

The French advance and order of battle.

During the night of the 17th of June, the 1st corps covered the front of the army, stretching its frontline between the Nivelles-road on its left and the village of Smohain on its right. On the morning of the 18th of June it left its positions between this high road and La Belle Alliance, to assemble on the right wing of the army. This would mean that the corps would have assembled there after leaving its positions to the left of the Brussels road, as during the night it must have stood as far as the farm of Mon Plaisir.

It may have been by 9 a.m. that the 1st corps had finished this manoeuvre.¹ By 10 a.m. the corps would have been pulled a bit more towards the 2nd corps as it had been before.²

The divisions of the 1st corps must have been in two lines of deployed battalions with artillery in the intervals of the brigades.³ Whether both these lines were south of the track which leads from La Belle Alliance to Papelotte or one in front and one in the rear remains unclear.

Directly to the right of the Brussels road, near La Belle Alliance, was the division of Quiot. Then, further to the right, were the divisions of Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte.⁴ This last division was opposite the farm of Papelotte.

The cavalry-division of Jacquinot was opposite Fichermont and Smohain on the extreme right flank, in three lines, having its artillery on its right flank. The division would have had posts towards Fichermont and Smohain.⁵

A time of 9 a.m. as time of arrival in the order of battle did not apply to the 4th division, the one of Durutte. This division, having had its position between Le Caillou and Genappe, moved north and halted on the high ground between Maison du Roi and the Bois de Callois. It was here that the division halted for about two hours; the men would have started to make some meal, when they were suddenly instructed to cross the road and take up a position on the extreme right wing of the army. The order would have been issued one hour earlier but the orderly apparently had missed the division. The result was that Durutte took up his position towards noon, or even a bit later than that.⁶

The 2nd corps left its bivouacs between 4 and 5 a.m.⁷ Not long after, the troops must have halted to have a small meal and to refresh themselves.⁸ The march may have been resumed around 8 a.m. [9] and not long after the divisions must have taken up a temporary position to the west of the road, near Le Caillou.¹⁰

After a short halt, the troops advanced from there to their positions in the order of battle, having the division of Jérôme opposite Goumont, the one of Foy in the centre and the one of Bachelu to the right, leaning on the Brussels-road. By then it must have been between 10 and 11 am.¹¹

By far the largest part of the corps was between the high roads, leading to Brussels and Nivelles and its divisions were in two lines – 60 meters apart from each other - of deployed battalions, with the artillery in front.¹²

Immediately to the west of the Brussels-road stood the division of Bachelu; it was situated north of the track which leads from the rear of Trimotion to the Nivelles-road, and south of the tracks which leads from La Belle Alliance to Goumont.

The division of Foy was to the left of the 5th division, in the low ground south east of the complex of Goumont, north of the same track which leads from Trimotion to the Nivelles-road. The division of Jérôme Bonaparte was opposite the south-west-point of Goumont, probably

north of the same track. It was in an almost square angle with the Nivelles-road.¹³

Next to this division was the one of Piré, which stood right across the Nivelles-road; it was in columns of squadrons in three lines, the artillery on the road. It had patrols and outposts on the fields west of the high-road as far as Braine l'Alleud and beyond.¹⁴

During the previous night, both cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie had stood on the heights of Rossomme. Now, in the order of battle they came (in close columns of squadrons) in rear of each other (Domon probably in front) to the right of the Brussels-road, most probably between this road and the village of Plancenot. The total depth of both columns was almost 450 meters. The artillery was on the right flank.¹⁵

The cavalry-corps of Kellerman had spent the night near Genappe and advanced to a position almost 200 meters in rear of the second line of the 2nd infantry-corps and was in two lines of deployed squadrons, the second line about 60 meters in rear of the first. On each flank was a battery of horse-artillery.¹⁶ The division of Roussel d'Hurbal was on the left and the one of l'Heritier on the right of the track which leads here through the fields from Rossomme towards the high road of Nivelles.¹⁷

The cavalry-corps of Milhaud had a position of about 200 meters in rear of the second line of infantry of the corps of d'Erlon.¹⁸ This corps was in two lines as well, with about 60 meters in between them.¹⁹ There was a battery of horse artillery on the left flank of each division.²⁰

At what time the 6th corps of Lobau left its bivouacs near Genappe is unclear.²¹ It may have advanced towards its position in the order of battle over tracks to the right of the road, in order to keep it free for other units to advance.²² The eventual position of the corps was to the right of the road, to the right of the infantry of the Imperial Guard, so on the heights of Rossomme, south of this farm.

Here, both the 19th and 20th division of the corps stood in columns of battalions. The 19th division of Simmer was in front. The 20th division was about 20 meters in rear of the 19th and had the same formation. The total depth of the column was about 200 meters. The artillery of the corps was on its left flank.²³

The Imperial Guard had its bivouacs widely scattered in and south of Glabais. By 9 a.m., the infantry was called to arms; one hour later, the men left their bivouacs.²⁴

Some parts of the Guard may have advanced over the Brussels road, but the majority moved along the tracks north of Glabais towards a temporary position between Le Caillou and the Bois de Chantelet. After a long halt here, the units then crossed the Brussels-road and moved further north to a position on the heights between this road and the observatory, immediately south of the position of Napoleon which was at the knoll of Rossomme.²⁵

The infantry of the Imperial Guard reached this position when the battle had already started.²⁶ It must have been between 11.30 a.m. and noon.²⁷

On the heights in rear of Rossomme, the 22 infantry battalions [²⁸] must have been placed in six lines. Between these lines there was a distance of about 20 meters.²⁹ The battalions initially formed close columns, but must have deployed soon after.³⁰ In all probability, the voltigeurs and tirailleurs were in front, the chasseurs in the centre and the grenadiers in the rear.³¹

The six batteries, attached to the infantry, were on both sides of the infantry, three on the left and three to the right.³² The reserve-artillery of the guard stood further to the rear, south of Rossomme, on both sides of the road.³³

The corps of Lefebvre Desnouettes must have been in two lines of deployed squadrons with an interval of about 60 meters, at almost 200 meters in rear of Milhaud. Its two batteries of horse artillery were in the centre of the corps.³⁴

The corps of Guyot would have left its bivouacs in and around Maransart by 7 a.m. to head for the Imperial headquarters, where it got by 10.30 a.m.³⁵

In the order of battle it stood in the same formation as the one of Lefebvre Desnouettes, and its place was in rear of the one of Kellerman, in line with the farm of Rossomme.³⁶

The total strength of Napoleon's army at Waterloo was most probably around 68.000 men (about 45.000 infantry, 15.000 cavalry, 7000 artillery with 248 guns and 1000 men of other services).³⁷

The grand French battery.

Napoleon's plan for the attack comprised a preparatory bombardment carried out by a grand battery consisting of the 12-pounder batteries of the 1st, 2nd and 6th corps.

This battery was formed, but eventually contained more as these 24 guns. Though numbers vary, the most probable strength of the battery was 54 guns. Of these 54 guns, 24 were the ones mentioned while the remaining 30 came from the 1st corps.³⁸

The overall command of the battery was in the hands of count Ruty, but he had delegated its formation to the commander of the artillery of the 1st corps, general De Salle.³⁹ As the units arrived on the field, he placed the guns in one line on the high grounds just north of La Belle Alliance and north of the road which connects this inn with the farm of Papelotte. On its immediate left was the Brussels road, while the battery extended to the right in front of the division of Allix. In this position it stood about 1000 meters away from the crossroads of the Brussels-road and the Ohain-road.⁴⁰ Here, the guns were placed halfway down the slope in a more condensed line as in a normal battery position, covering a total length of more as 400 meters.⁴¹ The battery must have been installed somewhere between 11.30 a.m. and 1.30 p.m.⁴²

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1. The chef d'escadron Dupuy (7th regiment hussars, division Jacquinot) claims his regiment took up its position at 8 a.m. In: Souvenirs militaires de Victor Dupuy
Corporal Dickson (Scots Greys) saw the French taking up their positions in front of him between 8 and 9 a.m. In: Bruce Low, E. With Napoleon at Waterloo p.140
Nine o'clock is confirmed by private Marshall (10th hussars). Cf. his letter dated 11th July 1815 to his parents. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Derbyshire Record Office, Matlock. D3287/29/15

According to the French official report of the battle the 1st corps started taking up its positions around 9 a.m. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.551
Captain Van Bronkhorst (7th battalion of National Militia), while in the advance posts of the brigade of Van Bylandt, however, says the enemy took up its positions on the opposite heights between 10 and 11 a.m. Cf. His letter dated 9th July 1815. In *Ons leger*, 1983 nr.6 p.32-38

Surgeon Jenks (10th hussars) states that the pickets of his regiment was driven in by 11 a.m. Cf. letter to his mother dated 21th June 1815. In: Liddell, R.S. The memoirs of the 10th royal hussars p.164

² Général de brigade De Salle (chief of staff of the artillery of the 1st corps). In: Souvenirs et correspondance sur la bataille de Waterloo p. 52

3. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.129

Adjutant Gastinieu (13th light infantry, division of Donzelot). In: Coppens, B. & P.Courcelle. La Haye Sainte p.75

Major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nr.24

A major part of the artillery was assembled in the grand battery on the far left flank of the corps (see below).

⁴ In the division of Marcognet, the 45th regiment would have been in front, to the left of the 25th regiment of the line. In rear of them would have been the 21st and 46th regiments of the line. Cf. Beslay, captain. Historique du 45me régiment d'infanterie de ligne p.292

5. Colonel Bro (4e regiment lancers) places his regiment in front of the 3rd regiment of *chasseurs à cheval*. Cf. his plan attached to his letter dated 2nd November 1822. In: AN,82 AP 5

Colonel Marbot situates his regiment (7th hussars) on the extreme right of the frontline; with him were three guns and a battalion of light infantry. This battalion most probably came from the 13th regiment of light infantry, the sole one of this type in the entire 1st corps. The guns most probably came from the horse battery belonging to Jacquinot's division. In: Mémoires Vol.III p.375

Mémoires pour servir etc. p.129

A separate, extensive note is dedicated to colonel Marbot's own version of the activities of his regiment.

6. Durutte mentions a position near the wood of Goumont, but what he actually means was the Bois de Callois as he refers to the presence there of the observatory (cf. description of the battlefield). Durutte also clearly indicates that the cannonade had already started. In: *Sentinelle de l'armée* p.78

According to De Mauduit, the division would have been ordered at 8.a.m. to take up a position near the observatory in the Bois de Neuve Cour. The division would have got there by 9 a.m. Having been there until about 10.30 a.m. it was ordered to leave immediately for a position on the extreme right flank of the army, which it did at noon. In: *Les derniers jours* etc. Vol.II p.305

Cf. Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment of the line, division Durutte). He claims the division halted at 8 a.m. In: Largeaud, J.M. - *Napoleon et Waterloo* p.374-375

7. Reille himself says it was at daybreak. In: *Documents inédits* p.60

Foy says he left with his division at 5.30 a.m. Cf. Girod de l'Ain. *Vie militaire* etc. p.277

Chef de bataillon Jolyet (1st regiment of light infantry, division Jérôme) mentions 5 a.m. . In: *Souvenirs et correspondance* etc. p.77

Colonel Trefcon, chief of staff of the 5th division, claims his division received orders to leave around 5 am, but on the other hand he also claims the attack on Goumont started at 1 pm., while it was at 11.30 am. In: *Carnet de campagne* p.185

Another, anonymous, member of the 2nd corps claims a departure at 2 a.m, but this is highly improbable. In a letter dated 27th June 1815. In: Coppins, B. – *Les mensonges* etc. p.501

8. Cf. Colonel Trefcon. In: *Carnet de campagne* p.185

⁹ Colonel Trefcon. In: *Carnet de campagne* p.185

10. For this time, see: chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment of line infantry, division Durutte). In: Largeaud, J.M. - *Napoleon et Waterloo* p.375

Reille. In: *Documents inédits* p.61

Trefcon. *Carnet de campagne* p.185

Reille himself claims it was 9 a.m. that his corps halted near Le Caillou.

Chef de bataillon Jolyet (1st regiment of light infantry, division Jérôme). In: *Souvenirs et correspondance* etc. p.77

General Foy claims it was between 11 and 12.00 o'clock but in this he refers to the whole army, and not the 2nd corps specifically. Cf. His notes in: Girod de l'Ain. *Vie militaire* etc.p.279

Chef de bataillon Puvis (93rd regiment, division Foy) claims the regiment left its bivouac by 6 a.m. from the right of the Brussels road, to cross this road and then to deploy, to advance and take up a position in a low ground, near a hedge. This was the low ground south-east of

Goumont. In: Souvenirs p.116-117

11. Colonel Trefcon asserts it was noon, but again, here he is a bit later in his statements as he believes Goumont was attacked at 1 p.m. In: Carnet de campagne p.187

Major Turner (13th regiment of light dragoons, brigade Grant) claims that around 10 a.m. large masses of French infantry were developing. As Turner was opposite the French left wing, this must have been the 2nd corps. Cf. his letter in the NAM, nr.7509-62

Cf. Plan of lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner). In: BL. Add.Ms.34.703 p.290-296 sketch nr.1

Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment) In: BL, Add.Ms.34.704 p.122-126

Lieutenant Henckens (6th regiment chasseurs à cheval, division Piré) remarks that his division had to be at the extreme left flank around 9 a.m. In: Mémoires p.231

The regimental history of the 2nd regiment of light infantry confirms a time of 11 a.m. Cf. Armée française. Histoire du 2^e régiment d'infanterie légère p.306

The distance between the centre of Genappe, along the road, and the position the 2nd corps eventually took in the order of battle is about 7.5 kilometers. As the 2nd corps was scattered around Genappe, it is not unlogical to suppose that it took the corps – including the two halts – six hours to reach this position.

Major Lemonnier-Delafosse, aide de camp of general Foy, would have been waiting for two hours during the action for the battery of his division; if this is correct, then the divisional artillery of Foy would then have arrived only by 1.30 p.m. In: Souvenirs militaires p.406-407

12. There would have been about 50 meters between the first and the second line. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.128

De Mauduit. Cf. plan. In: Les derniers jours Vol.II

General Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc. p.279

According to captain Robinaux (2nd regiment line infantry, division Jérôme) the army was in close columns. In: Journal de route p.208

The fact that the corps stood in two lines is confirmed by an anonymous, member of the 2nd corps. In a letter dated 27th June 1815. In: Coppens, B. – Les mensonges etc. p.501

¹³ Mémoires pour servir etc. p.128

Chef de battalion Jolyet (2nd battalion / 1st regiment of light infantry, division Jérôme Bonaparte) states his battalion was in front of a small, hollow road and which was cut through a hollow ground. Here it was posted immediately to the left of Foy's division. Even before his arrival here, Jolyet was ordered to send his company of voltigeurs to search the wood of Goumont. Very soon after the start of the battle, Bauduin pulled the battalion back into the road, due to the losses it suffered from enemy fire. In: Souvenirs et correspondance etc. p.77

Jolyet mixes up the units as he calls the 9th division the 5th and puts the 69th regiment of the line into this division, while this was in the 4th corps.

14. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.128

Craan, W.B.-, Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo dit de la Belle Alliance etc. Bruxelles, Harvaert en Pauwels, 1816

De Mauduit puts the 6th regiment of *chasseurs à cheval* and the 6th regiment of lancers to the left of the road (the first one in front) and the 5th regiment of lancers to the right of it; the 1st regiment of *chasseurs à cheval* is left out altogether. Cf. plan In: Les derniers jours Vol.II

15. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.130

16. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.129

¹⁷ Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, MR718

18. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.130

Colonel Michel Ordener (7th regiment cuirassiers). In: Lot, H. - Les deux généraux Ordener p.91 He says his men were about 300 meters in rear of the infantry.

19. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.130

The 1st regiment of cuirassiers (brigade of Dubois) would have been on the right flank of the first line. Cf. Histoire du 1er régiment de cuirassiers p.163

The 12th regiment of cuirassiers (brigade of Travers) would have been on the left flank of the first line. Cf. Place, R.de - Historique du 12e régiment de cuirassiers p.124

20. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.130

21. Lobau himself would have sent out colonel Janin that morning to reconnoitre the enemies outposts. Cf. Janin. Campagne de Waterloo p.32

Sergeant major F.Marq claims his regiment (probably member of the 107th of line infantry) left its bivouac near Genappe at 10 a.m., but this must have been earlier. Cf. Marq, F. Description des campagnes de guerre (1817). Manuscript in the collection of the prince of Jean d'Orléans. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, nr.29 (1997) p.48

²² General Pelet states he saw units of the 6th corps advance along the wood near Le Caillou. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.37

23. For the formation of the corps, see: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.130

There is a good deal of confusion about the exact position of the corps of Lobau in the order of battle. The above mentioned Mémoires (p.130) situate the corps in the immediate rear of the 2nd corps. Cf. Mauduit, H. – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II plan

However, from other sources it becomes clear that this is incorrect. First of all, it is Gourgaud who writes: “Notre ligne était ainsi: à la droite, le corps d'Erlon ayant en réserve derrière lui, les corps Lobau, Duhesme [etc.]” In: AN, Fonds Gourgaud 314 AP30

And in another publication he describes the position as: “Le sixième corps (Lobau) se forma en colonnes serrées sur la droite de la chaussée de Charleroi: il se trouvait ainsi en réserve derrière la gauche du premier corps, et en potence derrière le centre de la première ligne.” In: La campagne de 1815 p.74

And the *chef de bataillon* Rullière (95th regiment, division of Durutte) writes: “Le 6^e corps qui avait pris position à une certaine distance de la droite de l’infanterie de la garde et sur les derrières du 1er corps [etc.]” In: Largeaud, J.M. - Napoleon et Waterloo p.376

Octave Levassieur, aide de camp of Ney, mentions Lobau and Duhesme as being “à droite”, but this is a far too general statement. In: Souvenirs p.295

Craan places the corps in its correct position. In: Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo dit de la Belle Alliance etc. Bruxelles, Harvaert en Pauwels, 1816

The position is confirmed by 1st lieutenant Brade. In: Memorie etc. In: NA, 2.13.13.09 nr.185

De Mauduit puts the 6th corps to the left of the chaussée, in rear of the right of the 2nd corps. Cf. plan In: Les derniers jours Vol.II

24. General Petit – In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - General Petit’s account of the Waterloo campaign. In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.324

Captain Prax (3rd regiment of chasseurs) believes it was 8 a.m. that his unit left its bivouac. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L’infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.120

General Pelet claims it was 9 a.m. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L’infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.37

Friant, J.F. Vie militaire etc. p.387

For 9 a.m. also see: Lachouque, H. - The anatomy of glory p.482

25. General Pelet (2nd regiment of chasseurs). In: d'Avout, vicomte – L’infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.37

General Petit – In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - General Petit’s account of the Waterloo campaign. In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.324

Mauduit, H.de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.254

According to captain Prax (3rd regiment of chasseurs), after having crossed it, the men marched for about one hour to the left of the road and took up position in rear of the emperor. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L’infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.120

General Christiani (2nd regiment grenadiers) places his unit in rear of Napoleon, but situates him to the right of the road. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L’infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.112

26. Cf. General Petit – In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - General Petit’s account of the Waterloo campaign. In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.324

27. According to H.de Mauduit it was 10 a.m. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.254

28. At 7 a.m, colonel Duuring, commander of the 1st battalion 1st regiment of chasseurs, had

received the order to remain at Le Caillou as a sentry for general headquarters. Cf. his account. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.1116
The 4th regiment of grenadiers and the 4th regiment of chasseurs each consisted of one battalion; the sappers and miners also formed a battalion.

29. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.131

30. Cf. Pelet in his memoirs. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.37
Petit. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - General Petit's account of the Waterloo campaign. In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.324
De Mauduit mentions close columns. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.254

31. This formation is taken from the way the units advanced later. Cf. Pelet in his memoirs. In: d'Avout, vicomte – L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.37
Also see: J.F.Friant. In: Vie militaire etc. p.387

32. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.131
Lachouque, H. The anatomy of glory p.483

The battalion of sappers and miners of the guard was employed on the 18th of June in the artillery-prak of the guard. Cf. Lomier, E. – Le bataillon des marins de la garde p.448

33. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.131
Lachouque, H. - The anatomy of glory p.483

34. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.131
Lieutenant Chevalier (maréchal des logis in the chasseurs à cheval). In: Souvenirs etc. p.322

³⁵ Cf. Guyot. Notes. In: Carnets de campagnes p.294-295
Guyot in a letter to general Pelet, dated 27th April 1835. In: carnets de campagnes p.395

36. Guyot. Carnets de campagne p.395
Mémoires pour servir etc.131
Lieutenant Chevalier (maréchal des logis in the chasseurs à cheval). In: Souvenirs etc. p.322

³⁷ These totals have been based upon the files contained in SHAT, nr.C15/34 and the casualties and detachments which occurred during the preceding days of the campaign (cf. separate notes and preceding chapters). The figures can of course merely be estimates due to numerous circumstances which cannot be checked at their full value (unofficial tables of casualties, wounded men returning to the army, fugitives which are unaccounted for etc.).

³⁸ Leading in this respect is the account of De Salle who writes: “J'étais auprès du comte d'Erlon quand M.de Labédoyère, général aide de camp de l'empereur, vint me dire de sa part

qu'il me donnait le commandement d'une batterie de quatre-vingt bouches à feu, qui se composait de toutes mes batteries de six, de ma réserve de douze, et des réserves de 2^e et 5^e [sic] corps, ce qui ne formait réellement que cinquante-quatre bouches à feu dont vingt-quatre de douze. J'avais d'abord ordre de mettre en batterie toutes ces pièces dans la position que nous occupions, à mi-côte, sur une seule [ligne] et de commencer le feu de toutes à la fois pour étonner et ébranler le moral de l'ennemi.“

Why and with which guns he diminished the size of the battery from 80 to 54 remains unclear, but he confirms it was this last number which he actually assembled immediately to the right of the Brussels road. In: Souvenirs et correspondance p.52

The number of gun crews (15 each) amounted to a total of about 800 men.

From this account it also becomes clear that no batteries of the artillery of the Imperial Guard (as claimed by De Mauduit and Durutte) formed part of the grand battery. If there would have been any, he would mentioned these as he also refers to those of the 2nd and 6th corps.

In: Mauduit, H.de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.279-280

Durutte. In: La sentinelle de l'armée p.78

For a similar claim see Bowden. In: The armies at Waterloo p.64 (he mentions a company of horse battery from Milhaud's corps, as well as the mobile *volante* companies of the Imperial Guard).

Cf. Delloye, S. – La grande batterie p.9

Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.339

The usual number of guns in the grand battery given by historians is 80 guns. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.134

Gourgaud. La campagne de 1815 p.77 (though in his other account he mentions 64. In: AN, Fonds Gourgaud 314 AP30)

In: Mauduit, H.de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.279, 293

Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.200-206

Elsewhere, however, Gomm assign the battery 20 to 30 guns. In: Letters and journals p.358

Heymès mentions a total of 60 guns. In: Documents inédits p.14

Gourgaud states there were 64 guns of which 30 12-pounders. In: Manuscript account. In: AN, Fonds Gourgaud 314 AP30

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner) mentions 70 to 80 guns in the French centre and right wing, so this comprises not only the grand battery but also the guns of the entire 1st corps. Cf. his diary. In: RAI, nr.MD 797

In another account Ingilby refers to a “very long line of guns at their right centre, near the main road.” In: BL, Add.ms. 34.703 p.266-271

Private gunner Edwards (battery Ross) states that 28 guns were placed opposite his own. Cf. the letter to his brother dated 14th July 1815. In: Laws, M.E.S. (ed.) A Waterloo letter

Lieutenant Müller from the Hanoverian artillery was on the left wing and he saw how 40 guns were brought up. In: Kannicht, J. - Und alles wegen Napoleon p.70

³⁹ Cf. De Salle. In: Souvenirs et correspondance etc. p.52

Some suggest as if baron Desvaux de Saint Maurice and (after his death) baron Lallemand (commanders of the artillery of the guard and of the artillery of the old guard only respectively) were in charge, but this is incorrect.

Cf. Bowden, S. – The armies at Waterloo p.64

⁴⁰ Mémoires pour servir etc. p.134 (“Dix divisions d’artillerie se réunirent, la gauche appuyée à la chaussée de Charleroi sur les monticules au delà de la Belle Alliance et en avant de la division de gauche du 1er corps“)

Colonel Heymès. In: Documents inédits p.14

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner) refers to a “very long line of guns at their right centre, near the main road.” In: BL, Add.ms. 34.703 p.266-271

Some erroneously place the grand battery on the intermediate height which is too far north.

Cf. Adkin, M. – The Waterloo companion p.353

Uffindell, A. – On the fields of glory p.163

⁴¹ In a battery like this one at Waterloo, guns were placed in a more concentrated position, which was 5.5 to 9 meters apart, so about 7 meters average (the normal interval was 10 to 13.5 meters). This results in a length of about 60 meters per battery. In: Haythornthwaite, Ph. – Weapons and equipment etc. p.71

Coppens and Courcelle erroneously assign the battery a length of about 1400 meters, which is virtually the whole length of the front of the infantry of the 1st corps. In: Le chemin de Ohain p.10

⁴² Napoleon issued the order to establish the battery at 11 a.m. and its bombardment most probably started around 1 .30 p.m.

Cf. Captain Leach (1st battalion 95th regiment). He stood right opposite the grand battery and states it was established around 10 or 11 a.m. At the same time he adds that he had no watch but that it was during the time Goumont was attacked [so after 11.30 a.m.]. In: Rough sketches etc. p.386

De Salle confirms it was after 10 a.m. In: Souvenirs et correspondance etc. p.52

Lieutenant Chevalier (Lefebvre Desnouettes) mentions a time of 12 o’clock. In: Souvenirs p.322

Lieutenant coloel Gomm (chief of staff 5th British division), however, believes it was put in place about 2 p.m. In: Letters and journals etc. p.358