

The second attack on Plancenoit.

It was barely after his first attack on Plancenoit that colonel Von Hiller relaunched his troops towards the village for a second attempt.¹

To the right, Von Hiller launched the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 15th regiment again, but now they had the support of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment Silesian infantry nr.11 and the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment Pommeranian Landwehrinfantry, both of the brigade of Von Ryssel. This force was led by major Von Wittich.

Towards the centre of Plancenoit, Von Hiller led the entire 2nd regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry. The 1st regiment Silesian Landwehr infantry was kept in reserve.

Colonel Von Hiller expected to penetrate into the centre of the village, while diverting the enemy's attention to its left by an assault on the northern part of the village, led by major Von Wittich.. Despite the heavy fire and the losses they had already sustained, both musketeer battalions of the 15th regiment succeeded to enter the village here.

The other battalions further to the left also penetrated into the village, though none of the battalions seems to have been able to take the churchyard.

All in all, the Prussians were not able to hold the village The reason was that general Pelet got reinforcements, and these were the men of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment grenadiers which was led by colonel Golzio (about 500 men). It must have been between 7.30 and 7.45 p.m.

The battalion would have been ordered by Napoleon: "de ne pas tirer un coup de fusil, mais d'arriver sur l'ennemi à la baionette ".²

The moment the Prussian units fell back for this strong French counter-attack, Von Ryssel committed both the second battalions of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry nr.11 and of the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr into the fight; they were followed by the 1st battalions of both regiments.³

Of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry nr.11, the 2nd battalion, led by captain Von Dresky, supported the 1st battalion, of which the skirmishers were led by captain Von Künsberg. Both penetrated from this side of the village towards the centre and the churchyard, where they however were forced to leave again due to the fierce French resistance.⁴ During the attack in the village, the 3rd and 2nd companies (led by 1st lieutenant Von Schätzelk and lieutenant Von Rahden) had got isolated in another lane from the other two companies, and even emerged on the other side of the village, from where they unsuccessfully tried to take the churchyard. In this action, the colour of the 2nd battalion was almost taken by the French.⁵

The French were able to drive the Prussians out again by a counterattack and by manoeuvring on their left flank; as they were afraid to be turned, eventually all Prussians were forced to evacuate the village, except for a few houses at the north east border of the village; here the 2nd battalion of the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr held out.

Outside the village, the Prussian infantry was received by the 1st regiment Silesian Landwehr.⁶

The 15th regiment would then have been collected by Gneisenau himself.⁷

The second attack on Plancenoit was supported by foot battery nr.13 and immediately after it had silenced some French guns to the north of the village; in this it had been supported by the horse battery nr.12.⁸

Just after or during the second attack on Plancenoit by the brigades of Von Hiller and Von Ryssel and the actions of the brigades of Von Hacke and Von Losthin against Smohain and the units of Lobau, a gap had developed in the centre of the Prussian front line.

Initially, this part of the line was occupied by artillery and skirmishers of infantry, but now a part of the reserve cavalry of the 4th corps moved here to support this thin line.⁹

The units which did so were in all probability the 8th regiment of hussars (brigade of Von

Watzdorff), the 1st regiment of Neumark Landwehr cavalry and the 1st regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr cavalry (both from the brigade of Von Sydow).

Here they held out, despite the strong gunfire of the French; colonel Von Watzdorff was mortally wounded.

In this sector of the front, a French regiment of lancers charged the Prussian skirmishers covering the front between the brigades of Losthin and Hiller.

However, it was the 8th regiment of hussars, led by major Von Colomb, having passed from the left to the centre, which advanced and drove them back up to the ranks of the 6th corps. It was here that the hussars were driven off by the fire of a square and by the threat in their flank of a regiment of French hussars (these must have been the 7th hussars). The Prussian regiment had also been split up in two by the presence of the square and, to make things even worse, during its course towards this square the rear squadrons had ridden into the front ones, thereby causing disorder, which, however, soon was restored by captain Von Eisenhardt.

Now the regiment fell back and reformed in rear of the Prussian battalions near the 2nd regiment of Silesian hussars.¹⁰

The exact position of the 1st regiment of Neumark Landwehr cavalry is not known; it would have had a position in rear of a battery but which one is unknown. As soon as it moved forward the cavalry did the same.¹¹

The 1st regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr cavalry had got its position near the 3rd regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry, and both in rear of the infantry.¹²

One of units of the 15th brigade, the fuselier battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr led by captain Von Conradi also moved out to its left to a position to the right of Plancenoit to protect the centre of the Prussian line.

The battalion here was also reinforced by now by half of the foot battery nr.10 led by captain Von Magenhöfer, of the 2nd corps.¹³ It was by the steady behaviour of this battery as well that the enemy pushed through, the moment the enemy pursued the Prussian troops.¹⁴

The arrival of the units of the 2nd Prussian corps.

The first units of Pirch I which arrived on the battlefield were the four regiments of the reserve-cavalry, three of Von Thümen and one of Von der Schulenburg. On the battlefield itself they were joined by those of Von Sohr.¹⁵ It was towards 7.30 p.m. (¹⁶) The horsemen advanced in three lines under French grenade-fire, the last line on a larger distance.¹⁷ After the request of general Von Bülow, the reserve cavalry advanced to reinforce the left wing of the army. Right at that moment units of the 14th brigade streamed back from the (second) attack on Plancenoit; they were now halted by this new mass of cavalry.

In rear of the reserve cavalry came the 5th brigade of Von Tippelskirch. As soon as the infantry of Von Tippelskirch appeared on the battlefield, the cavalry wheeled further left to make space for this infantry which took up positions in close columns along the road which leads from Plancenoit to Lasne.

Further to the rear, the brigade of Von Krafft followed, doing the same in close columns order to be able to turn right or left, according to the circumstances. Then the reserve cavalry took up a position at some distance in rear of this infantry.¹⁸

Soon it became clear that the left wing was in most need of help and therefore general Pirch I ordered major general Von Tippelskirch to bring his right shoulder forward and to advance to the left of the road Plancenoit-Lasne.

As Von Tippelskirchs forces gathered on the battlefield, they were formed having in front the fuselier battalions of the 1st Pommeranian infantry nr.2 and those of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr in front. In his first line Von Tippelskirch formed the musketeer-

battalions of the 1st Pommeranian regiment nr.2 and the 3rd battalion of the 25th regiment (to the left).

In rear of the 1st battalion of the 1st Pommeranian regiment nr.2 was the Jäger-company led by 1st lieutenant Müller.

The second line was formed by the musketer battalions of the 25th regiment and the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr. All battalions were in columns and these were densely packed on a small front.

Von Tippelskirch moved his units to the left, towards Plancenoit, but was by mistake instructed to follow the 14th brigade, a bit further to the right; the manoeuvre was soon countermanded but all this caused a delay of about 15-30 minutes. Then, Pirch led the brigade towards Plancenoit.¹⁹

The only batteries of the 2nd corps present, the horse battery nr.6 (reserve cavalry) and the foot battery nr.10 (brigade Von Tippelskirch) got into positions in the same line as those of the 4th corps.²⁰

Colonel Von Hiller, who was in charge of the actions against Plancenoit, now decided to commit the brigade of Von Tippelskirch right away for the **third** attack, thereby being incited by Blücher (through lieutenant colonel Von Thiele).²¹

The Prussian right wing.

Also during the second attack against Plancenoit, the actions of the brigades of Von Losthin and Von Hacke with the French infantry of Lobau and Durutte and the cavalry of the divisions of Domon and Subervie between Plancenoit and Fichermont continued.

In this stage of the battle, large parts of the right wing of Von Losthin's brigade (led by major Von Massow) must have been acting in large masses of skirmishers.²²

In the sector around Fichermont the 1st battalion of the 18th regiment followed both battalions led by Von Koschkull (the 2nd battalion 18th regiment and 3rd battalion of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr infantry) directing its march towards Fichermont and the area immediately south of it. The skirmishers, led by captain Von Pogwisch, carried out a bayonet attack on the French in and around the chateau of Fichermont and took it – then the Nassau troops also re-occupied it. As the French left their positions in and around Fichermont, the battalion crossed the small road in rear of it and descended into the low ground immediately in rear of the chateau. It was here that it got to the right of the 2nd battalion of the 18th regiment.²³

The 3rd battalion of the 18th regiment, led by captain Von Biberstein, had got forward towards the small wood south of the complex of Fichermont, while being covered by skirmishers. However, due to the vegetation and its speed the battalion got too far (about 40-50 meters) forward from the second line and too far left as well; in this situation Von Biberstein asked major Von Krahn for orders – meanwhile, his skirmishers were in close combat with the French skirmishers and drove them back. But as the Prussians had gone too far ahead here too, they were forced back with high casualties in men and ammunition. Now, the whole battalion was forced to fall back to the original second line, where it formed again. After that it did another attempt to drive the French away, but also this failed. By now, the Prussian firing-line was reinforced by the 1st and 8th platoon and now the French were driven back. But not for long: as soon as they got reinforcements, they advanced again, also in combination with cavalry; a bitter fight ensued in which the whole battalion became engaged in a line of skirmishers.²⁴

The right wing of the 15th brigade was soon to be reinforced by the two battalions which came from the 13th brigade, the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Silesian infantry nr.10 (leading)

and the 1st battalion of the 2nd Neumark regiment of Landwehr infantry. They entered the fray around 6 p.m. Both battalions must have turned to the right and advanced towards Smohain.

The 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment Silesian infantry nr.10 was the leading battalion and was preceded by its skirmishers, which were commanded by captain Von Monsterberg. Initially, while approaching the village, they mistook the Nassau troops for French – soon after, however, they must have seen that they shared the village with the 18th regiment of the brigade of Von Losthin.

Both battalions entered the village, while their skirmishers were in front, getting into contact with the French who were immediately out in front of the village, in gardens and behind hedges. Meanwhile, a party of the fuseliers of the 1st regiment of Silesian infantry nr.10 had joined the Prussian skirmishers. In front of them were, apart from the French skirmishing line, two regiments of cavalry (probably of Jacquinet) but, they, though threatening, didn't charge.

Further to the rear in the village, major Von Braunschweig of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of Neumark Landwehr infantry had sent his 1st company out of the village in order to support the skirmishers, while he occupied a bridge over the Ohain-stream with two companies and a field further to the left with another two led by major Von Steinmetz; some time later these were called back by major Von Braunschweig.²⁵

Further to the left of Fichermont, but somewhere in the centre of the frontline of the 15th brigade, the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry gradually came into the frontline. Having sent out its skirmishers, the battalion advanced and in this position it was moved in closed column to the left and right by its commander, major Von Knorr, to avoid the French gunfire.²⁶

The 2nd battalion of the same regiment, also somewhere in the centre, did the same; at some point of time, its skirmishers advanced towards the firing line, but within a short time they lost about half their numbers and the remainder was taken back. The bataillon column must have been kept further back.²⁷

As the action increased around Fichermont, the skirmishers of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry (to the right and left) were pulled to the firing line which was formed here by those of the 3rd battalion of the same regiment. The fighting here must have been that hard, that most of the 3rd battalion had been extended as skirmishers – all in all, the Prussian skirmishing line must have been able to make a slow advance, followed by both the 1st and 2nd battalion.²⁸

It was in this situation that a part of the skirmishing line of the 2nd battalion (including 4 officers) got too far left and got involved in the actions of the 16th brigade (cf. actions at Plancenot).²⁹

Of the artillery, the foot battery nr.14 was initially kept to its former position, but as the infantry advanced to the front line, the battery got further in front as well, though in rear of the infantry, over whose heads it fired on the French cavalry. Later it had another three positions, while following the infantry without being damaged as the French fired too high. That evening the guns must have been attacked by a swarm of French skirmishers which came from the right, but they must have been repelled by the 1st and 2nd platoons of Silesian skirmishers of the regiment nr.10 (13th brigade). The French action was meant to cover the retreat, which accelerated as soon as more Prussian guns joined in - by then it was dusk. That day, the battery lost one gun (of which a wheel had got damaged) as well as its two howitzers (which had got out of order by the intense use).³⁰

Further to the left, the horse battery nr.11 was able to maintain itself in three different positions, though it suffered. First of all it lost in its second position a houwitser (which had got damaged) as well as a gun (of which all the horses had been killed). In the third position another four guns had to be taken to the rear because of a lack of ammunition; this left the crew with just two guns (loaded with canister only).³¹ Yet one of the guns soon returned and these three guns kept firing their rounds till they had run out too. By that time, the battery joined horse battery nr.6 (reserve artillery of the 2nd corps) which supplied them with a bit of ammunition to make sure it was able to keep up its position till the end of the battle.³²

Twelve pounder battery nr.3 had been in action for some time in the centre of the 15th brigade, until it advanced for about 300 paces to fire on some French cavalry and infantry. In this position it came to the left of the foot battery nr.14. Here lost some of its crew and horses by French skirmishing fire. Later, as the Prussian infantry stormed to the front and the units got too near to the French the battery was unable to fire. It pulled back for some distance until it was ordered to the front again on the right, where it successfully drove back French units with canister fire on an average distance of 700 paces.³³

By now, the brigade artillery of the 13th brigade, foot battery nr.21 entered the front line. It was split in two half batteries which got a position in the front line, to the left and right of the 6p.battery nr.14 and 12p.battery nr.3. As both half batteries were turned inwards, they got the opposite French artillery under a cross-fire.³⁴

As the 1st West-Prussian regiment of uhlans (brigade Von Schwerin) arrived from the left wing at the right wing, it took up a position in rear of the infantry. As these advanced, the regiment followed and prevented the French cavalry from charging by advancing to their right and left. Now, the French cavalry confronted the Prussian skirmishers but as soon as the uhlans offered them a charge, they fled back in rear of their infantry and artillery. As the French infantry now formed squares, the uhlans went back and now the French infantry sent out swarms of skirmishers. As a result, some platoons of uhlans advanced in extended order followed by the closed squadrons, after which the French yielded again.³⁵

The third attack on Plancenoit.³⁶

Before the actual third attack begun, a previous attempt to take the village was made by the battalions of the 2nd regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr (14th brigade).

The 1st battalion advanced to the left, the 3rd battalion in the centre and the 2nd battalion to the right into the village. The Prussian skirmishers clashed on the French, but yielded soon after and fell back to the closed columns of the battalions. Now, these approached the village. While the fusilier battalion suffered while trying to get to the churchyard, the 1st battalion only slowly advanced on the marshy grounds south of the village.

Yet, the Prussians seem to have pressed on but at some point of time the French counterattacked from some houses and a hollow road and at the same time they tried to turn the Prussian right flank. As a result, both the 2nd and 3rd battalions were pressed, while the 1st battalion still lingered in the low grounds south of the village. As the Prussian confronted their enemies, eventually a bayonet action ensued after which the Prussian units got scattered. It was only outside the village that the officers managed to collect the regiment, which had suffered high losses.

Right at the moment the 2nd regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr streamed back from Plancenoit, units of the 5th brigade of Von Tippelskirch of the 2nd corps had arrived in front of the village, to assist in the offensive against Plancenoit.

Von Tippelskirch was able to do so right away, as he had the 6th brigade right in rear of him.

The formation he chose was one in which the fuselier battalion of the 1st regiment Pommeranian infantry nr.2 was in front to the left and the fuselier battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr to the right. They had to go head on onto the village.

In the first line, behind the Pommeranians, and led by major Von Cardell, were (to the left and right) the 2nd and 1st battalions of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2. By now, the Jäger-detachment of the brigade had split in two: the main body had joined the 1st battalion and a small part had joined the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2.

Here, further to the right must have been the musketeer battalions of the 15th regiment. They advanced to the northern side of the village.³⁷

In the second line, in support, were from left to right the 1st battalion of the 25th regiment, the 2nd battalion of the same regiment and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr. All these units were led by major Von Helmstreit.

Meanwhile, on the heights south of Plancenoit, major Von Witzleben turned the village with his 3rd battalion of the 25th regiment of infantry.³⁸

The 2nd regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr (14th brigade), as well as the 1st regiment of Silesian Landwehr (16th brigade) and both the musketeer battalions of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry nr.11 (14th brigade) must all have been kept further to the rear, east of Plancenoit.³⁹

It was now about 8 p.m. The interval between the second and third attack was a brief one, in order not to let the enemy too much time.

The third offensive against Plancenoit was for the Prussians the last one to take the village, even though it cost a lot of effort.⁴⁰

It was mainly against the churchyard that the actions of the 3rd battalion 1st regiment Pommeranian infantry stranded. The reason was that the French here had a very strong position as the churchyard was on a higher ground and was surrounded by a stone wall. This bastion was also well covered on its flanks: on its right side there was an open ground which was highly unaccessible for the enemy as it was completely under French fire from all sides, from the churchyard, the houses and from its west side. On its left side, the houses on the other side of the passageway gave the French the possibility to give the Prussians effective volleys from both sides. On top of that, some buildings were in flames⁽⁴¹⁾; one of these buildings was the farm of Cuvelier and its outbuildings situated at the end of the passageway. The smoke must have hindered the Prussians in their advance and thereby adding to the "cul-de-sac". During its actions here the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2, lost its captain Von Mirbach.⁴²

As a result, the Prussian staff decided to act on a wider front and to give the actions on their flanks more accent thereby encircling the centre.

Though the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 (led by lieutenant colonel Von Cardell) may initially have taken a course towards the centre of Plancenoit, it soon took a much more southern course to get involved just south of the village, to the left of the skirmishers of the fuselier battalion, led by captain Von Goszicki. They advanced in connection with the 3rd battalion of the 25th regiment led by major Von Witzleben on the height between the Lasne and the small stream which flows through the southern part of the village.⁴³ Further to their left was the Jäger-detachment and which was led by lieutenant Rehbein.⁴⁴

Over this height the sand-track ran which connects Maison du Roi with the abbey of Aywiers and which was bordered on both sides by small houses; the area here was also cut up by hedges and trees. This forced Von Witzleben into a skirmish with the French guardsmen and in which each house, hedge, tree and passage had to be taken.

Being supported on the left by the skirmishers of the musketeer battalions of the 25th regiment

as well as by the detachment led by major Von Keller (⁴⁵), Von Witzleben finally succeeded in driving off the French and thereby turning the French centre. ⁴⁶

The 1st battalion also must have made a move to its left, towards the edge of the Bois de Virère, in order to cover the brigade from that side. The role of the 2nd battalion is not very clear; apparently it didn't have any substantial contribution to the attack.

In the centre, the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr-infantry succeeded in penetrating into the village and to threaten the churchyard and its immediate surroundings. The 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2, led by captain Von Korth, did the same, in which lieutenant Marquardt with his skirmishers distinguished himself. ⁴⁷ On the right of the same battalion lieutenant Müller led the main body of the Jäger detachment himself.

At the same time, the musketeer battalions of the 15th regiment must have passed through and along the northern side of the village. Here they took two guns and three powder-waggons. Despite these threats and the fact that the remainder of the French army was dissolving, the resistance of the French guard in the centre of Plancenoit must have been strong, but finally the Prussian pressure and numbers grew too strong. The Prussian movement on the French right flank threatened to cut off the French in the village and now general Pelet decided to evacuate the village.

By 8.30 p.m., at the moment the French had evacuated Plancenoit, both the musketeer battalions of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr - while advancing under a French bombardment in two lines from the rear - got near the village but were too late to do anything at all.

As Pelet reached the western edge of the village, it became clear that at least half of both battalions of the Old Guard was either killed or wounded. Pelet tried to collect as many men as he could, particularly when he found the eagle of the 1st regiment of chasseurs. The situation was very confusing: the stream of French refugees was immense and the Prussian cavalry was cutting in them. Also the French masses were bombarded by Prussian gunfire.

Despite the confusion, Pelet succeeded to form a small square in a hollow with the words " A moi les chasseurs de la garde, ralliez vous à votre aigle et à votre général ! " With this force he kept the enemy at bay, to reach the Brussels road near Maison du Roi. ⁴⁸

On this side of Plancenoit, the fuselier battalion of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 was able to take a French gun by storm. The time was now running towards 9 p.m. ⁴⁹

It was around 7.30 p.m. (⁵⁰) that the fusilier battalion of the 15th regiment of infantry, led by major Von Keller, and possibly the fuselier battalion of the 1st regiment of Silesian infantry (which must have followed far behind) advanced from the Bois de Hubermont towards the Bois de Chantelet. ⁵¹

The 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of chasseurs, led by colonel Duuring, was still in position near the imperial headquarters at the farm of Le Caillou. Since the afternoon it had two companies on the road and one on each side of it.

That evening, a post of the battalion informed Duuring about the approach of the two enemy columns towards the Bois de Chantelet. Duuring then detached two guns (loaded with mitraille) and 50 men led by a lieutenant to a covered position, probably in the northern end of this wood. ⁵²

By now, numerous refugees of the French army of all arms tried to fall back over the Brussels road; Duuring tried to stop them by placing his four companies with crossed bayonets on and along the road. Despite the order of Duuring to allow only the wounded to pass, a lot of men got away from the battlefield. Nevertheless, Duuring managed to collect several hundred of men, organise them into a battalion and place them to the right of the road. ⁵³

By now, the crew of both guns which had joined Duuring before now left their guns.

Now, general Radet, grand-prevost of the army, intervened. He had been informed of the

Prussian advance and, having inquired personally about the situation, while keeping the main body of the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of chasseurs in and near Le Caillou, he instructed colonel Duuring to detach one company to the extreme northern part of the Bois de Chantelet. While Radet advanced with this company he placed one of its platoons halfway between the headquarters and the extreme of the wood; he also sent a platoon of chasseurs to the western edge of the wood and take up a position there.⁵⁴ Soon a brisk fire ensued between the French chasseurs and the Prussian skirmishers. Shortly after that, Radet sent the formed battalion forward over the area between Bois de Chantelet and the Brussels-road as far as Maison du Roi. It suffered from a Prussian volley, but after that the commander, adjudant Granier (aide de camp of Radet), drove the enemy off in an eastern direction by a brisk musketry fire.⁵⁵ The Prussian battalions here now remained inactive near the Bois de Chantelet until Plancenoit had fallen after the Prussians had attacked it for the third time.⁵⁶

The third attack on Plancenoit was also supported by the foot battery nr.13. From its favourable position, it had bombarded the enemy in rear of the village after it had been taken by the Prussians. After that, having nothing to do, it advanced towards the former French heights, but before captain Von Martitz was able to reach them it had become dark.⁵⁷

As stated before, the horse battery nr.12 had a share in the fighting for Plancenoit. In the very first period of its actions, so before the actual attack on Plancenoit, it used the more northeast orientated direction of the French guns to deliver them a fire on their right flank. Soon after, however the enemy artillery adjusted its direction of fire. Some time later, during the fighting for Plancenoit, the battery got the fire of a French battery on its left flank and therefore had to pull back its left wing for some distance. So, the battery kept up its position despite the French pressure. It even was able to bombard the village in conjunction with the howitzers of the horse battery nr.1, further to its left.⁵⁸

12p. battery nr.13 had a particularly hard time during the struggle for the village and suffered more casualties as other batteries did. The battery particularly suffered on its left side (the side towards the village) from French fire; as a result major Von Ziegler had half of the right wing of the battery wheel 1/8 forward towards Plancenoit. The three guns on the left wing were directed to their left and any French skirmishers coming forward from the village were now greeted with canister. During the fighting for the village, however, the French skirmishers advanced later again and then, covered by the high corn, even succeeded in getting to about 16 paces from its most left gun. Captain Wolze, the commander, however, was able to have the guns limbered right away and while pulling back was received by a battalion which some time later advanced towards the village. By the time dusk fell, the battery marched off.⁵⁹

Horse battery nr.1, also in position slightly to the right of Plancenoit, had an engagement with the French artillery until a French column of infantry (probably of Lobau), covered by skirmishers and canister fire, advanced right in its front but was beaten off by the Prussian artillery here. Some time later, other French infantry emerged from Plancenoit, took cover behind a hedge and opened a brisk fire on the battery. Now, the battery wheeled in their direction and blew them away with canister; Prussian infantry then pursued them right onto the village where they had come from.

Since then, the horse battery nr.1 joined the 2nd regiment of hussars further to the north, near the road which connects Plancenoit with Lasne, in the very centre of the Prussian line. In this position it had an initial succes, but soon it was forced to fall back for a distance of about 300 paces in which retreat a howitzer and a gun had been mauled so much by French artillery fire that they had to be taken out of the firing line. Their limbers were now used to bring in new ammunition. Now the battery got into a position in rear of the hussars and the only gun to fire into Plancenoit itself was the one howitzer left. The moment however that French skirmishers

got too near, the hussars went back as well so that the battery had an open range to fire again, which it did with a double load of canister on a distance of about 800 paces; the success of this volley drove the French back, but not for long. After that, the whole situation was repeated again. By that time time, however, the French started to yield in and out of Plancenot ⁶⁰

Both batteries of the 2nd corps, the foot battery nr.10 and the horse battery nr.6 contributed to the fall of Plancenot. The moment the first battery got into action it came under strong French fire of grenades and then captain Magenhöfer immediately pushed forward his two howitzers for about 200 paces; three of his guns wheeled to the right but their success was very limited. After the taking of the village by the Prussians, it bombarded the French refugees on the heights in rear of the village. ⁶¹

After the fall of Plancenot, the Prussian reserve cavalry of the 2nd corps, on the extreme left of the front-line, advanced through and along the edge of the Bois de Virère in pursuit of the French. The French gunfire was still there, but from afar and not well aimed. ⁶²

Pirch I had left the 6th brigade of Von Krafft near the road Plancenot – Lasne in close columns; in order to maintain the communication with the centre of the front line but, now the moment they marched forward in storm-pace the battle was practically over and they now halted immediately in front of Plancenot, where they bivouaced. ⁶³

The situation in the Prussian centre.

As the Prussian infantry units were advancing , the 8th regiment of hussars followed in their wake. Soon after, however, they got under a very strong French skirmishing fire. Through this fire, the Prussian skirmishers were forced back; in stead of interfering, the hussars were ordered to fall back, which they didn't as the infantry held firm. ⁶⁴

The situation at the Prussian right wing.

As the skirmishers of the 2nd battalion of the 18th regiment had emerged from Smohain and gradually turned to their left they met a stiff French resistance while climbing the slope of the height in rear of Smohain and Fichermont. As a result the Prussians reinforced their firing line with two platoons , but they were unable to repel the French. Another two platoons came in to relieve the skirmishers (led by captain Von Koschützky) which had been engaged for some time now and gradually they were able to push back the French towards La Belle Alliance. ⁶⁵

To their right they were supported by the 1st battalion of the same regiment. Facing similar French resistance, it was captain Von Zietzen who reinforced the firing line with men from the 8th platoon and was able to stop the French pressure.

Right at that moment Von Zietzen was ordered by major Von Koschkull to keep more to his left in order to link up with the remaining battalions of the 15th brigade. Von Zietzen obeyed but was soon sent back to his former position by general Von Bülow himself. Having got there, he now sent forward the 1st and 7th platoon first and some time later the 2nd platoon as well.

Being successful, Von Zietzen proposed to major Von Koschkull to storm the height with the battalions in a storm attack. Von Koschkull agreed and the battalions, crying hurrah, stormed forward.

In combination with the other Prussian units further to the left, the battalion was able to advance towards the southwest, despite the confusion and the smoke. While detaching two other platoons to reinforce the skirmishers led by captain Koschützky, Von Zietzen was able to drive the French gradually before him to the heights of La Belle Alliance. Apparently, Von Koschützky must still have been in trouble. ⁶⁶

Although their exact positions are not known, but both the battalions of the 13th brigade which

had been detached towards Smohain had also sent their skirmishers out to the front of the units of the 15th brigade here in order to drive the French from their strong position on the heights.

The 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of Neumark Landwehr infantry was also sent to the front; two other companies had started to do the same, but major Von Braunschweig called them back.

In rear of the units of Von Losthin and Von Hacke here, it was the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Neumark Landwehr infantry which acted as a reserve; at some point of time it advanced into the more western part of Smohain but its skirmishers stranded here on a French skirmishing line, in front of the height. They also suffered from a lack of ammunition. Now major Von Grolmann, the battalion commander, reinforced his firing line with the skirmishers of his 5th, 6th and 7th company led by lieutenant Rittwagen, Drümel and Klenke. During this action most of these skirmishers got isolated from the battalion and only rejoined it the 19th of June. As soon as the French yielded, the battalion, ordered by Von Hacke to do so, took up a position on the height.

Half an hour later, however, the French rushed forward with cavalry and infantry in order to cover their retreat.⁶⁷

Now, more Prussian guns of the reserve artillery advanced and these were in their turn covered by the battalion; as these guns moved further to the left, the battalion did the same and ended in a position near Plancenoi. By then it was 9 p.m.⁶⁸

Further to the left in the Prussian right wing, it was the 3rd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Neumark Landwehr infantry which had detached its skirmishers (led by captain Von Seydlitz) to the front as their French counterparts inflicted high losses to the Prussian guns. Soon after they drove them back and after that the battalion was used to cover the artillery in its advance.⁶⁹

The main task of both musketeer battalions of the 1st regiment of Silesian infantry nr.10 was to cover the artillery in the second line and in this position they suffered from French artillery fire.

The 1st battalion must have covered foot battery nr.14 as well as 12p. battery nr.3 During the evening the battalion must have gone to the front, covered by artillery.⁷⁰

The 2nd battalion must have suffered quite a lot in its advance towards the French position during a bitter, but indecisive, skirmishing-fight. As soon as the Prussian battalion resumed its offensive action in a mass, the French fled.

Not much is known about the role of the musketeer battalions of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry (15th brigade); both must have participated in the general action on the French position, but the only information available is that the 1st battalion was able to take three French guns, as well as a ammunition wagon.⁷¹

As the units of Von Hacke were drawn into the fray, the 3rd regiment of Neumark Landwehr infantry got on the left flank and from there it gradually pulled towards Plancenoi. In front it had a strong skirmishing line which was in continuous contact with the enemy; the columns of the battalions were right behind them, ready to follow.⁷² However, the regiment didn't play any part in the fighting for Plancenoi itself.

One of the few cavalry units to support the Prussian right wing was the 2nd regiment of Neumark Landwehr cavalry.

As the Prussian infantry had emerged south west of Smohain it got into a very fierce resistance of the French so that the Prussian units had to act in large masses of skirmishers.

Now, lieutenant colonel Von Hiller, despite being wounded, decided to support the infantry by pulling four of his platoons through the infantry and posted them in front of them. Despite the heavy fire they held out and by their advance the Prussian skirmishers were able to regain their strength. By now, Von Hiller had given the command of the regiment to count Von Haslingen. Though the fighting remained bitter, the French finally yielded and the horsemen got the instruction of general Von Valentini to follow the infantry until the enemy would have been

completely overthrown, then to march through the infantry and to cut the enemy down. Meanwhile, two other regiments of Prussian cavalry had come up. While these regiments advanced, the uhlans went to the right towards a battalion which needed cover. As they went there the battalion had already got the cover it needed and now the uhlans went back to their former position from which they advanced. Four platoons went ahead, while the main body of the regiment followed; though they all came under heavy fire, they managed to drive the French skirmishers away and pursued them.⁷³

Revised: 21st August 2009

¹ For the general description of this attack from the Prussian side of view, cf.
Cf.Ebertz, G.W.von Hundertjurige Geschichte etc. p.200-202
Julius von Pflugk Harttung in:
GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4B.p.24,27-28
GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.4A.2.p.8
GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4F.2.p.17-24
Report of Von Bulow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson.La campagne de 1815 aux
Pays Bas.Vol.III p.532
Report of colonel Von Hiller. In: Ollech, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.248-249
Hiller, Von Denkwurdigkeiten etc.p.249-250
Dork, E.M. Das Koniglich Preussische 15.Infanterie-Regiment etc. p.130-131
Damitz, K.von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.298

2.Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armee Vol.II p.400-401
He erroneously mentions the 1st battalion, as other historians do.
Some even mention the presence of a thrid battalion. Cf.
Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.317

³ Both their fusilier battalions were with the detachment of colonel Von Ledebur.

⁴ Cf. Eberts, G.W. von - Hundertjurige Geschichte etc. p.201-203 In this attack the 2nd
battalion lost: captain Von Morgenstern, captain Rosenthal, lieutenant Von Aulock, lieutenant
Walter, lieutenant Von Bodewils, Von Eglosstein (wounded) and lieutenant Dewette (killed).

⁵ Cf. 1st lieutenant Von Rahden, member of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Silesian
infantry nr.11 Von Rahden got wounded, and ws about to fall in French hands, when he was
dragged away by a comrade. Cf. Rahden, W.von -Wanderungen eines alten Soldaten p.366-
369

6. Hiller, Von Denkwurdigkeiten etc. p.250

⁷ GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4A.2.p.8

⁸ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.24

⁹ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 E.2.p.12, 4A.1.p.4 and 14, 4F.1.p.32 and 4C.p.6-7

10.Husaren-regiment Nr.8 p.5
Geschichte des 1.Westfalischen Husaren-Regiments p.4-5

Report of Von Bulow. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.530

GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.4 E.2.p.17, 4C,p.7 and 4C.p.23

¹¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.16

¹² GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.25

¹³ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.57, 4A.1.p.33,37

14.Hiller, Von Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.251

15.GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.22-

Wedel, C.von Geschichte eines Offiziers etc. p.250

16. Report of Von Gneisenau. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.486

Pirch I claims his vanguard reached the wood after 6 p.m. Cf. report as referred to in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.506

For 7.30 p.m. also see:

Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.330

¹⁷ Siborne specifies them, being in the first line the 5th regiment of Pommeranian hussars nr.1, the Brandenburger hussars (both of the brigade of Von Sohr); in second line the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlands, two squadrons of the 6th regiment of Neumark dragoons, the Königin dragoons (all of Von Thümen's brigade) and in the third line the 5th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry (brigade Von der Schulenburg) and the regiment Elbe Landwehrcavalry (brigade-cavalry of Von Brause and Von Böse). In: History of the war in France etc. Vol.II p.188.

¹⁸ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.22-23,31 According to Von Hagen, the regiment of Neumark Dragoons nr.6 covered a battery up the end of the battle and suffered here just a few casualties. Cf. Hagen, E.von Geschichte des Neumärkischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.3 p.280

Von Ardenne confirms that the brigade of Von Sohr halted the infantry which emerged from Plancenoit. Cf. Ardenne, A.von - Geschichte des Zieten'schen Husaren-Regiments p.492

¹⁹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.35-36

20.Report of Pirch I, as referred to in: Bas, F.de en T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.508

Report of Von Bülow. In: Bas, F.de en T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.534-536

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.26

21.Hiller, Von Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.251

²² Cf. Wedell, Von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 18.Infanterie Regiments p.168

²³ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.4 E.1.p.49 and 4A.1.p.17

²⁴ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.34-37, 51-52 and 4A.1.p.25-27

²⁵ Report of the 1st battalion. In: Schulze, M. Das 2^e Neumarkse Landwehr Infanterie

Regiment p.177

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.4B.p.11, 4 E.p.69-70

²⁶ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.53, 4A.1.p.30, 4F.1.p.33

²⁷ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.54 and 4A.1.p.31

²⁸ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.54-55

²⁹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.56 and 4A.1.p.29

³⁰ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4A.p.12,36 and 4 E.2.p.26,77, 4D.p.10

³¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.62

³² GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.77 and 4D.p.14

³³ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.77 and 4D.p.16

³⁴ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.66, 4F.1.p.41, 4D.p.17-19

³⁵ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.17-18

³⁶ For the reconstruction of this attack:

J.von Pflugk Hartung. In:

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.35-41

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4F.2.p.28-41

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4A.2.p.12

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4B.p.31-33

³⁷ Dörk, G.M. Das Königlich Preussische etc p.132

³⁸ Cf. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments etc. p.35

³⁹ J.von Pflugk Hartung. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.

Report of Von Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.534

Report of Pirch I as referred to in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.506

Major Von Pfeil, in his diary. In: Militärarchiv der DDR, PR.19/109 (Bl.20-22R)

Report colonel Von Hiller. In: Ollech, Von. Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.248-249

Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.249

Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.311-315

Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.435

Von Damitz gives a different order of battle for this third attack. According to his account, the 2nd and the 3rd battalion of the 1st Pommeranian regiment came into position in battalion

columns opposite the church of Plancenoit (the 3rd battalion to the right and the 2nd battalion to the left), while the 1st and the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr infantry directed their assault upon the north-side of the village.

The 1st battalion of the 1st Pommeranian regiment followed the interval which was between these columns of attack.

Major Von Witzleben. With the 3rd battalion of the 25th regiment of infantry, turned Plancenoit on its south side by advancing along the heights there; the musketeer battalions of the regiment, as well as its Jäger were detached against the Bois de Chantelet.

In support, in the second line, the 11th regiment of infantry (two battalions) and the 2nd regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr (three battalions) of Von Ryssel's brigade followed, as well as the 15th regiment of infantry (1st and 2nd battalion) with the 1st regiment of Silesian Landwehr (1st and 2nd battalion), both of Von Hiller's brigade.

The whole was covered by skirmishers and a bombardment of the Prussian artillery. The first line advanced in a storm-pace. In: Geschichte etc. p.311-315

Colonel Von Hiller acknowledges the role of the units of Von Tippelskirch, but not in a position in front of his own. He also adds a correction in the plan as published by W.Siborne in his work of 1846. In: Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.251.

40. The fact that Plancenoit was taken during the third attack becomes clear from the reports of general Von Bülow and colonel Von Hiller (see above).

In his memoirs, colonel Von Hiller mentions four attacks, in which account he enters relatively short into the third. He also believes that during the last attack he suffered a relatively low percentage of losses. Cf. Hiller, Von Denkwürdigkeiten, p.252

41. Horse battery nr.12 also fired grenades which made building catch fire. Cf. diary of major Von Pfeil. In: Militärarchiv der DDR, PR.19/109 (B1.20-22R)

Von Hiller himself, however, claims that it were the French who set fire into the buildings. In: Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.251.

⁴² Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.339

⁴³ Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.337

⁴⁴ Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.339

45. Erroneously, Siborne speaks about the right bank of the Lasne, where Von Keller advanced. Cf. Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.II p.240

According to Von Hiller, Von Keller's men almost hadn't got involved in any fighting that day. Cf.Hiller, Von Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.253

Major Von Keller himself, however, mentions the pushing back of the enemy by captain Von Humbracht. Cf., Major Von Keller in: Narrative of the particular circumstances etc. In: A description of the costly and curious etc. p.11

⁴⁶ Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.106

⁴⁷ Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.339

48. Stawitzky, E.H.L. Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.106 Pelet. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905. p.33-54 en 107-128

Diary of major Von Pfeil (commander of the horse battery nr.12).In: In: Militärarchiv der DDR, PR.19/109 (Bl.20-22R) Major Von Pfeil was severely wounded at this time.

49. According to Pelet he evacuated Plancenoit at 8 or 8.30 p.m. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905 p.51

Von Bülow, in his report, states it was "gegen den Abend". In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.536

For 8.30 also see:

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.437

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.II p.243

50. It was in the period that the two first assaults on Plancenoit took place. Cf. Dörk, E.M. - Das königlich Preussischer 15tes Infanterie Regiment p.133

General Radet believes it was around 8 p.m. Cf. report of general Radet, dated 19th June 1815. In: Combiér, A. Mémoires du général Radet p.343

Colonel Duuring (1st battalion 1st regiment of chasseurs) believes it was 5 and 6 p.m. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905 p.117

H.Houssaye and H.de Mauduit state it was 7 p.m. Cf.

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.396

51. Dörk, E.M. - Das königlich Preussischer 15tes Infanterie Regiment p.133

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4A.2.p.19, V.4F.2.p.40

Fleury de Chaboulon, secretary of Napoleon's cabinet, spreekt van een actie van pruisische cavalerie op het Bois de Chantelet. Bij die gelegenheid werd deze cavalerie aanvankelijk teruggeslagen, maar kwam zij versterkt terug en dreef zij de franse troepen terug. Ook Charras spreekt van cavalerie in plaats van infanterie. Zie: Fleury de Chaboulon, M. Mémoires pour servir etc. Vol.II p.131

Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.318

52. It is not clear which battery these guns came from. Duuring gives no further details about the position of the detachment either. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905. p.117

Marchand confirms that the men guarding the baggages pulled against the enemy into the adjacent wood. In: Mémoires de marchand premier Valet etc. p.

53. Duuring mentions 200 men. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905, p.117

54. Report of Radet, dated 19th June 1815. In: Combiér, A. Mémoires du général Radet p.343

Colonel Duuring claims 100 men were detached twice.In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à

Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905. p.117

55. Report of Radet, 19th June 1815. In: Combier, A. Mémoires du général Radet p.343 He claims the Prussians had lost 14 men killed.

Account of colonel Duuring. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache.1905 p.117

Houssaye uses both accounts in an incorrect way. First, he believes the Prussians advanced in and beyond the Bois de Chantelet (which they didn't) and secondly he claims the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment chasseurs pushed them back while it was the temporarily formed battalion under adjudant Granier. In: 1815.Waterloo p.424

Also see:

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.II p.242 He mentions the presence of grenadiers in stead of chasseurs.

⁵⁶ Dörk, E.M. - Das königlich Preussischer 15tes Infanterie Regiment p.133-134
GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4A.2.p.19, V.4F.2.p.4041

⁵⁷ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.24

⁵⁸ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.26

⁵⁹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.28-29

⁶⁰ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.30-33

⁶¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.26,28

⁶² GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.23-24

Count Von Wedel of the 1st regiment Pommeranian hussars nr.5 (Von Sohr) confirms his regiment was at this extreme left flank at the edge of the wood. From here it would have charged only once on French cavalry which charged Prussian squares, but the hussars had to wheel back for the French infantry which was further to the rear. In: Wedel, C.von Geschichte eines Offiziers etc. p.250

The 2nd regiment of Brandenburg hussars nr.3 was instructed to halt near Plancenoit when it tried to follow the infantry. Cf. Ardenne, A.von - Geschichte des Zieten'schen Husaren-Regiments p.492

Dziengel, however, claims the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlands was to the right of Plancenoit. He also cites from the account of a sergeant Knothe who says his brigade (Von Thümen) was to the right and that it actually passed through the village. It may well have been that the scattered houses here, to the right of the wood, may have been held for Plancenoit as such. Cf. Dziengel, J.D.von - Geschichte des königlichen Zweiten etc. p.390

⁶³ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.31

⁶⁴ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.24

⁶⁵ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V E.1.p.48 and 4A.1.p.22

⁶⁶ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr. V.4A.1.p.18-19

⁶⁷ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr. V.4 E.1.p.73, 4 E.2.p.24, 4B.p.15-16

⁶⁸ Report of the 2nd battalion. In: Schulze, M. Das 2^e Neumarks Landwehr Infanterie Regiment p.178-179

⁶⁹ Report of the battalion. In: Schulze, M. Das 2^e Neumarkse Landwehr Infanterie Regiment p.179

GSA, VPH-HA, nr. V.4B.p.19 and 4 E.1.p.73

⁷⁰ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr. V.4B.p.13

⁷¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.4 E.2.p.19 and 4A.1.p.30-38

⁷² GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr. V.4 E.1.p.74 and nr. V.4B.p.18

⁷³ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr. V.4C.p.13-14