cf. Hagen, E.von Geschichte des Neumärkischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.3 p.279

81.Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.385

Von Ollech places her on the extreme right flank, towards Mellet. Cf. Ollech, Von. Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.150

Jürgass himself says he was supported by Von der Marwitz a bit later but doesn't give any details. Cf. Report of major general Von Wahlen Jürgass. In: KA, VI.E.15.145. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.26

According Von Der Marwitz himself his brigade left the 3rd corps by 4 p.m. He moved it from Bothey through Sombreffe to a position west of Wagnelée, after having briefly discussed his mission with Blücher, Gneisenau and Von Pfuell at the windmill of Brye. In: Aus dem Nachlasse etc. Vol.II p.116-117

All in all, he may have reached his new position by 4.30 p.m.