Napoleon re-divides his forces.

Napoleon moves towards Quatre Bras.

To support Ney to take Quatre Bras, Napoleon decided to move the 6th army-corps and the Imperial Guard to Marbais and to join them himself some time later. It was now around 10.30 a.m. [1]
The corps of Lobau was in a position north of Ligny, towards Sombreffe. From here it moved towards the Namur-road. The division of Subervie must have advanced via the Roman road and Les Trois Burettes, having been on the extreme left flank, in front of Wagnelée. [2]
At some distance, the imperial guard followed in its wake. [3] This means the different parts of the guard must have followed different tracks.
The Young Guard was north of Saint Amand La Haye, while the grenadiers, the 1st regiment chasseurs and the heavy cavalry of the guard were north of Ligny.
The whole infantry of the Imperial Guard (except for the Young Guard) was assembled north of Ligny by 10 a.m. [4] Shortly after that Napoleon ordered it (plus the corps of Lobau), to march to Marbais. It did so at 11 a.m. ([5]) and followed the corps of Lobau. It marched in columns of sections. Between Brye and the Bois Delhütte, the Imperial guard was obliged to halt two or three times in all probability to restore some order in the column. [6]
The letter written at noon by Soult to Ney shows that, by that time, both the Imperial guard and the corps of Lobau were between Le Trois Burettes and Marbais. The distance between Bussy and Les Trois Burettes is about two kilometers; this would mean that the French moved with an average speed of two kilometers per hour.

Not long after sending away Lobau and the Imperial guard, Napoleon sent Grouchy out on a mission; by then it must have been running towards 11 a.m. (see below). After completing the orders for Grouchy, and knowing that Quatre Bras was still held by Wellington, Napoleon now urged Ney to occupy the crossroads immediately. Accordingly, he sent Ney the following order:

En avant de Ligny, le 17 juin, à midi.

à M.le maréchal Prince de la Moskowa 4e [?] corps d'armée à Gosselies

Monsieur le maréchal, l'empereur vient de faire prendre position en avant de Marbais à un corps d'infanterie et à la garde impériale; Sa Majesté me charge de vous dire que son intention est que vous attaquiez les ennemis aux Quatre Bras, pour les chasser de leur position, et que le corps qui est à Marbais secondera vos opérations. Sa Majesté va se rendre à Marbais, et elle attend vos rapports avec impatience.

Le maréchal d'Empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie [7]

It must have been between noon and 12.30 p.m. that Napoleon himself left the battlefield of Ligny for Marbais with the corps Milhaud and the division of Domon. [8] Following the road leading to Nivelles, Napoleon got south of Marbais around 1 p.m. [9]
The reason for the emperor of halting here may have been that he was awaiting the news of Ney about the situation at Quatre Bras. However, this news did not come and, what was even worse, it soon appeared that Wellington had not evacuated the crossroads at all. Napoleon, growing very impatient, now sent out the following order to Ney.

Monsieur le prince de la Moskowa,

Je suis surpris de votre grande retard à exécuter mes ordres. Il n'y a plus de tems [sic] à perdre; attaquez avec le plus grande impétuosité tout ce que est devant vous. Le sort de la patrie est dans vos mains.

1 heure après midi

Napoleon [10]

The French column heading for Quatre Bras was preceded by a detachment of 100 men of the 7th regiment of hussars (brigade Jacquinot). [11]
The detachment of the French hussars was pushed back by the British outposts, which were near the Bois Delhütte and Sart-à-Mavelines. [12] By now, Napoleon had decided to march straight towards Quatre Bras, without waiting for Ney. For this reason he placed his troops in the following positions: the artillery of the Imperial Guard and the 6th corps in the centre, the infantry of both these corps in the second line, Milhaud and Subervie to the right of the road and Jacquinot and Domon to the left of it. This formation must have been taken up next to the Bois Delhütte, on and on both sides of the road. [13] From here to Quatre Bras was three kilometers.
At the same time, Napoleon sent out 500 horsemen towards Frasnes to communicate with Ney. However, by moving north of the Bois Delhütte and the Bois de Bruyère the group met with the red lancers of the Imperial Guard who held them for British cavalry. A skirmish of musketry fire ensued which however was soon brought to an end.
Other members of the 7th regiment of hussars had gone in the direction of Quatre Bras and had taken a British sutler prisoner. She was brought to the emperor and informed him of the fact that Wellington had left Quatre Bras, and that at the crossroads there were only some rearguard cavalry and artillery. She also believed the troops of Ney had gone back across the Sambre. [14]

During the march of the French towards Quatre Bras, there would have been two encounters with Prussian cavalry.
The first one would have been one of a patrol of the 4th regiment chasseurs à cheval (division of Domon) which would have pushed through as far a the bridge over the Dyle at Moustier. [15] The regiment would have been detached by Domon to reconnoitre the left bank of the Dyle as well as the area between the Dyle and Brussels road. There would have been an exchange of some carbine-fire with the Prussian cavalry. After that the French would have returned to their division. [16]
The mission is very doubtful. Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence from authentic records, the distance to Moustier is more than twelve kilometers. And to return back to its division, the patrol would have to make a long detour through Genappe, as in returning, it could impossibly know where it had to go to reach the main army.
But that there has been contact between French and Prussian cavalry during the French march to Quatre Bras and beyond, can be derived from the reports of count Von Gröben. It was before 2 p.m. that he was driven out of his post near Marbais by " Seitenpatrouilles ". Later, as Von Gröben mentions, the " Seiten-Detachements " advanced over Tilly and later through Strichon and Villers-la-Ville, after which Von Sohr slowly went back towards Mont-Saint-Guibert. In all probability, these French horsemen were either lancers or *chasseurs à cheval* of the division of Subervie, which moved north of the Namur-road. [17]

Grouchy's mission.

It was towards 11 a.m. that Napoleon told marshal Grouchy that he had to move the 3rd and the 4th corps of infantry towards Point du Jour. [18]
Point du Jour is at the crossroads of the roads towards Gembloux and Namur and that was where to both Exelmans and Pajol were reconnoitring the enemy. Pending further information resulting from these activities, Grouchy was to halt at Point du Jour and there to await Napoleon's further instructions. The conversation lasted just a couple of minutes [[19]]. Then, Grouchy left Napoleon for Ligny between 11 and 11.30 a.m. [20]
Shortly after Grouchy had left for Ligny, however, Napoleon changed his mind about the use of both Domon's and Milhaud's cavalry. Napoleon felt he needed more cavalry for his own forces which were supposed to go to Marbais and from there to Quatre Bras. For that reason he sent Grouchy the following order through Bertrand:

Ordonnez au général Domon de se rendre sur le champ à Marbais. Il y sera sous les ordres du Comte de Lobau. Il dirigera des détachements sur les Quatre Chemins, route de Bruxelles, et se réunira par la gauche avec les troupes des 1er et 2e corps, qui occupent ce matin le village de Frasne et qui doivent aussi marcher sur les Quatre Chemins, où les Anglais sont supposés être.
Ordonnez au général Milhaud de se rendre à Marbais. Il aura devant lui la cavalerie légère du général Domon. Il y trouvera le corps du Comte de Lobau et la garde.

Ligny, ce [sic] 17 juin

Dicté par l'Empereur en l'absence du major général,

le grand maréchal,

(signé), Bertrand [21]

Eventually, the units led by Grouchy were the 3rd (not including the cavalry of Domon) and the 4th infantry-corps, the division of Teste of the 6th corps and the cavalry corps of Pajol (not including the division of Subervie) and of Exelmans. Teste's division was attached to Pajol's corps. In total Grouchy disposed of a force of about 30.000 men with 104 guns. [22]

It must have been after 12 o'clock that Milhaud and Domon moved towards Marbais; Milhaud must have done so by turning around Sombreffe towards the Namur-road, while Domon may have moved to Les Trois Burettes via Wagnelée and the Roman road. Domon preceded Milhaud. [23]
Near Marbais Domon attached his division to Lobau's corps, as he was ordered to do.
While the artillery and the infantry marched over the road itself, the cavalry moved through the adjacent fields. [24]
Another division of cavalry which was pulled by Napoleon to his forces, supposed to be marching against Wellington, was the one of Subervie (corps of Pajol).
During the battle of Ligny, the division had fought in the vicinity of the 3rd corps, and then had probably been temporarily attached to this corps. [25]

Grouchy received Napoleon's order related to the cavalry of Milhaud and Domon when he was on his way to general Gérard at Ligny. Shortly after he met Soult, who was, in his turn, on his way from Fleurus to Napoleon.
It must have been shortly after he had left Napoleon that Grouchy received Exelmans' report which dated from about 10.15 a.m. As this was the information Napoleon was waiting for, he immediately must have forwarded it to him.
Being now in the possession of further information of both Pajol and Exelmans, Napoleon now decided to issue more particular orders to Grouchy. As Soult still had not returned from Fleurus, Napoleon had Bertrand write them. By then it must have been between 11.30 and 12.00 a.m. The document reads:

Ligny, le 17 juin 1815

Monsieur le maréchal, rendez-vous à Gembloux avec le corps de cavalerie du général Pajol, la cavalerie légère du quatrième corps, le corps de cavalerie du général Exelmans, la division du général Teste, dont vous aurez un soin particulier, étant détachée de son corps d'armée, et les troisième et quatrième corps d'infanterie. Vous vous ferez éclairer sur la direction de Namur et de Maestricht, et vous poursuivrez l'ennemi.
Eclairez sa marche et instruisez moi de ses mouvements, de manière que je puisse pénétrer ce qu'il veut faire. Je porte mon quartier général aux quatre chemins, où ce matin étaient encore les Anglais. Notre communication sera donc directe par la route pavée de Namur. Si l'ennemi a évacué Namur, écrivez au général commandant la deuxième division militaire à Charlemont de faire occuper Namur par quelques bataillons de garde nationale et une batterie de canon qu'il formera à Charlemont. Il donnera ce commandement à un maréchal de camp.
Il est important de pénétrer ce que l'ennemi veut faire: ou il se sépare des Anglais, ou ils veulent se réunir encore pour couvrir Bruxelles et Liège, en tentant le sort d'une nouvelle bataille. Dans tous les cas, tenez constamment vos deux corps d'infanterie réunis dans une lieue de terrain, et occupez tous les soirs une bonne position militaire, ayant plusieurs débouchés de retraite. Placez des détachements de cavalerie intermédiaire, pour communiquer avec le quartier général.

Ligny, le 17 juin 1815
Dicté par l'Empereur en l'absence du major général,
(signé) Bertrand [26]

Shortly after this order was written and sent, Soult dropped in from Fleurus. Napoleon had intended to write to Ney, and now this ran through Soult again. This resulted in the order as issued to Ney at noon.
As a result of the arrival of Exelmans report, Grouchy sent his aide de camp Bella to Gembloux to meet Exelmans and to see for himself about the latest situation there and to report back to him. Bella did so about three hours later (see below).

The division of Girard.

While Napoleon took the main body of his army towards the road which leads from Charleroi to Brussels and Grouchy took the troops under his command to pursue the Prussian army, the division of Girard was left on the battlefield of Ligny. During the battle it had suffered terribly: from the 3925 men, 1900 had fallen. [27]

The remaining 2000 men were put at the disposal of the *ordonnateur général* and baron Percy, the *chirurgien en chef* of the army. In this capacity the division was assigned two tasks: to bring the wounded from the field and to protect convois for their evacuation to Charleroi. At the same time, the division would have been used to restore order at Fleurus and to protect convois which were arriving there from Charleroi. [28]

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1.Some say it was 10 a.m.:
Ropes, J.C. The Waterloo campaign p.203
Löben Sels, E.van Bijdragen tot de krijgsgeschiedenis etc. Vol.IV.p.
Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.236
Ollech, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.172

Houssaye thinks it was 11 a.m. In: 1815.Waterloo p.232

2.According to Grouchy the division of Subervie marched with the 6th corps. Cf. Grouchy in: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.172

3.H.de Mauduit claims the guardsmen found the 6th corps at Marbais; this must have meant that the corps of Lobau must have halted there for some time, for the guard to come up. Cd. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.207

4.General Petit's account of the Waterloo campaign. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII. 1903 p.324
J.F.Friant in Vie militaire etc. p.386

The battalion of sappers and miners, having been attached to the 3rd corps on the 15th of June, had not seen any action on the 16th, being part of the reserve. Now, it was re-united with the Imperial Guard. Cf. Lomier, E. – Le batiallon des marins de la garde p.448

5.Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.207
Colonel Duuring claims his regiment (the 1st regiment of chasseurs) left its position after noon. General Christiani (2nd regiment of grenadiers) says it was 11 a.m. or noon. Cf. d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.33-54 and 107-128

Baron Rogniat confirms the army started to move between 11 a.m. and noon. In: Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoleon p.270

6.Mauduit, H. Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.207
Mauduit erroneously mentions the Bois de Villers Peruin, in stead of the Bois Delhütte.
Colonel Duuring (1st battalion of chasseurs) would have got the instruction to go to the emperor, but shortly after that he met general Friant who instructed him to remain where he was.Cf. d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.33-54 and 107-128.

7.SHAT, nr.C15, 1-5
Quinet, E. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.426
Duc d'Elchingen. Documents inédits p.44
Pontécoulant, F.G.de - Souvenirs militaires. p.237
The general staff presumed Ney to be at Gosselies, while Ney had written from Frasnes on the evening of the 16th.

8.According to Charras Napoleon was then in a carriage. Cf. Charras. La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.250

Colonel Petiet (staff-officer of Soult) claims Napoleon was escorted by his duty squadrons.
Cf. Petiet, A.- Souvenirs militaires p.203
Delloye also believes it was after noon. Cf.Delloye, S. Napoleon dans sa dernière campagne. Special number of the bulletin of the SBEN.1996. p.43

9.According to a local tradition, Napoleon would have made a halt at the house of a local rich men at Marbais, called Delestange. Here, the emperor would have taken a small nap in a summer-house. Cf. Piérart, Z.J. le drame de Waterloo p.237
Delloye (see above) mentions a brief halt at Les trois burettes.

10.Cf. copy given by Chandler. In: Chandler, D. Waterloo, the hundred days p.89
It would have been sold in 1970 at Sotheby's London. The order has the following note, written by colonel Gourgaud:
"Ordre d'attaquer la position de Quatre Bras écrite de la main de l'empereur Napoleon le seize juin mil huit cents quinze pour le maréchal Neij. Le général aide de camp de l'empereur le baron Gourgaud."
Gourgaud erroneously writes the order dates from the 16th of June, but this could not be the case as it could never have been written before the orders written by Soult in the middle of the afternoon of the 16th. On the other hand, it fits to the order issued by Soult at noon on the 17th of June.

11.Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.109
The only hussars present were those of the 7th regiment (Jacquinot's division).
It had spent the night at Villers Peruin. Cf. Chef d'escadron Dupuy. In: Souvenirs militaires etc.
D'Erlon had left the infantry division of Durutte plus three regiments of the division of Jacquinot near the battlefield, the moment he left for the one of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 16th of June. Cf.Durutte in the Sentinelle de l'armée, 8th March 1836

12. These were the men of the picket of the 18th regiment of hussars.

13. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.210-211
Lieutenant Hay (12th regiment of light dragoons) confirms the presennce of a force of about 22.000 men with about 50 guns, in three lines. Cf. Hay, W. Reminiscenses under Wellington p.169
All in all there must have been about 28.000 men.
According to sergeant Coglan (18th regiment of hussars) the French approached from a wood, in a very good order. Apart from that, the French guns opened fire. In: History of the 18th hussars (..).
Sir H.Vivian, In his diary. In: Vivian, Cl. R.H.Vivian, first baron Vivian p.271

14.Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.109-110

15. Berton, J.B. Précis historique etc. p.50

16.Berton, J.B. Précis historique, militaire etc. p.50

[17] In this context, Napoleon claims that on the evening of the 17th of June general Milhaud " qui avait marché avec son corps pour maintenir les communications avec le maréchal Grouchy, rendit compte qu'il avait eu connaissance d'une colonne de cavalerie ennemie, qui, de Tilly s'était reployée en toute hate sur Wavres."
First of all, the impression is given that the whole corps of Milhaud was used as a communication between the main army and the detachment led by Grouchy, and this was clearly not the case. Secondly, heavy cavalry is not used to establish communication lines like these. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.114

18. Different hours are mentioned for the moment Grouchy was sent away:
11 a.m.:
Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.232

Noon:
Grouchy. In: Observations sur la relation etc.In: Mémoires etc. Vol.V p.117 and in Relation succincte etc. p.19
Quinet, E. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.304
Ropes, J.C. The Waterloo campaign p.206
Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.239

12.30 p.m.:
Grouchy in "Bataille de Waterloo, par un combattant de Waterloo", from 1818. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy, Vol.V p.79
Le Sénécal. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.128
Colonel De Bloqueville. In: Mémoires etc. Vol.IV p.146

1 p.m.
Grouchy. In:
Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Grouchy, G.de - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.V p.113
Fragments historiques etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol. V p.275
Reaction to Rémy and Barthelémy. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.498
Allocution du maréchal Grouchy. In: Le maréchal Grouchy du 16 au 19 juin 1815 p.117

In another version Grouchy claims it was 1.30 p.m. Cf. Grouchy, In: Appendice. Campagne de 1815. Pièces officielles etc. p.15

[19] Grouchy. In: Relation succincte p.21

[20] Grouchy himself claims it was 1 p.m. In: Fragments historiques etc. In: Mémoires etc. Vol.V p.317

21.In: SHAT, nr.
This order is not mentioned in the register of staff. It was unknown for a long time, until Grouchy published it in 1842.

Chuquet dates it at 11.30 a.m., but the copy from Vincennes has not been timed. In: Inédits Napoléoniens p.471

22. This figure is based upon the following calculation:
3rd corps: 12.500 + 40 guns
4th corps: 11.300 + 38 guns
Teste: 2700 + 8 guns
Pajol: 1300 + 6 guns
Exelmans: 2600 + 12 guns.
In all, about 5000 cavalry.

Grouchy himself mentions a number of 32.000 men. Cf. Grouchy in: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy Vol.V p.137 and in: Observations sur la relation etc. p.137 (of which 4870 cavalry).
Aerts also comes to about 32.000 men + 96 guns with the following numbers:
3rd corps: 13.000 + 32 guns
4th corps: 12.200 + 38 guns
Teste: 2600 + 8 guns
Pajol: 1300 + 6 guns
Exelmans: 3000 + 12 guns.
In: Etudes (manuscript) p.26

Elsewhere, Grouchy gives a total 31.000. In: Fragments historiques etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.277 At the same time, here he grossly exagggerates the Prussian strength, being about 100.000

Gourgaud comes to 35.220 + 110 guns, but includes the division Girard. Exclusive this division, his total then is 32.060 + 102 guns.(he assigns both the 3rd and the 4th corps 38 guns each).

23 That morning, lieutenant general Delort had written his report to general Milhaud:

Mon général,

La 14e division de cavalerie, après avoir exécuté divers mouvements du centre à la droite et à la gauche de l'armée, a recu directement l'ordre de l'Empereur, vers six heures et demie du soir, de se porter sur-le-champ à la poursuite de l'ennemi, en traversant Ligny. Parvenue sur les hauteurs qui dominent ce village, elle a rencontré une forte masse de cavalerie prussienne, appuyée par des carrés d'infanterie et par plusieurs batteries d'artillerie.
Malgré ces obstacles, le 1er escadron du 5e régiment à peine formé, ayant à sa tête le maréchal de camp Farine, le colonel Frère, de votre état-major, a chargé avec la plus grande vigueur et avec toute l'impétuosité possible la prémière ligne de cavalerie des ennemies qui a été enfoncée et mise en plein déroute, après avoir laissé bon nombre de morts sur le champ de bataille.
Une seconde ligne de cavalerie étant venue au secours de la prémière, les 5e et 10e de cuirassiers, successivement formés et avec ordre, ont encore culbuté cette seconde ligne avec la même intrépidité, sans être intimidés par le nombre des escadrons prussiens, trois ou quatre fois supérieure au notre.
L'ennemi, voulant à toute force reprendre le plateau sur lequel je venais de m'établir, pour appuyer les troupes de la garde impériale, nous a, en quelque sorte, environnés de son feu de mousqueterie et d'artillerie, tandis que sa cavalerie menacait de nous charger de front, sur le flanc droit et en queue.

Dans une position aussi critique, des charges ont été exécutées sur tous les points, des carrés d'infanterie ont été enfoncés, mais un feu très meurtrier duquel ma division a beaucoup souffert, et la nuit survenue, nous ont empêchés de profiter de tous les avantages que nous avions obtenus. Quelques prisonniers, parmi lesquels un officier général de cavalerie, et un obusier attelé sont restés en notre pouvoir. Cette pièce a été enlevée par le 9e de cuirassiers. Le colonel Frère et le général Farine ont été gravement blessés. Je l'ai été moi-même dans la première charge, mais légèrement, d'un coup de sabre au bras droit.
Je vous ferai connaitre, mon général, par un rapport spécial, mes pertes en tués et blessés, ainsi que le nom des officiers, sous-officiers et soldats qui se sont le plus distingués. Je me borne à present à vous dire que ma division, au milieu du feu le plus vif et le plus soutenu, est restée inébranlable, faisant toujours face à l'ennemi et le repoussant, de quelque coté qu'il se présentat.
Dans les divers charges exécutées à la fin de la journée, le prince Blücher a été renversé de cheval, est resté près d'une heure en notre pouvoir et ne s'est sauvé de ce danger extrême que parce qu'il n'a pas été reconnu par les uns ou qu'il a été réputé mortellement blessé par les autres.

Agréez, etc.

Le lieutenant général, Baron Delort
In: Delort. Notice sur les batailles de Fleurus et de Mont de Saint p.371-373
An other version, with some slight differences in details can be found in: Stouff, L. Essai etc. p.129-130 The main difference lies in the extra sentence at the end stating: *"Le colonel Legay d'Arcy m'a parfaitement secondé et mérite le grade de commandant de la Légion d'honneur."*

24.Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.211

[25] At 10 p.m. Grouchy wrote to Pajol: " Vandamme a donné ordre à Subervie de vous rejoindre; ne l'a t'il donc pas fait ? " This would be an indication that, at that time, Grouchy (and Vandamme) were still unaware of the fact that the emperor had drawn it to his own army.

26. SHAT, nr. Based upon the original as supplied by mr. Du Casse in 1865.
Also see:
Cf. Grouchy, In: Appendice. Campagne de 1815. Pièces officielles etc. p.17-18
Quinet, E. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 nr.7
Pollio takes this last version, but leaves out two important words: "[pour couvrir Bruxelles] et Liège." In: Waterloo p.300
De Pontécoulant, F.G. - Souvenirs militaires etc. p.198-199
He claims he bases himself upon the authentic handwriting, yet his version is different as the one published here. Apart from a few minor differences, he adds "sur le champ" right after "rendez-vous" in the beginning of the document and leaves out "et Liège". In his main text, however, while citing from the same order he quotes it as "Bruxelles et Liège."
Grouchy, G.de - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.50-51 This version is differemt as the original copy from Vincennes. Houssaye publishes this version as well. In: 1815.Waterloo p.237

The order was published separately in 1840 by Bauduin, Paris under the title: " Ordre de

l'empereur Napoléon au maréchal Grouchy, recu sur la route de Namur, où Napoléon avait enjoint de se rendre au moment où il quitta le champ de bataille de Ligny pour se porter aux Quatre Bras. D'après la lettre autographe du grand maréchal du palais Bertrand. " Cf. Piérart, Z.J. Le drame de Waterloo p.238
Pascallet published it in 1842. Cf. Notice biographique sur le maréchal Grouchy p.79-80

G.de Grouchy dates the order at 3 p.m. Cf. Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.241

Chuquet dates it at 11.45 a.m. but the original has no indication of an hour. In: Inédits Napoleoniens p.471-472

27. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.98
Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.180

28. Colonel Matis himself states in his (unpublished) and somewhat uninformative memoirs: "Le lendemain de la bataille de Ligny, ma division (celle de Girard) fut appelée au grand quartier général, qui était aux Quatre Bras […] Une heure après, je recus l'ordre de me rendre à Fleurus pour y arrêter des maraudeurs qui commettaient des désordere; et protéger l'arrivée des convois destinés à l'armée."
In: Quinet, E. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.437-438
The surgeon d'Héralde (12th regiment of light infantry) doesn't give any useful information, as he was at Charleroi to take care of general Girard, who had got wounded at Saint Amand.
In: Delloye, S. Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde p.27

Grouchy claims the division was left at Fleurus to guard this village and to evacuate the wounded from the field. In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. in: Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy, Vol.V p.112

Yet, another source claims Matis was left behind to care for the wounded and to guard Charleroi. Cf. Arvers, P. Historique du 82e régiment d'infanterie de ligne p.162