

16th – 22nd of April

The situation of Wellington.

On the 18th of April, sir Charles Stuart wrote from Brussels to Castlereagh:

“Arrangements have been adopted by general Gneisenau for dividing the Prussian army at present on the Meuse and the Sambre into three corps. They are shortly to be reinforced by a fourth corps of 30.000 men which, it is expected, will cross th Rhine about the 20th of this month, and the whole will be placed under the command of prince Blücher.

No material movement has taken place on either side in the front, since I had the honour to address your Lordship.

Orders having been received from Paris for provisioning Lille, Valenciennes, Condé and the other fortresses of French Flanders for six months the French contractors have made considerable purchase of cattle and grain on the Belgian side of the frontier.

As measures will be adopted to impede the exportation of supplies from this country and the cattle have been stopped in several instances at the out-posts, they will very shortly be deprived of this resource.

General Vandamme has marched a reinforcement of several battalions to Dunkirk and has endeavoured to inspire terror among a population certainly well disposed to the royal cause, by acts of severity which justify the reputation he has acquired.

Loyal deputations from the communs of Armentières, Bailleul, Aire and from different towns on the frontier have arrived at Ghent during the last fortnight.

The accounts of the disposition prevalent at Paris, have certainly been very satisfactory, since Bonaparte has openly manifested an intention to render his views in a great measure subservient to the interests of the Jacobin party.[..]”¹

It was on the 16th of April that the duke of Wellington left for Ostend to inspect the situation there. In passing through Gent he had a look at the works executed by the orders of the prince of Orange. Having done that, he proceeded to Ostend the same day. From there he visited Nieupoort and Ypres, on the 19th he was at Ath and he returned to Brussels on the 20th of april.²

It was after his visit to Ghent that the duke made a strong plea towards the prince of Orange for the completion of the works there by strengthening the Bruges-gate and to repair those of the citadel; other than that he did so for fortified places of Tournay, Ath and Mons.³

This week was no exception in Wellington’s need for more troops. On the 21st he wrote to major general Torrens:

“Before you send any more general officers let me see more troops. [...] I must, besides, mention that in the Peninsula I always kept three or four divisions under my own immediate command, which, in fact, was the working part of the army, thrown, as necessary, upon the flank or the other. It might be convenient to have something of the same kind now.”⁴

And to earl Bathurst he made a request for more guns (he had asked for 150 guns, but had then only 72) and for horses and drivers for musket ball cartridge carts, entrenching tools, carts for the engineers, pontoons and the heavy artillery.⁵

Wellington was not the only one to write about the lack of drivers in particular as the commander of the Royal Horse Artillery, sir Augustus Frazer wrote on the 21st of April: Brussels: “I arrived here yesterday, and am off this morning for Ostend, to arrange and to hasten the lauding of ordnance and stores; this will occupy a few days. The army cannot move for three weeks; our corps and every other is yet inefficient; we have here a couple of hundred horses, but no drivers; we pick up fellows in the streets to look after the horses.

Our deficiency at this time is about 3000 men, and 5000 horses, but all these we may readily have, and I have written home on the subject. We are to have in all, 17 batteries, and 8 troops of artillery with the army.”⁶

By this time, at least several cavalry units were dropping in from Ostend, through Brugge and Eeklo towards Ghent.⁷

The presence of strong French forces on the northern frontier was confirmed again: the presence of a corps (Reille's) in and around Valenciennes and 60.000 men between Dunkerque and Givet. A rumour was spreading that Napoleon would attack Wellington near Lille by surprise, but at the same time there were reports that no further troops would be on the way to the north of France.⁸

And according to the intelligence the duke received through viscount Castlereagh the situation for an invasion would be optimal as France would not be totally in the hands of Buonaparte; as there would be no army fit to contend with or resist the allies and that the army present was the sole base of power of the emperor. Other than that, the people would not rise in any case; the esprit militaire would be on the wane in France and there would be no public feeling, out of the troops, against the entrance of the allies.⁹

Additionally, Wellington received through earl Bathurst detailed information about the composition of the French 7th, 8th and 9th corps.¹⁰

Apparently, in this period, the duke made a kind of planned tour as on the 15th he wrote to Gneisenau: “Je pars demain matin pour Ostende, et je fais un tour de la frontière, qui me retiendra quatre jours.”¹¹

On the 17th of April a pontoon-bridge over the Rupel near Boom (about 10 kilometers south of Antwerp) was constructed; this passage was regarded as vital in case of a retreat towards Antwerp.¹²

It was also in this period, on the 21st of April, that the union of the armies of the North (Dutch) and South Netherlands (Belgian) was effected.

The situation of the Prussian army.

From Liège Gneisenau wrote to Von Clausewitz on the 16th of April:

“Es ist, nach den uns des feindes Stärke zugekommenen Nachrichten, nicht wahrscheinlich dass solcher seinerseits den Feldzug bald eröffnen werde, unsererseits sollen wir ihn noch nicht eröffnen, obgleich wir es vernünftiger Weise müssen, denn in wenigen Tagen haben wir 53.000 [¹³] Mann Preussen zu Gebot und der Feind beginnt erst seine Bataillone auszuheben, die noch nicht gekleidet noch ausgerüstet sind. Geschütz ist noch nicht bespannt. Alles dies müssten und sollten wir stören, aber es soll nicht so sein.”¹⁴

Another, much more extensive and informative letter was written by Gneisenau to Boyen on the 18th of April:

“Ein Einbruch in Frankreich zwischen Luxemburg und Givet hat seine grosse Schwierigkeiten wegen Mangel an Lebensmitteln, schlechten Wege und ich darf sagen, wegen dem wahrscheinlich kriegerischen Charakter der Einwohner dieser Gegenden. Wir haben im vorigen Jahr eine Erfahrung über den letzteren Punkt im Ardennendepartement mit der Lützowschen Kavallerie gemacht. In fruchtbaren Gegenden haben die Einwohner stets einen ruhigeren, furchtsameren, weniger unternehmenden Charakter und fühlen auch den Druck des Krieges weniger; in armen Gegenden aber tritt wirkliche Not zu schnell ein.

Gegen Givet würde uns die Maas und eine gute Chaussee führen und die Eroberung dieses Ortes zum Schutz unserer neuen Provinz sehr wichtig sein. Von da könnte die Eroberung der anderen Plätze an der Maas eingeleitet werden, die, Mézières ausgenommen, nicht von Bedeutung sein sollen.

Kämen wir damit zustande, so hätten wir den Vorteil, künftighin eine Vormauer für unsere neue Provinz zu haben; auch liessen sich auf diese Weise unsere Operationen mit denen des Herrn von Wellington verbinden; aber ein solcher Festungskrieg ist kostbar und weit aussehend. Für einen Invasionskrieg ist mir die Linie zwischen Luxemburg und Givet zu unwegsam und zu arm an Lebensmitteln. Es wäre indessen ein Versuch zu machen, wenn die Aufstellung der anderen Armeen und ihre Stärke es zulässt. Es ist sicherlich eine der schwächsten Fronten Frankreichs, und das Unerwartete tut im Kriege stets Wirkung; aber das Misslingen ist hier [...], wegen Natur des Bodens und des Charakters der Einwohner. Ein leichteres Eindringen gewährt uns die Operationslinie von Luxemburg über Longway und Verdun. Der erstere dieser Orte ist nicht gross und leicht zu bezwingen; der letztere soll sehr verfallen sein. Man könnte wohl beide zugleich belagern, und ich glaube, 30 Stück Belagerungsgeschütz würden dazu hinreichen. Wir sind aber auf diesem Weg nicht in so naher Verbindung mit anderen Armeen, und durch die nahen und bedeutenden Kriegsplätze Thionville und Metz sind unsere Kommunikationen bedroht. Hier also müsste eine starke Reserve uns folgen. Luxemburg liegt hierbei vortrefflich als Magazinplatz. Das Land umher, ohnedies arm, ist durch die langen Kantonierungen aufgezehrt, und wenn der Markt von Arlon nicht mehr Zufuhren aus Frankreich erhält, was in friedlichen Zeiten der Fall ist, so ist nicht genug Getreide vorhanden, um auch uns ein Armeekorps zu erhalten. Hier müsste auf der Mosel zugefahren werden, deren Schifffahrt im Sommer schwierig ist.

Als man 50.000 Gewehre aus Lüttich versprach, machte man sich wohl zu grosse Begriffe von den hiesigen Vorräten. Man hat die Veranstaltung getroffen, dass in 5 Monaten 12.000 Gewehre, alle 12 Tage 1000 Stück abgeliefert werden; dafür zahlt man etwas Geld, das übrige in Bons. Das ist das Höchste, was man auf diese Weise schaffen kann. Mit barem Geld aber könnte die Summe der Gewehre sehr gesteigert werden.

Im ersten Augenblick jetzt in den Rheinprovinzen noch mehr zu formieren als das 1. Aufgebot, wird schwer möglich sein, da 19.000 alte Soldaten vor Errichtung der Landwehr aufgerufen sind. Hierzu 25 bis 26.000 Mann Landwehr ist in einem Fabriklande sehr viel, um so mehr, da es der grossen Anstrengungen nicht gewohnt ist und von Napoleon geschont und in seiner Verbindung mit Frankreich blühend war.

Dass ich die sächsischen Offiziere, welche Anstellung bei uns verlangt haben, ohne Rücksicht auf ihren Geburtsort anstellen kann, meine ich doch wohlverstanden zu haben da dies nur gute Offiziere sind? Dass diejenigen, die zu uns übergegangen sind, nicht aufgegeben werden dürfen, versteht sich wohl von selbst.

Der Grundsatz, dass man diejenigen [sic] sächsischen Offiziere, die in ihren sächsischen Verhältnissen [ein] höheres Gehalt haben, solches in ihren preussischen Verhältnissen nicht zugestehen will, hat Schaden getan. Wir hätten dadurch den grösseren Teil der Ingenieuroffiziere gewonnen, die nun, da der Ingenieurhauptmann [...] der aus sächsischen in preussische Dienste übergetreten ist, 10 Reichstaler monatlich Gehalt jetzt verliert, dadurch abgeschreckt sind. Dass der Oberst Aster, der russischer General werden konnte, nicht in gleicher Eigenschaft bei uns aufgenommen ist, wird getadelt.

Ich habe dafür gehalten, dass bei dem Mangel an Geldmitteln und an Händen es besser sei, alle unsere disponiblen Kräfte auf Köln zu wenden und die schwachen Mittel nicht an mehreren Punkten zu zersplittern; haben Sie so viel noch übrig, so mögen Sie immerhin auch auf Koblenz etwas verwenden. Das Arbeiten durch Soldaten, wenn man deren entbehren kann, ist nach den Erfahrungen des Obersten Aster nur dann gut, wenn statt täglicher Zulagen die Arbeit im Verding gemacht wird. Für Mainz ist nichts disponibel als 3 Bataillone

münsterscher Landwehr unter dem Obersten Borstell, welche im Jahr [18]13-[18]14 mit den bergischen Truppen diente und später die neuen Landwehren vom Rhein.

Die Franzosen rüsten sich jetzt stark. Aus den Erfahrungen des letzten Krieges weiss ich, dass solche Rüstungen, vom Tage des gegebenen Dekretes an gerechnet, erst in sechs Wochen ihre Wirkung zeigen. Erlaubte daher uns die Politik, den Krieg sogleich anzufangen, so würden wir das meiste davon noch stören können, so aber werden wir abermals so lange warten, bis der Feind mit seinen Vorbereitungen zustande ist.

Vor den 3130 Bataillonen darf man nicht erschrecken; ihre Zusammensetzung ist schlecht. Mehr besorgnis machen mir die in Paris jetzt angeordneten Waffenfabrikationen, wodurch man alle alten Soldaten binnen kurzem wird wehrhaft machen können, und unsere, der Verbündeten, unselige Politik [...]. An der Grenze ist noch alles ruhig.¹⁵

The next day, on the 19th of April, Blücher joined Gneisenau in Liège.¹⁶

Though it was designed on the 28th of March, the total reorganisation of the army was initiated on the 21st of April as by then enough units had arrived; it was not until the end of May that it was fully completed. At least for the corps it meant that they were renumbered. The former 2nd corps (Von Zieten) now became the 1st, the former 3rd (Von Borstell) became the 2nd, while the former 1st corps (Pirch II) became the 3rd and which was now led by Von Thielmann.¹⁷

The invasion into France.

Meanwhile, at Vienna, Clancarty had communicated Wellington's proposal (dated 10th of April) for the invasion of France on the 1st of May to the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia and Russia. In a meeting they all admitted the policy of immediate action and accordingly a military commission, representing Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Württemberg, assembled on the evening of the 19th of April. The earl of Cathcart attended on behalf of Great Britain.¹⁸

The report of the results of this meeting reads:

“On a mis en délibération les derniers dépêches que le maréchal duc de Wellington avait envoyées à my lord Clancarty, en date de 10 Avril, de Bruxelles. Le duc propose de commencer l'offensive contre la France le 1 du Mois de Mai. Il soutient que Napoléon n'a point encore des forces suffisantes pour se défendre contre une armée de 270.000 hommes, qu'il croit que les Alliés pourraient mettre en campagne à cette époque, tandis qu'il calcule qu'à 180.000 hommes les forces que Napoléon pourrait nous opposer. Le duc observe encore qu'il croit très nécessaire de soutenir par une prompte attaque les mouvemens du Midi de la France. Il suppose enfin que l'assemblée sur le Champ de Mai que Napoléon avait convoquée pour le 15 de ce mois lui fournira de très grande moyens si on lui laisse du tems de les assembler et de les développer.

Après avoir pris cette opinion militaire du maréchal duc de Wellington [as contained in his letter dated 10th of April] en longue et mûre considération, la haute Conférence est convenue des points suivans:

L'armée Prussienne ne peut être rassemblée sur le Bas Rhin que vers la fin du mois de Mai, ou encore elle ne présentera qu'une force de 100.000 hommes, y compris les troupes du Nord de l'Allemagne.

L'armée Autrichienne ne commencera pas à se former avant le 18 Mai sur les points de Kannstadt, Stockach et Hall, où elle ne pourra réunir que 120.000 hommes, jusqu'à la fin de ce mois.

Il n'y a donc que l'armée Bavaroise et Wurtembourgeoise, et les troupes de Bade et de Darmstadt, dont on pourrait disposer au commencement du mois de Mai.

Toute opération offensive que l'armée du Haut Rhin pourrait entreprendre l'oblige à disposer d'un corps de 50.000 à 60.000 hommes, tant pour le blocus des forteresses que pour maintenir l'esprit du peuple dans les départements du Nord de la France, et pour y organiser les moyens de subsistance pour l'armée.

Les mouvements dans le Midi de France sont beaucoup trop éloignés des armées du Nord pour espérer qu'elles pourraient les seconder à temps.

On est enfin généralement de l'avis de ne pas vouloir hasarder des attaques séparées qui ne pourraient pas être soutenues par des forces supérieures à celles de l'ennemi, et on croit que des chances qu'on pourrait avoir pour soi, en attaquant, ne sont pas à comparer au mauvais effet que pourrait produire une défaite des premiers corps des Alliés.

On a donc unanimement décidé de ne commencer l'offensive contre la France qu'au premier du mois de Juin.

Le lieutenant-général Knesebeck a proposé de détacher un corps disponible de 30.000 hommes sur Genève, tant pour occuper les points importants de la Suisse que pour l'employer suivant les circonstances à soutenir les mouvements du Midi de la France.

La haute Conférence a été unanimement de l'avis qu'il est indispensablement nécessaire d'avoir trois routes militaires en Suisse, savoir, la route de Bâle, la route du Simplon, et une route de communication entre les armées du Rhin et celle d'Italie.

On n'aurait pas moins désiré pouvoir dès à présent occuper militairement la Suisse, mais on a trouvé qu'un détachement pour le Midi de la France serait beaucoup trop hasardé, et par conséquent tout-à-fait contraire à ces principes établis plus haut, et adopté par la Conférence. Le maréchal Wrede a supposé le cas que le duc de Wellington fut attaqué de vives forces avant que les armées Alliées fussent en état de prendre l'offensive, et c'est dans ce seul cas que la haute Conférence a cru devoir admettre la nécessité de faire faire alors une démonstration à l'armée Bavaroise et Wurtembourgeoise vers Metz, pour dégager l'armée du duc de Wellington.”¹⁹

So, concluding, the allies agreed not to follow Wellington's recommendation to start the invasion of France on the 1st of May, but to put it on 1st of June. This news must have reached Wellington and Blücher late April, as lieutenant colonel Hardinge wrote to lord FitzRoy Somerset on the 30th of April:

“The last Prussian news from Vienna fixes the commencement of operations the beginning of June, and that the Austrian army cannot be upon the Rhine before the latter end of May. I understood that this period of June had been fixed at a military conference.”²⁰

It was also still on the 23rd of April that Wellington expected the armies to be in motion before half of May, so he must have got the news some days later.²¹

The supply situation.²²

In having a war with France at hand, the allies were faced with the huge task of provisioning the hundreds of thousands of men of the coalition.

Given this scale, the unjustness of requisitions from the people of friendly states on one side and the insufficient financial means of the main powers of Europe involved – Prussia, England, Austria and Russia – to purchase provisions on commercial terms on the other, ways had to be sought for the solution of this problem.

It was the Prussian statesman Stein [²³] who came up with the idea of establishing inter-governmental contracts for supplies, payable at fixed rates with deferred settlement dates; the individual suppliers would be paid by their own governments and not by the foreign armies. Within this context, the contractors would be the powers mentioned, as these were the ones which had formally declared war on Napoleon.

As Britain was on a different footing in this (see above), the other powers attempted to agree upon subsistence arrangements which would be binding upon the entire Continental alliance. Using statistical data, Austria, Prussia and Russia defined geographical zones for Germany (i.e. the territories of the German princes), called “rayons.” Each of them was to supply the armies of a great power for three months until those armies should be able to draw upon French resources as they advanced.

It meant for Prussia the assignment of supplying the Hanseatic towns, Hanover, Brunswick, Rhenish Prussia and north-west Germany. Austria was to supply Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria while Russia would be responsible for the middle German states, Saxony, Bamberg, Ansbach etc.

The proposal in this way was agreed upon and formalised in seances held by a special committee (in which Austria, Russia and Prussia were represented) at Vienna on the 21st and 30th of April.²⁴

Right from the start, Britain, although relying in part upon German contingents, was excluded from the German rayon scheme. Wellington’s British army (including the King’s German Legion) and the regular Hanoverian contingent would get their supplies from British sources, paying cash at a commercial rate, while the Netherlands forces drew upon their own sources. And it was from this that complications came up.

Though Brunswick, Hanover (with a second contingent), Nassau and the Hanseatic towns were supposed to send troops to Belgium, no arrangements had been made at Vienna for their subsistence there.

First of all, their home governments were in the Prussian rayon and therefore were to deliver supplies for the Prussian army. And secondly, as the king of the Netherlands was no party in the agreements made at Vienna, this would mean that, strictly speaking, these contingents were to draw upon the Netherlands sources (for commercial rates).

At Vienna, British objections to this situation were dismissed by the statement that the rayon system was for Germany and that Britain could not have a rayon inside the country.²⁵

From the very start of the Prussian presence in the Low Countries, the supply of the Prussian army must have been a matter of great concern and strain between the two countries.

Before the corps of Von Zieten moved into Namur on the 2nd of April, Von Röder wrote on the 31st of March: “Was die Verpflegung anbetrifft, so sind die holländischen Kommissarien angewiesen worden, mit den unsrigen alles Erforderliche zu vereinbaren, damit es an nichts fehle.”²⁶

This arrangement, however vital, was a bilateral one between the Netherlands and Prussia, provoked by the emergency of the situation; apart from that, no price or payment terms seem to have been set.

And as Wellington had arrived in Brussels a few days later and asked Gneisenau to move the Prussian army further west, so as to be nearer to his army he wrote him: “Je dois avertir votre Excellence que le roi des Pays Bas a donné ses ordres que les mesures soient prises pour pouvoir vos troupes de tout ce qu’il leur faudra quand elles s’avanceront dans ce pays-ci.”²⁷

Resulting, general Von Röder wrote to Wellington on the 8th of April:

“Son Excellence Monsieur le duc de Wellington est supplié de vouloir accorder son intervention pour assurer la subsistance des troupes prussiennes cantonnants sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, tant en vivres qu’en fourrages.”²⁸

For the Prussians, Wellington was the guarantee of the promise of king Willem to take care of the supplies Blücher’s army needed.

In that context it was on the 27th of May that Von Müffling reported to the Prussian king:

“[...] worauf der Herzog mir die ganzen Wiener Verhandlungen, im Betref der Rayons mittheilte und hierzu sagte: er habe den König der Niederlande aufgefordert die Verpflegung

für uns besorgen zu lassen, und die Ausgleichungen (die ihm nicht fehlen könnten) auf diplomatischem Wege zu fordern.”²⁹

Yet, the system did not work the way it was supposed to do as magazines were not supplied in time and the local governments responsible for the distribution of the supplies did not do what they were supposed to do.

It led Gneisenau to write a complaint about the situation to Von Boyen on the 18th of April: “Sie haben, verehrter Freund, unsere Lage hier richtig beurteilt. Der Feind wird uns so bald nicht von hier vertreiben, aber wohl der Hunger. Vorderhand zwar ist noch einigermaßen gesorgt, wie lange dies aber noch in diesen Hungersmonaten bis zur Ernte dauern werde, lässt sich nicht vorher bestimmen. In diesem Augenblick schon isst unsere Kavallerie Hafer, der auf französischem Gebiet gewachsen ist. Wird die Sperre verhängt, dann treten Verlegenheiten ein.

Die Anstellung des Grafen Dohna-Wundlaken neben dem Gouverneur Sack ist ebenfalls schädlich und die Einheit störend. Um die Verpflegung der Armee zu sichern, ordnete der Graf an, dass fortan die Einwohner ihre Einquartierung zu ernähren hätten, und zwar ohne Vergütung. Nun ist die Eifel und die Ardennen ein sehr armes Land und bereits sehr hart mitgenommen. Sollte die Anordnung des Grafen Dohna in Ausführung ferner noch gebracht werden, so müssten die Einwohner auswandern. Nun ist den Gouvernementskommissärs hier in Luxemburg und Koblenz aufgetragen, für die Verpflegung der Truppen auf Wegen der Lieferung durch Kontrakte oder Ausschreibungen, wo solche ausführbar sind, zu sorgen. Ein Teil unserer Truppen ist auf belgisches Gebiet gerückt, und der König der Niederlande hat die Verbindlichkeit übernommen, sie verpflegen zu lassen, aber das geschieht nicht in der ganzen Ausdehnung, und Stockungen nebst Klagen von beiden Seiten haben sich schon ergeben, weswegen ich den o.K.Kommissär Ribbentrop nach Brüssel zur Abhilfe gestern gesandt habe. [..]”³⁰

And Gneisenau wrote a second one on the 8th of May, again to Von Boyen:

“Über die Verpflegung in dem sehr ausgezehreten Lande zwischen Maas, Mosel und Rhein steigern sich meine Besorgnisse mit jedem Tage. Ich sehe den Augenblick kommen, wo wir dieses Land verlassen und ein anderes suchen müssen, wo wir zu leben finden. Das ist unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen allein Brabant. Jetzt können wir aus diesem Lande (Brabant) nur durch Unternehmer etwas ziehen, nämlich wenn wir bezahlen. Aber an Geld fehlt es in allen Kassen. Gehen wir aber auf das linke Maasufer, so leben wir von den Vorräthen der Einwohner und geben höchstens Bons. Diese Maasregel vereinigt sich auch mit einer andern. Unsere beiden ersten Armeekorps nämlich stehen das eine bei Fleurus, das andere bei Namur. Wenn der Feind aus seinen Festungen schnell vordringt, so können sie mit Übermacht angegriffen werden. Wenn wir aber das vierte Armeekorps ebenfalls auf das linke Maasufer versetzen und es einen Marsch östlich von Gembloux aufstellen, so kann es zur Schlacht sich vereinigen. Das noch schwache dritte Armeekorps kann in diesem Falle bei dem Kreuzwege unweit Ciney aufgestellt werden, um einer etwaigen Detachirung des Feindes von Givet nach Lüttich zu begegnen. Die Gegend daselbst ist sehr schwierig.

Ich vernehme dass kaiser Alexander seine Armee zwischen die drei andern einschieben will. In diesem Fall können also wir das Kriegstheater an der Mosel nicht erhalten und wir müssen danach uns auf das an der Maas vorbereiten. Wundern Sie sich daher nicht, wenn Sie vernehmen, dass wir eine neue Aufstellung angenommen haben. Die Kriegsregel: schnell vereinigt seyn zu können und die Nothwendigkeit: dem Mangel vorzubeugen, sind für eine solche Bewegung hinlängliche Motive; selbige kann aber nicht ausgeführt werden bevor das Vierte Armeekorps nicht heran ist.”³¹

Apparently, the mission of commissary Von Ribbentrop as sent out by Gneisenau by the 18th of April had not been very succesful.

By now, the Prussian army lived from the inhabitants by paying them with promissory notes, as it lacked the money to pay them in cash. However, the Dutch authorities either refused to accept them and return them in cash, or were very slow in doing so. This, in turn, was of course detrimental to the relationships between the Prussians and the local inhabitants.

It even touched upon units of the army of the Netherlands, as for instance commanders of cantonments of the cavalry brigade of Van Merlen complained to Van Merlen himself about requisitions being carried out there for the Prussian army as well.³²

By the 29th of April, it led Provost - first counsellor to the embassy in Brussels - to write to Metternich: "Quelque justice que l'on rende à la valeur que les troupes prussiennes ont déployé dans les dernières campagnes, il n'en est pas moins vrai que leur conduite dans les endroits où elles sont actuellement en cantonnements les fait détester, et surtout dans le pays de Liège qu'elles épuisent totalement et de vivres et de contributions en argent; elles traitent ce pays et la province de Luxembourg en pays ennemi. Cette conduite contraste singulièrement avec celle des troupes anglaises et hanovriennes qui payent exactement ce qu'on leur fournit; ces dernières commettent bien aussi quelques petits excès, mais au moins elles ne battent et ne maltraitent pas les habitants comme font les Prussiens.[..]"³³

By the 1st of May, the situation was such that even the Prussians were threatening to withdraw their forces across the Rhine, while they had been obliged, since entering the Low Countries, to feed them from Jülich.³⁴

Two weeks later, on the 14th of May, Wellington sent a sharp reaction about the real situation in the Low Countries, contrary to what was said about it in Vienna.

He indicated to Clancarty the fact that, first of all, neither Hanover, nor Brunswick nor Prussia were paying any money for their troops in the Low Countries, and secondly, that it was not true that the Prussians drew their magazines from Jülich.

At the same time, the duke did not see these points worth disputing. What counted for him was the great interest of the allies and as far as both previous points respecting the rayons was concerned he left it to Clancarty to make such an arrangement as he thought proper.

For Wellington the bitter discussion over rations was secondary to what the allies were supposed to do: to endeavour to lessen their expenses and for Britain to "assist them as much as possible in drawing every resource from the countries within their reach, in order to enable them to subsist the enormous bodies which they are bringing to bear upon one point."³⁵

Meanwhile, it was on the 21st of May that king Willem sent a letter to Gneisenau in which he stated that the presence of the Prussian troops was too much of a burden to his country and that it was desirable to alleviate it, one way or another.³⁶

Colonel Hardinge wrote about it on the 22nd, after the letter had dropped in at Namur:

"General Gneisenau informs me a letter has just been received from the King of the Netherlands, the substance of which announces that the Prussian troops are felt to be a very heavy charge to this part of this country, and that it is desirable to consider of means to alleviate the pressure. It is intended to answer that the Prussians did not come uninvited, or purely for Prussian objects, and that if the King is decidedly of opinion that their services are no longer required, they will move on the Moselle, where, he added, the right bank afforded abundant subsistences and where the entrance into France presented none of impediments of fortified places with which the Belgian frontier was crowded."³⁷

The substance of the answer, as written by colonel Von Pfuel of the general staff, on the 24th of May is unknown, but the general tone may have been in the line Hardinge wrote the day after.³⁸

Before, Wellington wrote Hardinge on the 24th:

"In regard to the king of the Netherlands, his case is a very hard one. This subsistence of the Prussian army ought to be provided for on a trifling payment by a rayon, consisting of different countries in Germany, and on the left of the Rhine, as lately settled by the Congress.

The circumstances of our general situation require they should be here; for I can never admit that all the allies have not nearly an equal interest in preventing this country from falling, even for a moment, into the hands of the enemy; and the King of the Netherlands is obliged not only to maintain them at the expense of 200.000 pound sterling a month which is saved to the rayon, which ought to maintain them; but they do not pay him what they would be obliged to pay the rayon, from which they ought to be subsisted; and he besides gives subsistence to the whole of the army under my command, to which his country belongs as a rayon.

The King does not complain of subsisting them; and I believe they have been, and will be, as well taken care of in his country as on the Moselle or elsewhere; but he complains of the expense, which ought not to fall upon him, but partly on the King of Prussia, and partly on the countries forming the rayon of the Prussian army.

I beg you will explain this point to general Gneisenau. As soon as we understand well the basis on which this question stands, I will enter farther into it.”³⁹

Hardinge wrote as a reply on the 25th of May:

“I spoke with general Gneisenau this forenoon on the subject of the subsistence of the Prussian troops by the King of the Netherlands. I introduced the conversation by asking if the general had received the Vienna arrangements for the subsisting of the allied armies by rayons of countries. He said he had not; and that he knew nothing more on the subject than the references made to such a system in the letters he had lately received, and by the information he had obtained from general Grollmann, who happened to be at Vienna at the time the Commission was sitting. I then explained the points, according to your Lordship’s instructions, which render the case of the King of the Netherlands a hard one. The general admitted the expense to be very heavy: his reasoning on the questions was, that when circumstances rendered it expedient that the Prussian troops should enter Belgium, it was stipulated that their subsistence should be provided at the expense of the King of the Netherlands, and that your Lordship was a party, or the guarantee to this stipulation, and the principal cause of the readiness with which the movement was made without magazines or means to supply their troops; that the King of the Netherlands can only complain of the heaviness of the expense, and require an indemnity, since the period of the Vienna arrangement taking effect; and that he has no doubt the redress which those arrangements point out for the case of a rayon furnishing more than its own army will be fairly fulfilled on the part of the King of Prussia; and that he knows corn and other supplies are sending by Prussia to Rotterdam; but that the agitating of this subject by the King in writing in the style of a complaint to this head quarters on a matter requiring representation between the two Courts is calculated to have any but a good effect; and that on several occasions of unpleasant communications from the Netherlands government, he has abstained from any mention of them in his despatches to the King of Prussia for the purpose of avoiding any sharp correspondence. However, if the King’s ministers continue to seize with eagerness every opportunity of collecting grievances of the ruin of the country by the Prussians, that the latter may be compelled to make a printed statement of the causes to which these misfortunes are attributable, which, he acknowledged, were severe, but maintained were owing to the bad measures of the government in their arrangements of magazines, and to the ignorance of their commissaries, and that in most instances the irregularity in the supplies had produced the irregularities of discipline. The general then remarked, that if a country like Prussia, poor in money, makes an extraordinary effort in men, and raises 25.000 upon each million of its population, whilst its wealthy ally has not raised 8000 on a million, the more energetic proceeding ought to be assisted.

During this conversation strong expressions were used towards the Belgian government, showing the acrimony and bad understanding which exist between the two Courts.”⁴⁰

Parallel to these words as uttered by Gneisenau towards Hardinge, he made similar complaints about the total lack of money of the army and the lack of cooperation of the King of the Netherlands towards Hardenberg and Von Dörnberg.⁴¹ At the same time, Gneisenau expressed his discontent about the supply situation to the representative of the Netherlands in the Prussian general staff, baron Van Panhuys. In this connection, if it would be down to the supply situation only, he also mentioned to him the consideration to move the mobile army from the Netherlands towards the rivers Saar and Moselle.⁴²

Blücher seems to have discussed the issue with the King when he was in Brussels on the 29th of May. It was on the same day that Von Brockhausen, the Prussian ambassador to the Netherlands, reported that the King promised to take care of the subsistence, while repeating at the same time, however, that the Prussians had to pay for it; he denied having declared that he would take over these costs.⁴³

It was also on the 28th of May that king Willem had talked to Wellington on the supply problems for the Prussian army. As a result, the duke wanted to assist him as much as he could and it was for that reason that he made means of transport of his army available for the Belgian authorities.⁴⁴

Whatever the result of this may have been, it was on the 4th of June that Blücher took his share in the complaints, towards the Prussian king, as apparently the situation hadn't improved:

[...] "Die lange Verzögerung des Anfangs der Feindseligkeiten halte ich für höchst nachtheilig. Der Feind verstärkt sich von jetzt an verhältnismässig weit mehr als wir, und Bonaparte gewinnt wieder Zeit, seine Macht im Innern Frankreichs fest zu gründen. Da ferner hier durch die nicht guten Anstalten der niederländischen Behörden die Verpflegung mit jedem Tage schlechter und die Last für das Land drückender wird, so muss ich Ew. Majestät allerunterthänigst bitten, den Anfang der Feindseligkeiten möglichst zu beschleunigen."⁴⁵

Meanwhile, early June, Wellington must have received Clancarty's letter dated 26th of May, which was a reaction of his letter of the 14th. Clancarty had forwarded this letter to Hardenberg and to the Hanoverian minister at Vienna, count Münster.

The Prussian delegates gave no reaction, while count Münster "remarked that the binding arrangements imposed by the three autocracies on the smaller states in western Germany were not matched by anything similarly binding on Austria or Russia or most of Prussia; that Prussia was claiming, from the rayon allocated to her, subsidised provisions for "280.000 men and 70.000 horses" and additionally for units which should not form part of the agreement, although in reality the three army corps under Blücher "are at present actually maintained by the Low Countries". It would seem, therefore, the the Prussian claims about reliance upon Jülich (Rhenish Prussia) were suspect, if not bogus.⁴⁶

Apparently there have been contacts between the Prussian commissaries and the authorities of the Low Countries in which the duke of Wellington may have played a role as on the 6th of June he wrote in a memorandum that a conferences with the Prussian Commissaries had already produced "an arrangement satisfactory to them for the formation of their magazines"⁴⁷

It suggests as if some kind of solution, at least for the formation of magazines, had been found but it was on the very same day that Blücher issued a decree which allowed his troops, due to the inconsistency of the supplies, to live at the cost of the local inhabitants.

It was also still on the 9th of June that sir Charles Stuart wrote to Castlereagh that the Netherlands "are unable to support the Prussian army for a longer period than a month to come. The Prussians are aware of this and anxious to move."⁴⁸

As the process dragged on till the very moment of the French invasion of Belgium, relations between the Prussian general headquarters and the King of the Netherlands continued and reached its lowest point as Gneisenau wrote to Hardenberg on the 12th of June:

“Ew.Durchlaucht wollen geruhen, das was die folgende Zeilen enthalten, als eine blosse Privatmittheilung und nicht als einen offiziellen Bericht anzusehen, da der Gegenstand derselben von einer zu zarten Natur ist, als dass ich mir erlauben könnte, ein Aktenstück damit zu füllen, und selbiger dennoch zur Kenntniss von Ew.Durchlaucht gebracht werden muss.

Der König der Niederlande ist als ein heftiger Feind Preussens zu betrachten. Seinen Hass gegen den König, unsern Herrn, trägt er auch auf uns, seine Diener über, und trotz allen gezwungenen Höflichkeitsformen bricht dieser bei der mindesten Veranlassung aus.

Die Verpflegung unserer Armee hier bietet hiezu häufige Gelegenheiten dar. Oft sind, wie ich vermuthe durch absichtliche Stockungen, die Truppen ohne Lebensmittel und diese dann genöthigt, ihre Verpflegung von den Bequartirten zu fordern, wodurch Bedrückungen des armen Unterthanen entstehen.

Als ich den interimischen Befehl über die Truppen hier übernahm und der König der Niederlande sowohl als der Herzog von Wellington unsere Hülfe verlangten, willigte ich nicht eher darein, bis nicht der König sowohl als der Herzog unsere Verpflegung uns zugesagt hatten. Es war meine Pflicht dem König unserm Herrn diese Ersparniss zu machen, und ich benutzte gern die günstige Gelegenheit.

Jetzt, wo die Gefahr eines feindliches Angriffs fast verschwunden ist, fällt es dem kargen König, der durch unterlassene Rüstungen ansehnliche Schätze gespart hat, empfindlich, unsere Truppen zu ernähren, und er hat schon Versuche gemacht, davon sich zu entbinden; ja er ging hierin so weit, dass er sich nicht entblödete, zu leugnen, er habe jemals es übernommen, unsere Truppen zu verpflegen. Hiegegen spricht aber das Zeugniss des Generals von Röder, das des Gesandten von Brockhausen und endlich das des Herzogs von Wellington, gegen den er, zur Zeit unserer Verhandlungen über Hülfeleistung und Verpflegung, geäußert hatte: es falle ihm zwar hart, uns zu ernähren, indessen sei es doch besser, Preussen zu ernähren als Franzosen. Auch habe ich nicht eher die Hülfeleistung zugesagt, bevor nicht der Herzog von Wellington die Bürgschaft über die Verpflegung übernommen hatte. Denn aus einem früheren Vorgang noch aus der Zeit der Untersuchungs-Kommission her ist mir bewusst, wie wenig der König der Niederlande Anstand nimmt etwas abzuleugnen.

Wenn daher dieser Herr auf diplomatischen Wege und auf die Rayonsbestimmungen zu Wien sich gründend eine Vergütung der uns geleisteten Verpflegung unterhandeln wollte, so kann aus den hiesigen Verhandlungen dargethan werden, dass ihm solche nicht gebühre, und ich habe stets alle derlei Anträge abgewiesen, so wie einen, der mir vor wenigen Tagen wurde: nämlich unsere Armee aus den Magazinen von Maestricht und Venloo zu verpflegen und das Entnommene wieder aus den dem preussischen Rayon ankommenden Vorräthen zu erstatten. Ein schlimmer Umstand ist, dass uns noch aus den abgetretenen Ländern am rechten Maasufer etwa 1 ½ Millionen Franken rückständiger Einkünfte zukommen, die er sicherlich uns vorzuenthalten trachten wird, so wie die Vergütung des durch den General von Bülow in den Festungen eroberten Geschützes [...]

Als der Baron Reinhardt in Aachen war angehalten worden und er erfuhr, dass dies auf einen Wink von Brüssel aus, geschehen sei, so brach er ganz entrüstet aus: “So ! also der König der Niederlande ! Wenn nur der Preussische Hof wüsste, welche Anträge er Frankreich zu einer Verbindung gegen Preussen gemacht.”

Diese Aesserung vermochte mich um so mehr, auf Sendung der Papiere des Baron Reinhardt an Ew.Durchlaucht zu bestehen. Der Major Dumoulin leitete einst die Unterredung mit dem König auf diesen Gegenstand, und da gestand dieser seine Anträge an Frankreich und setzte

hinzu, was ich bereits früher Ew. Durchlaucht zu melden die Ehre hatte, nämlich: da er unter den andern Mächten Freunde nicht habe finden können, so habe er wol dahin sich wenden müssen, wo er hätte hoffen dürfen Freundschaft zu finden.

Es ist in diesem Lande jedem Unterrichteten ausser allem Zweifel, dass der König der Niederlande bei einem den verbündeten Waffen zustossenden Unfall sogleich trachten werde, Friede und Bündniss mit Frankreich zu schliessen, sofern dieses nur will. Zu einem entgegengesetzten rühmlichen Entschluss mangelt ihm Seelengrösse und Einsicht.”⁴⁹

Supply problems for the Anglo-Netherlands-German were virtually non-existent, at least there are no records of such problems.

Most of the supplies were either sent directly from England or taken from the local inhabitants and paid for in cash right away.

Apparently, the only instance of complaint about the subsistence seems to have come from the duke of Brunswick late May, after his units had reached their cantonments in and near Brussels.

Wellington's reaction of the 1st of June explains on the system used for the allied armies in the Netherlands in general:

“That to which Your Highness is entitled in this country, as one of the Powers adhering to the treaty of the 25th of March, is a certain ration for each man and horse in your service, of which Your Highness has a statement as fixed by the Powers of Europe and their Ministers assembled in congress at Vienna; and this ration is regularly delivered to Your Highness' troops, as I am informed. It is delivered from the British magazines under a particular arrangement with the King of the Netherlands, who will have to pay for what is delivered, and Your Highness will have to pay to his said Majesty the price for each ration fixed by common consent in Congress.

I have no authority to consent to alter the quantity or the quality of this ration, either from the King of the Netherlands or my own sovereign; and, if Your Highness chooses that your troops should receive more than it has been fixed by common consent that they should receive from this country, it will be necessary that you should pay for it, not the price fixed by common consent, because that price is applicable only to the fixed ration, but its real value in the markets of the country.

I believe Your Highness labors under a mistake regarding the supplies taken by the Allies from your Highness's dominions. The ration taken from Your Highness's country by the Prussian army is the same as that delivered to your Highness's troops here from the British magazines, for which ration your Highness's treasury will be entitled to receive the same sum as that which your Highness will have to pay to the King of the Netherlands.”⁵⁰

Observations.

In this week Wellington was only strengthened in his arguments for an almost immediate invasion of France, as - according to the intelligence he duke received through viscount Castlereagh - the situation for an invasion would be optimal. First of all, France would not be totally in the hands of Buonaparte. Secondly, there would be no army fit to contend with or resist the allies and that the army present was the sole base of power of the emperor. Other than that, the people would not rise in any case; the esprit militaire would be on the wane and there would be no public feeling, out of the troops, against the entrance of the allies.⁵¹

For the time being, however, the patience of both the duke and the Prussian staff was still tested.

It is a remarkable fact that the re-organisation of the Prussian army was carried out in the face of the enemy for a period of about five weeks.⁵² It is an element which is rarely pointed out about, but there is no doubt that this process must have influenced its unity and readiness for war. In strength, the army counted in the beginning of March about 30.000 men, by the end of April it had reached a total strength of about 50-53.000 men. With the addition of the 4th corps this figure rose to about 78.000 by mid-May, while one month later the number of combattants was about 115.000.

Revised: 25th July 2008

¹ Malet, A. (ed.) Louis XVIII et les Cent-jours à Gand etc. Vol.II p.52-53

² Wellington to the prince of Orange and to the prince Regent, 17th of april In: WD, Vol.XII p.312-313

Wellington to the earl of Clancarty, 19th april. In: WD, Vol.XII p.314

Salviati to Friedrich Wilhelm III, 20th April 1815. In: Colenbrander, H.T. Gedenkstukken etc. Vol VII p.316

Cf. Galesloot, L. Le duc de Wellington à Bruxelles p.141

Lieutenant colonel Desnoyers to Tindal, dated 21st of April. In: Couvreur, H.J. Le drame belge etc. p.69 The original document is in the national archives of Belgium, Brussels (A.R. Inventaire 108 nr.5)

Sabine, E. (ed) , Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.485

On the 20th of April, the secretary of Von Brockhausen, in The Hague, Salviati, mentions the visit of the duke to several places. Cf. his letter to the Prussian king. In: Gedenkstukken etc. Vol.VII p.317

³ In: WD, Vol.XII p.312-313

⁴ In: WD, Vol.XII p.317

⁵ In: WD, Vol.XII p.319-320

⁶ Sabine, E. (ed) , Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.490

⁷ Cf. chapter 14th – 20th of May.

⁸ Cf. information forwarded by lieutenant colonel Rooke to lord FitzRoy Somerset, dated 20th april. In: WSD, Vol.X p.110-111

Reports of Von Dörnberg, dated 20th and 21st april. In: WSD, Vol.X p.112, 82

Letter from dr.Macnab to Wellington , dated 21st april. In: WSD, Vol.X p.128-129

⁹ Intelligence forwarded from Paris by viscount Castlereagh, dated 19th april. In: WSD, Vol.X p.100-105

¹⁰ In: WSD, Vol.X p.121-124

¹¹ In: WD, Vol.XII p.312 and NAK, WO 1/205/1

Cf. next chapter.

¹² Sperling, J. Letters of an officer of the corps of Royal Engineers p.120

Cf. Memorandum of expense etc. dated 15th of April, written by lieutenant colonel Carmichael Smyth for the duke of Wellington. In: NAK, WO 55/959

Sir Augustus Frazer mentions the bridge on the 10th of May as not yet having been completed. In: Sabine, E. (ed) , Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.507

¹³ The text reads 153.000, but this is an error. Cf. Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleon's Untergang p.154

Cf. the statement of the congress of Vienna as produced on the 19th of April: “L’armée Prussienne ne peut être rassemblée sur le Bas Rhin que vers la fin du mois de Mai, ou encore elle ne présentera qu’une force de 100.000 hommes, y compris les troupes du Nord de l’Allemagne.” (see below).

¹⁴ In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.496-497
Lettow Vorbeck, O.von Napoleon’s Untergang p.154

¹⁵ In: Gneisenau. Ausgewählte militärische Schriften p.338-343
Original from: GStA, Rep.92 Boyen d.A.XIII a Bl.133-134 v.

¹⁶ Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.5
Henckel, Erinnerungen etc. p.350
Das Preussische Heer in den Jahren 1814 und 1815 p.143
Wagner, J.Chr.A. Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen p.2
He had left from Berlin on the 10th of April and reached Liege through Kassel. In: Plotho, Von Der Krieg etc. p.19

¹⁷ Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.26
Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Bundestruppen p.46
Lettow Vorebeck, O.von – Napoleons Untergang p.163

¹⁸ Cf. Clancarty to Wellington, 20th of April. In: WSD, Vol.X p.116-117

¹⁹ In: WSD, Vol.X p.120-12

²⁰ In: WSD, Vol.X p.189

²¹ Cf. Wellington to king Willem I. In: WD, Vol.XII p.324

²² This chapter is largely based upon:
Hofschröer, P. 1815. The Waterloo campaign. Wellington etc. p.118-121
Lettow Vorbeck, O.von - Napoleon’s Untergang Vol.III p.179-184
Hussey, J. “Provisioning the allied armies in 1815.” In: First Empire (2007), nr.94 p.23-27

²³ Stein, Karl, Freiherr vom und zum , 1757-1831, Prussian statesman and reformer. Rising through the Prussian bureaucracy, he became minister of commerce (1804-7) but was dismissed by King Frederick William III for his attempts to increase the power of the heads of the ministries. He was recalled (1807) as chief minister after Prussia's defeat by the French only to be dismissed again (1808) on pressure by Napoleon I . An exile in Russia, Stein helped to bring about the Russo-Prussian alliance of 1813 and returned to prominence as chief administrator of the reconquered and newly conquered Prussian provinces, following the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. His hopes for a united Germany were disappointed at the Congress of Vienna, and his role after 1815, when Prussia turned to reaction, was not prominent. Few men have achieved as many radical and successful reforms in so peaceful a manner and in such difficult circumstances as did Baron Stein. His chief reforms were carried out in 1807-8, when Prussia was a defeated nation and a virtual dependency of France. They were continued by K. A. von Hardenberg after Stein's exile, and they were forwarded by such men as Gerhard von Scharnhorst in the military field and Wilhelm von Humboldt in the educational system. Before Stein's reforms Prussia was still a semifeudal state. Stein caused the king to abolish serfdom and the estate system by the Edict of 1807. The law ended the

restrictions against the sale to burghers of land owned by nobles; those restrictions had had disastrous effects on Prussian economy, for the nobles lacked the capital to till their land properly. The edict also opened all trades and professions to all classes. Stein instituted local self-government in towns, cities, and provinces. His administration transformed Prussia into a modern state and enabled it to play its leading role in the eventual unification of Germany. Stein was also responsible for the publication, beginning in 1826, of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, which became the model for editions of national historical documents. In: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Stein-Ka.html>

²⁴ In: WSD, Vol.X p.207-212

²⁵ Lord Stewart to Wellington, 1st of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.205-207

²⁶ Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.9

²⁷ WD, Vol.XII p.288-289

²⁸ WSD, Vol.X p.47-48

²⁹ In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.510

³⁰ In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von – Napoleon's Untergang Vol.III p.510

³¹ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.503

Lettow Vorbeck. O.von – Napoleon's Untergang p.179-180

³² Cf. Van Merlen (at Binche) to Constant Rebecque, dated 19th april 1815. In: NA, 2.13.14.01 nr.7-8

³³ In: Gedenkstukken etc. Vol.VII p.344

³⁴ Lord Stewart to Wellington, 1st of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.206

³⁵ WD, Vol.XII p.386

³⁶ Cf. Prussian register of staff. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII nr.6 p.13. The letter reached Gneisenau on the 22nd of May.

³⁷ In: WSD, Vol.X p.337

³⁸ The heading of the letter written by Von Pfuel reads: "Obrist v.Pfuel an S.Maj.Kg.der Niederlande. Betrifft die Verpflegung der Truppen und der darüber getroffenen Verordnungen." In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI, nr.VII nr.6 p.13

Colonel Ernst Heinrich Adolf von Pfuel (1779-1866) was later an infantry general, a reformer of the military sports and prime minister and minister of war.

³⁹ WD, Vol.XII p.422

⁴⁰ WSD, Vol.X p.368-369

⁴¹ In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.511-512

⁴² Baron Van Panhuys to baron Van der capellen, 24th May 1815. In: NA, 2.05.01 nr.771
Von Nostitz claims that, thanks to him, it was Van Panhuys who joined Prussian headquarters specifically to deal with the problems related to the supply of the army, and what he would have done very well (according to Von Nostitz). In: Das Tagebuch etc. p.14

⁴³ At some point of time, colonel Von Nostitz, aide de camp of Blücher, would have been sent to Von Brockhausen to discuss the supply problem with the King. As Von Brockhausen would not have done so, Von Nostitz would have managed to talk with the minister of the interior . The result was that the king sent major Van Panhuys to Namur to settle this matter. According to Von Nostitz he did, but from my data it becomes clear that it was a problem also in June. In: Das Tagebuch etc. p.14

⁴⁴ Cf. Wellington to general baron Tindal, the Netherlands liaison officer at his headquarters – 30th of May 1815. In: WD, Vol.XII p.429

⁴⁵ Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.51

⁴⁶ Hussey, J. – Provisioning the allied armies in 1815 p.25
Cf. Count Münster to Clancarty, 26th May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.380-381

⁴⁷ WD, Vol.XII p.444

⁴⁸ TNA, FO 37/79

⁴⁹ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.518
Also in: Lehmann, M. Zur Geschichte etc. p.276-278

⁵⁰ WD, Vol.XII p.433-434

⁵¹ Intelligence forwarded from Paris by viscount Castlereagh, dated 19th april. In: WSD, Vol.X p.100-105

⁵² Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.18