

Bachelu's attack.

Bachelu's division had covered the 1400 meters from its position near Le Balcan to the height in front of the low ground east of Gémioncourt not without difficulty due to the ground and the heat. <sup>1</sup> It had, while doing so, driven off the Netherlands chasseurs. At its right flank it had driven them from Piraumont too, and here it must have left some troops.

By now, Ney had probably received Soult's order of 2 p.m. which told him to drive Wellington away from Quatre Bras and then to turn right to fall on the Prussian right wing.

With the remaining force, Ney now decided to attack the plateau on the other side of the low ground, on the front which stretches between Gémioncourt and the Etang Materne. It was running towards 4 p.m. <sup>2</sup>

At that time, Ney had his division Bachelu in the low ground on a front which ran from Piraumont on the right up to Gémioncourt to the left.

Further to the left, Foy must have kept his battalions on and on both sides of the Brussels-road and probably in the farm of Gémioncourt.

After the division of Bachelu had formed columns of battalions on the plateau south-east of Gémioncourt, it now worked its way through the double hedge in the low ground in columns of battalions, while being covered by a bombardment and preceded by skirmishers of the 2nd regiment of light infantry. <sup>3</sup>

After that they climbed the slope of the plateau which was fully covered with high corn. <sup>4</sup>

From his position in the very centre of his position, Wellington must have seen the French approaching and now he ordered to meet them with the most of his 5th division. For that reason, all battalions (except for the 92nd, the 95th and those of Best) were ordered to take in their light troops first and then to advance from their positions along the Namur-road – in all these were about 4400 men. <sup>5</sup>

Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment) says about the situation:

"Our pieces were loaded, and perhaps never did a regiment in the field seem so short taken. We were all ready in line-"Forward" was the word of command, and forward we hastened, though we saw no enemy in front. The stalks of the rye, like the reeds that grow on the margin of some swamp, opposed our advance; the tops were up to our bonnets, and we strode and groped our way through as fast as we could. By the time we reached a field of clover on the other side we were very much straggled; however, we united in line as fast as time and our speedy advance would permit. The Belgic skirmishers retired through our ranks, and in an instant we were on their victorious pursuers." <sup>6</sup>

As the British units met the French 400 to 500 yards in front of the Namur-road, they must have opened a devastating fire, which completely surprised the French. <sup>7</sup>

But that was not all: as the French started to hesitate after the British volleys, Picton now launched a bayonet-attack on the French and which was accompanied by a cheer of the British. This proved too much: even before confronting the charge, the 2nd regiment of light infantry fled while the remainder of the division also got into disorder and faced about. As the French streamed back into the low ground several got entangled in the hedges. <sup>8</sup>

Only on the left, the 108th regiment of the line, being delayed by a strong hedge in front, was

able to keep up some order.<sup>9</sup>

The situation was that further to its right the three other regiments of the brigade had been able in their advance to cross the hedge through gaps which had been cut out, but not without problems however. The hedge in front of the 108th was however very thick and high and its commander, colonel Higonet, ordered his sappers and grenadiers to open a gap of about a platoon width; it did so, and then the first battalion of the regiment slipped through, to form to the immediate left of the 72th of the line. As they had done so, however, the British attacked the French formations and now pushed them back through the hedge in confusion. Somehow, Higonet's battalion in front of the hedge had maintained its order and was now pulled back through the hedge behind the other two battalions, which now formed front in line to the right where the 72nd passed, back to the French position. It was from here that they were able to push back the British from the hedge by a volley and a subsequent bayonet charge.<sup>10</sup>

So it was up to the first hedge on the bottom of the slope that the British pursued the French and forced them through the gaps in as much as they didn't get entangled themselves.<sup>11</sup> It was not only the state of the ground, however, which prevented them from advancing any further, even though they were already a fair distance away from their former positions. To the left rear of the division of Bachelu, on the high ground to the south-east of Gémioncourt, general Foy had left – as a precaution – his 100th regiment of the line for the division to collect in case of a defeat and this it did by giving off a fire.<sup>12</sup>

The 79th regiment, however, went beyond both hedges just west of the Etange Materne and started here a musketry-fire on the French on the other side of the low ground. It was able to keep this up for about 15 minutes until their ammunition nearly ran out; then the battalion went back to a position which was about 50 yards in front of its former position and where it soon lay down because of the French gunfire.<sup>13</sup>

Neither of the other British battalions pulled back after their success to their former position; they all now took up positions in front of the Namur-road.

While the 79th was (probably in column) about 50 meters in front of it, the 32nd may have been in about the same situation.<sup>14</sup> To its right front were the 28th and the 1st regiment; these were both in columns on quarter distance and very close to each other.<sup>15</sup>

Further to the right front were the 44th and 42nd regiment (in column or in line) – the 42nd must have been about 400 meters south of Quatre Bras (around 100 meters east of La Bergerie), to the right front of, but close, to the 44th regiment. Both battalions acted as one regiment most of the day under the immediate command of Sir Denis Pack.<sup>16</sup> At the same time it was on the right of the line which was en echelon, right in front, pivoting on the 79th, which was north of Piraumont and just south of the Namur-road. The front-length the battalions covered in this way was around 900 meters.<sup>17</sup> The 92nd regiment, for the time being, kept up its position on the Namur-road.

The situation to the far left of the British position didn't change much between 4 and 6 p.m.: the 95th regiment and the Brunswickers were still in position in the Bois de Censes and on and around the Namur-road to the north and northeast of Piraumont, which was still held by units of Bachelu.

Apart from the fact that there is no indication that the French advanced in force from

Piraumont at the same time the division of Bachelu advanced to Picton's division further to their left, there is no indication whatsoever from the Riflemen that they joined the British charge after this French attack.<sup>18</sup>

It was probably towards 5 p.m. or a bit later that the companies (nos.1 and 2 ), which were in the houses of Sart-à-Mavelines were driven away by a unit of French voltigeurs, which was supported by some gunfire – this must have come from the artillery which was in front of Piraumont.

Both companies now extended along a lane, from whence a galling fire was kept up for some time on th sides.<sup>19</sup> The role of the Brunswickers in this part of the field remains a mystery.

The moment the Brunswickers and the 5th British division had left their positions (to the right and to the front, on the other side of the Namur road respectively), major general Best led his brigade towards the Namur-road, under cover of a skirmishing line of the Lüneburg and Osterode battalion. It must have been towards 5 p.m. They took up a position (in line) immediately in rear of this road. The only unit which crossed the road in order to support the 42nd on the right of the division was the Verden-battalion. Major general Best had ordered so after the request of Sir Thomas Picton to send him a battalion as a support. The Verden battalion must have taken a position near to the 42nd to support the skirmishing-line, but where is unknown.

In this action, the 1st company advanced into the skirmishing-line en débandade; soon after the 2nd company also advanced and chased the French infantry back until behind a hedge; a fire-fight ensued, in which the 3rd company also got involved; but as the troops were not used to this way of fighting however, a part of the 2nd company went too far ahead and was taken prisoner. This group consisted of lieutenant Von der Horst, ensign Plate, Kotzebue, some subaltern officers and 63 men. As they were instantly replaced, the battalion was able to maintain its position despite the strong French skirmishing-fire.

This fire annoyed the Hannoverians as it came from behind a hedge and some bushes, while they were in the open field. Lieutenant Hurtzig charged the French there and drove them out of two positions, but finally had to return to his battalion in order not to be cut off.<sup>20</sup>

The movement was supported by the battery of captain Von Rettberg, which now took up a position south of the road, further to its left and probably between the 42nd (to its left) and the battalion Verden (to its right). By doing so, Rettberg left his ammunition waggons on the Namur-road, as well as all the men he didn't really need in order to avoid unnecessary casualties; in addition, he gave his guns ample distances.<sup>21</sup>

The 2nd battalion of Orange Nassau still had its position north-east of Quatre Bras, but it could have been now that it moved forward as well, by following Best's battalions. The battalion now took up a position near them, close to Quatre Bras, but wasn't engaged that day.<sup>22</sup>

The division of Bachelu must have been hit that hard that it was only able to collect in the low ground between the farm of Lairalle and the hamlet of Piraumont.<sup>23</sup>

At least in its staff, its casualties were considerable: amongst the wounded were general Campi, colonel Higonet (108th regiment of the line), colonel Maigrot (2nd regiment of light infantry), the chefs de bataillon Peltret (61st regiment of the line) and Thibault (72nd regiment of the line). The chefs de bataillon Dujardin (72nd<sub>3</sub>regiment of the line) and Delhoux (61st

regiment of the line) had been killed.

The situation in the centre.

At the time Bachelu advanced through the low ground east of Gémioncourt, Foy had his brigade Gauthier cross the rivulet near the farm. While the 100th regiment of the line of the brigade of Jamin was held back to the right rear of the farm (see above), Foy must have led the other regiment of this brigade, the 4th regiment of light infantry, in support of the brigade of Gauthier.<sup>24</sup>

It was at the moment that further north of the farm Piré clashed with Van Merlen and other Anglo-Netherlands-German units.

At the time Bachelu was being defeated by Picton, Foy must have had a rather static position in and around the farm of Gémioncourt with Jamin's brigade: the 100th regiment of the line was in its right rear and the 4th regiment of light infantry must have been able to keep up a position on and near the Brussels road, north of the farm. Gauthier's brigade must, as Bachelu fell back, have gone to the rear as well and collected as far as on the plateau north of Lairalle.<sup>25</sup>

To his left may by then have been units of Jérôme's division, which had arrived around 3 p.m. and which advanced along the east edge of the Bois de Bossu.<sup>26</sup>

It must have been battalions and their skirmishers of Foy and /or Jérôme's division which were in the frontline between Gémioncourt and the Bois de Bossu, and it was this French frontline to which most of the Brunswickers now advanced. Very close to the west-side of the Brussels-road, south-west of Gémioncourt and immediately south of the road which leads to the farm of Grand-Pierrepont, the French also must have had a battery which now bombarded the Brunswick line shortly after it had taken up position.<sup>27</sup>

Those who were hit in particular were the husars; major Cramm was wounded. The Brunswick units also suffered from the French musketry-fire, as they also recoiled slowly.<sup>28</sup>

Though through his countenance the Duke of Brunswick inspired his troops in their situation, he saw how they needed urgent support. They had been under this murderous fire for some time then.

To make matters even worse, two strong French infantry columns (in rear of each other) approached to the right, along the Bois de Bossu. While the first one was covered by a battalion of infantry in line, the other one was by some cavalry and artillery. At the same time, French units of cavalry – those of Piré – (again) advanced over the Brussels road.

As the duke now saw that his skirmishers on his right wing fell back for the French ones, he decided to get the hussars to the other side of the Brussels road and to fall back towards Quatre Bras; here they had to be in readiness to act according to circumstances.<sup>29</sup>

In order to cover the retreat of the hussars, the duke led his 200 uhlands against the French infantry.

However, the charge failed completely as the French received the Brunswickers with a well-aimed volley and the horsemen faced about; they only got together again in rear of Quatre Bras. Now, the Duke ordered the hussars to charge and his infantry to go back as well.

The 1st battalion of the line did so along the Brussels-road, while the Leib-battalion did so by

taking to its left through the fields, east of La Bergerie, in order to reach the Namur-road. Major Von Pröstler did his utmost to maintain order but he failed due to the presence of a numerous French infantry, the strong French artillery-fire, the lack of experience of the Brunswick troops and the approaching French cavalry. Now, panick struck them and they fled back towards Quatre Bras and Picton's position.<sup>30</sup>

As the Duke of Brunswick was now trying to restore the wavering Leib-battalion by presenting himself in front of it, he got mortally wounded and fell from his horse. This was not far south-east of La Bergerie.<sup>31-32-33</sup>

At that moment he must have had no staff around.

Some members of the Leib-battalion, corporal Külbel, accompanied by trumpeter Aüe and Jäger Reckau now stepped out of the ranks to bring the duke in rear of the front-line. They picked him up, and brought him upon muskets to the battalion which, meanwhile, was falling back. As it did, a section stepped away, to lead the party further to the rear of the battalion, where the duke was put upon blankets which were taken from British soldiers who had fallen. It was then that the duke asked for water, which was offered but which he didn't take due to loss of consciousness.<sup>34</sup>

Shortly after, however, probably excited by the noise of cannon, the duke asked for Olfermann. Olfermann wasn't present, but was looked for by captain Bause.<sup>35</sup>

As there was no doctor too and as he was still not safe, the group decided to carry him further to the rear towards the Namur-road, where the part met colonel Von Wachholz.

From there they went through the fields to the inn of La Baraque, 400 meters north of Quatre Bras. Here the Brunswick surgeon Pockels examined the Duke and shortly after he died.<sup>36-37</sup> Wellington appointed colonel Von Olfermann as commander of the Brunswick corps.<sup>38</sup>

The retreat of the Brunswick units caused their fellow hussars to charge the French cavalry of Piré, which was now approaching.

In their approach, the 6th lancers must have been leading, in front of the 1st chasseurs à cheval.<sup>39</sup>

However, as the hussars advanced their order was quickly disturbed by a stragglng fire from French infantry, to which their right flank became exposed, and as a result they failed in producing the slightest check upon the French cavalry. The result was that they were soon in full flight, closely pursued by their opponents.<sup>40</sup>

The 42nd and 44th regiment, both in line (<sup>41</sup>) and not far off from the Brussels-road, had seen the French cavalry pass by. The majority of both regiments initially had the impression they were Anglo-Netherlands-German cavalry, but their veterans recognized them as French and gave an oblique volley; after that the most rearward squadrons of lancers wheeled to their right in order to charge both units in their rear.<sup>42</sup>

Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment) writes:" We saw their approach at a distance,as they issued from a wood, and took them for Brunswickers coming to cut up the flying infantry; and as cavalry on all occasions have the advantage of retreating foot, on a fair field, we were halted in order to let them take their way; they were approaching our right flank, from which our skirmishers were extended, and we were far from being in a formation to repel an attack; if intended, or to afford regular support to our friends if requiring our aid. I think we stood with

too much confidence, gazing towards them as if they had been our friends, anticipating the gallant charge they would make on the flying foe, and we were making no preparative movement to receive them as enemies, further than the reloading of the muskets, until a German orderly dragoon galloped up, exclaiming, "Franchee! Franchee!" and, wheeling about, galloped off." <sup>43</sup>

The 42nd regiment was about to form a rallying square, but just at the moment as both flank companies were about to take their positions, the lancers reached the regiment in its rear and overtook both companies; both were dragged along and some confusion was the result. Several men were cut off but both companies succeeded to complete the square thereby closing in the most forward lancers; immediately they were bayoneted. The remaining lancers were beaten off. <sup>44</sup>

The 42nd had to pay dearly, however. Colonel Macara was killed by a thrust of a lance through his chin (<sup>45</sup>); colonel Dick then took the command.

As soon as he got seriously wounded, brevet-major Davidson succeeded him. After Davidson also got wounded, brevet-major Campbell finally took over the command of the battalion which he did for the remainder of the campaign. <sup>46</sup> That day, the battalion lost more than 280 men. <sup>47</sup>

The 44th regiment also was in line the moment the lancers hit it from behind. Here too, the same mistake was made as to the identity of the approaching cavalry. <sup>48</sup> The moment the majority of the men realised they were French, the lancers were already very close. Colonel Hamilton saw that forming square had no more sense and therefore decided to receive them in line.

He had the rear rank turn and fire a volley the French were very near. The effect was devastating: a lot of lancers fell and they were in the utmost confusion. Only in the centre of the Scottish line there had been a short direct contact with the lancers; here they had attempted to take the colours, but they didn't succeed although they showed much bravery.

During this action ensign Christie was seriously wounded as he got a lance in his face; the moment the lancer tried to take the colour, Christie instinctively fell to the ground on top of the colour. The result was that the lancer only got away with a small part which had torn off in the action. Immediately after, however, he was dragged from his horse by members of the 44th and stabbed. <sup>49</sup>

The French lancers fled along the flanks of the 44th regiment thereby receiving the fire of the left flank company and the front companies. <sup>50</sup> In all the 6th regiment of lancers suffered heavy casualties: chef d'escadron and lieutenant Chasseigne were killed, while captain de la Bellière, Guillaume and Malot and lieutenant d'Espiennes were wounded; in all the regiment lost 60 subalterns and men. Colonel Galbois had got wounded as well but kept leading his regiment. <sup>51</sup>

The battalion of Verden of Best's brigade had hardly taken up its position near the 42nd (see above) , as a part of it was also under attack of the French cavalry; it suffered losses, but the French were also fired at at close range by the skirmishers of the battalions of Osterode and Lüneburg from behind the Namur-road and fled. <sup>52</sup>

The most part of Piré's division, however, must have continued its charge along the Brussels road towards Quatre Bras. Here they met the 92nd again and it was this battalion which, again, repulsed Piré with its fire at close range. <sup>53</sup>

Very shortly after this, it must have been around 5.30 p.m., two columns of French infantry advanced, one over the Brussels road as far as La Bergerie and its immediate surroundings, the other one further to the French left, towards the Bois de Bosu.

The Duke of Wellington himself and major general Barnes, both near the 92nd regiment, saw what happened and decided to counteract as the French drew too near to the centre of the position and this area was now void of any Anglo-Netherlands-German units, after the retreat of the major part of the Brunswickers. Ordered by Wellington, Barnes now launched the 92nd regiment forward with the order " 92nd, follow me ! " <sup>54</sup>

Led by Barnes and colonel Cameron the Highlanders leapt from their position on the road. The grenadier- and the first company were led forward over the Brussels road by colonel Cameron and general Barnes, while the rest of the battalion advanced by an oblique movement to their right upon the enclosures.

The French, having entrenched themselves in the house and behind the hedges and ditches around it received them with a strong musketry fire, but the 92nd regiment pushed through and succeeded in driving the French out.

Before that moment, however, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded while being on horseback, being hit in the groin by a musket shot from the upper storey of the house. As a result, Cameron lost control over his horse, which now faced about and galloped back over the road towards Quatre Bras, where his groom was standing with Cameron's reserve horse. Here it suddenly halted and threw off its rider, who was pitched on his head on the road.

Cameron was then carried to the rear by private Ewen Macmillan and a piper, from where he was transported to Waterloo, where he died later that night. <sup>55</sup>

The 92nd regiment halted to fire, but major Mitchell, who succeeded colonel Cameron, (<sup>56</sup>) decided to continue the attack. What had happened was that the 92nd regiment had succeeded in driving away the French skirmishers and advance guard: the main body of the French was in the rear and showed no disposition to retire – in fact it now started a heavy musketry fire on the Highlanders.

In order to extricate itself from this fire, the 92nd regiment took the adjoining garden of the house by penetrating it through its centre and by the sides at the same time. As the men still were under French musketry fire, the battalion now formed a line west of the garden and in this way tried to drive back the French. They were able to do this with the bayonet, right through the open field without any support whatsoever and under a heavy fire of musketry. The French apparently must have been retreating in a south-west direction, towards the Bois de Bossu as now the 92nd started skirting it for a considerable distance until it reached the elbow of the wood, about 800 meters from Quatre Bras.

It was here that the 92nd regiment came under a strong French artillery fire and, additionally, some cavalry was near, which was ready to charge wherever it could. This made the 92nd retire into the edge of the wood, where some time after the Foot Guards and Brunswickers came up from their rear. <sup>57</sup> An attempt to take the French guns failed. <sup>58</sup>

After the 92nd regiment had left its position near the crossroads, its position was filled up by the Lüneburg battalion of the brigade of major general Best. <sup>59</sup>



The situation in the Bois de Bossu.

By 3 p.m. the division of Jérôme Bonaparte reached the battlefield over the Brussels road and then wheeled to the left towards the Bois de Bossu.<sup>60</sup>

Having this division in hand as well, Ney's force had grown to about almost 18000 men and 30 guns.<sup>61</sup>

Though there are virtually no details about the way it was involved in the action, units of the division must have started to press back the infantry of the prince of Saksen Weimar (which was in front) into the wood (see below). Deeper into the wood they must have met the Brunswick carabiniers as well.<sup>62</sup> At some point of time prince Jérôme himself got slightly wounded in or around the wood.<sup>63</sup>

Apart from the action in the east point of the wood earlier that afternoon (between 3 p.m. and 3.30 p.m.), there is no reliable information available about the actions of the different units of Van Saksen Weimar either.<sup>64</sup>

As for those of Van Bijlandt, the 8th battalion of National Militia, after it had gone back into the wood, wasn't able to maintain its order there and fell back towards the Namur-road.<sup>65</sup> Near it was the 7th battalion of the line, but about its further whereabouts no details are known, although it can be presumed it took the same course as there are no indications that it came into action again.

As the French pulled up into the wood from its south side, as they advanced east of it towards the centre of the Anglo-Netherlands-German line, while at the same time he was bombarded on his front and his own ammunition started to run out, prince Bernhard van Saksen Weimar asked for orders by sending out his major Von Ampt.

However, as Von Ampt didn't return, Saksen Weimar decided to evacuate the wood. While the troops went to a position between the wood and the Namur-road, east of Hautain-le-Val, they were covered by the fire of the section of Winssinger. They must have been able to retire in good order also as the French didn't pursue them.<sup>66</sup>

Saksen Weimar must have left the Bois de Bossu before Alten arrived at 6 p.m., maybe around 5 p.m.<sup>67</sup>

Ney's situation.

It was probably towards 5.30 p.m. that Ney received Soult's order of 3.15 p.m. Its messenger, as well as colonel Delcambre slightly later, informed him about the turn of the 1st corps to the battlefield of Ligny.<sup>68</sup>

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- <sup>1</sup> Colonel Trefcon. Carnet de campagne p.182  
Reille, in Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc. p.59
2. Account of an anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. Historical records of the 32nd etc. p.116  
Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.201  
Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.453  
Von Müffling confirms the attack took place around 4 p.m. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.10
3. Notes of general Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc. p.271  
Report of Reille to Ney, dated 17th June 1815. In: SHAT, C15/22  
Unfortunately, colonel Trefcon, chief of staff, doesn't enter into any detail about the formation of the division during the attack.  
Captain Ross-Lewin claims there was one heavy column. Cf. Ross-Lewin, H. With the thirty second etc. p.257  
According to Von Müffling there were columns three deep with small intervals. In: The memoirs of etc. p.238 In his earlier version of the events the attack was carried out en echelon, left in front. In: CvW Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.10-11
4. Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington's men p.291  
Private D. Vallence (79th regiment). In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.21 nr.2  
Captain Macdonald. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.500501  
Colonel Trefcon. Carnet de campagne p.181
5. Lieutenant Forbes (79th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.314  
Captain Macdonald (1st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6  
Reille in his report of the 17th of June writes "elle [de divisie Bachelu] ne put résister à la charge d'une ligne d'infanterie anglaise et écossaise.." In: SHAT, C15 nr.22  
This is being corroborated by the chief of staff of the division, colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne p.181-182
6. In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington's men p.291
7. Most British participants do not mention a volley of their units but only the charge itself, but this is the most logical line of events.  
Those who do mention a volley are:  
Major Calvert. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258  
Sergeant Anton (42nd). In: Fitchett p.291  
Account of an anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. Historical records of the 32nd etc. p.116

Ensign Mudie (1st) Diary. In: Diary of ensign C.Mudie, 3rd Bn.The Royal Scots. Describing the battle of Waterloo and occupation of Paris, 1815. In: The Thistle. April, July and October 1931 p.184

The fact how much the French were staggered by the fire and action of the enemy is underlined by colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne p.182

Siborne depicts the French as having fired from the heads of their columns and by their skirmishers, but I have no indications for such fire. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.111-112

The distance in front of the road is taken from the account of lieutenant Malcolm (42nd regiment). In: BWRA, nr.220

<sup>8</sup> Foy in: Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc. p.271

Report of Reille to Ney, 17th June 1815. In: SHAT, C15.22

Reille. Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc.p.59

Colonel Trefcon. Carnet de campagne p.182

Major Calvert (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258

Lieutenant Forbes (79th). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.1-2

Captain Crow (32nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321

<sup>9</sup> Reille. In his report dated 17th June. In: SHAT, C15 / 22

<sup>10</sup> H.de Mauduit. Somehow, he must have had a report of a member of this regiment, but it is not clear who. In: Les derniers jours Vol.II p.148-150

<sup>11</sup> Captain Ross-Lewin (32nd regiment). In: Ross-Lewin, H. With the thirty second etc. p.257-258

Major Calvert (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.284-286

Captain Crowe (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321

Houssaye says the British pursued as far as Piraumont, but this is incorrect. In: 1815.Waterloo p.203

12. Captain Ross-Lewin (32nd regiment). In: Ross-Lewin, H. With the thirty second etc. p.257-258

The 32nd must have suffered considerably from the French fire at the hedge.

Report of Reille to Ney, 17th June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15/22 and Reille in his Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits p.59

Notes of Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc. p.271-272

<sup>13</sup> Major Calvert (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-259

Captain Jameson. In: J.Macveigh The historical records of the 79th Highlanders p.38-39

Jameson, R. Historical record of the seventy-ninth regiment etc. p.51-52

According to another source the 79th had to fall back as it nearly was cut off by French forces; as the battalion faced difficulties in getting through one of the hedges it would have suffered from French musketry fire quite considerably. Cf. Private D.Vallence (79<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: *The Waterloo Journal* Vol.21 nr.2 p.15

Sergeant Dewar (79th regiment) mentions the advance for about 500 yards, but he doesn't mention the presence of French columns, only of French skirmishers who fell back slowly. It might have been that the French right flank consisted of a strong swarm of skirmishers. In his letter to his brother dated 5th of august 1815. In: NWMS, M1960.2

<sup>14</sup> Captain Ross-Lewin (32nd regiment) states the battalions fell back to a position on the other side of the slope. In: *With the 32nd etc.* p.257  
Major Calvert isn't specific about the position. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258  
Captain Crowe asserts his light company was about 450 meters in front of the battalion after it had charged. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321  
Another officer claims the 32nd charged the French again after their pursuit of the battalion. Cf. *Account of an anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment.* In: Swiney, G.C. *Historical records of the 32nd etc.* p.116

<sup>15</sup> Captain Macdonald (1st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.707.2 *The 1st would have been brought back with difficulty.* Cf. *Operations of the 5th or etc.* p.174

<sup>16</sup> Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324  
Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Fitchett, W.H. *Wellington's men* p.293

<sup>17</sup> Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Fitchett, W.H. *Wellington's men* p.293  
Sergeant McEween (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706 p.455-456

<sup>18</sup> Lieutenant Kincaid mentions the attack of Bachelu on the division, but doesn't enter into any detail about any share of the Riflemen, nor about any French action against his colleagues. Nor do other witnesses of the battalion do so. In fact, Kincaid mentions a lull in the fighting in his front for about an hour, until the units of Kielmansegge arrived (see below). Cf. *Adventures etc.* p.319-320

<sup>19</sup> Costello, private Edward. In: *The adventures of a soldier etc.* p.286

<sup>20</sup> Reports of major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nr.7 and 8.  
Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4  
Ensign Oppermann (Münden battalion). In a letter dated 23rd June 1815 to his parents. In: Kannicht, J. *Und alles wegen Napoleon* p.203  
Lieutenant Von der Horst himself. In: *Hannoversches Magazin*, 95<sup>e</sup> Stück. 1816 p.1507-1511  
He clearly states, unlike Best himself, that it was the 2nd company which he was a member of

and that it succeeded the 1st into the action.

Von der Horst was led to the rear to a farm, from where he was led towards Charleroi on the 17th and the 18th to Beaumont.

<sup>21</sup> Captain Von Rettberg. In: VPH-LBA, nr.16  
Captain Von Cleeves. In: VPH-LBA, nr.15  
Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4

<sup>22</sup> At least, captain Eberhard doesn't mention any actions of the battalion at all. Cf. Captain Eberhard, C.F. Nassauische Erinnerungen an Waterloo. In: Der Uhrturm. Heft 27, juli 1940 p.552

Colonel van Zuylen van Nijvelt mentions an advance of the battalion en echelon to the 2nd battalion, but it is not clear when and where this would have taken place. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: Bas, F.de la campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.314

De Bas himself seems to take this as if the battalion was sent to the wood by the prince of Orange, where it must have had a position in its northern part near Quatre Bras. In: Vol.I p.496, 507

23. Notes of Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc. p.271-272  
Colonel Trefcon. Carnets de campagne p.183  
Reille. In his report dated 17th of June. In: SHAT, nr.C15/22

<sup>24</sup> General Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc. p.271-272

<sup>25</sup> While Foy gives the impression that Gauthier's brigade fell back -while Jamin's kept its position in the frontline- Reille himself doesn't. But at the same time he doesn't get back on this brigade at all and only mentions the situation of the regiments of Jamin's brigade. Cf. General Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc. p.272

Report of Reille, dated 17th of June. In: SHAT, nr.C15/22

It is chef de batallion Puvis of the 93rd regiment of the line (Gauthier's brigade) who claims his regiment deployed around 3 p.m. and that it operated skirmishing in the high corn till dusk, without mentioning a retreat. In: Souvenirs p.116

<sup>26</sup> Reille. Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc. p.59

<sup>27</sup> Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. Plan.

28. Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.27  
Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Ad.ms.34.706.11

29. Wachholtz, Von. In: Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28-29  
Two Brunswick accounts speak in this phase of artillery-support of which they do not mention

the name but it cannot have been another battery as the one of Lloyd (from the description of its position and fate), but from members of this unit it becomes clear that these guns came into action *after* the charge of the cuirassiers.

Cf. Von Wachholtz in: Geschichte des herzoglichen etc. p.28

Colonel Von Herzberg (of the general staff of the Brunswick corps).In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.11

Aerts takes over this support and identifies the guns as Hannoverian ones, without assigning them to a specific battery however. In: Etudes etc. p.445

Siborne does the same but doesn't designate them to any battery whatsoever either. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.114-115

30. Colonel Von Herzberg (of the general staff of the Brunswick corps).In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.11

Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28-30

Lieutenant Henckens (6th regiment of chasseurs à cheval) confirms the fact that the Brunswick cavalry attacked the French infantry first. In: Mémoires p.229

Corporal Külbel of the Leib-battalion denies his battalion fell back in disorder, and at the same time erroneously claims it stood near la Bergerie for about 2 hours (from after 5 p.m. till about 7.30 p.m.), when it fell back upon units of Picton which, in the meantime, had taken up positions further forward as they stood in the beginning, after their success in repelling Bachelu.

In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.5

<sup>31</sup> It must have been between 5 and 5.30 p.m. as the Brunswickers arrived around 3.45 p.m. After their advance to the front (which must have occurred around 4 p.m.), they remained there under French fire for about an hour, and after that they went back, in which movement the duke was hit.

In one version, colonel Olfermann mentions a time of 6 p.m. In his report of the night of the 16th of June. In: VPH, nr.9

Yet, in another account, he claims it was between 5 and 6 p.m. Cf. his letter to the duchess of Brunswick. In: Schneidawind. Der letzte Feldzug etc. Annex XIII p.155

Surgeon Schütte (Heinemann's troop) says it was 4 p.m., but Schütte wasn't present at that time of the battle. In: VPH-LBA, nr.95

Corporal Külbel (Leib-battalion) states it was after 7.30 p.m. that the duke was wounded. In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.5

For the site where he fell:

Külbel, E.C. Die letzten Augenblicke etc. plan

Major Von Wachholtz. Geschichte etc. plan

Scheltema confirms he fell at about 400 paces (200 meters) of the farm of Quatre Bras, which is around the same place. Cf. Cf. Scheltema, J. In: Verhaal van een reisje langs de slagvelden

van Belle Alliance etc. In: Vad.Letteroefeningen, 1815 II p.593

Another Brunswick report claims he fell when he led the uhlans against some French artillery, but this was west of the Brussels-road. In: VPH-LBA, nr.1

Külbel adds that the duke came from the right, about 25 paces in front of the Leib-battalion, on his own, and about mid-way between the battalion and the French cavalry in front. While the battalion was firing, the duke was hit and fell. In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.5

<sup>32</sup> In 1840, duke Wilhelm, son of the Duke of Brunswick and regent of the duchy of Brunswick, had already tried in vain to erect a mausoleum for his father on the battlefield. Finally, on the 16th of June 1890 another monument was inaugurated by lieutenant general Von Wachholtz, son of the former chief of staff of the Duke of Brunswick. It was Von Wachholtz who chaired a committee which was installed in 1885 to erect a monument for the Duke. Finally, a piece of ground was acquired on may 27th 1889. This piece of ground is not the place where the Duke fell: it is too far south-west, as the Duke fell further to the north-east of it, in the fields.

On the day of the inauguration, the committee arrived at 10 a.m. on the railway-station of Genappe. Present were the German ambassador, count Von Alvensleben, the military attaché major Von Smettau and lieutenant general Von Wachholz.

After a reception in the chateau in Thy the group was expected at la Baraque where a tablet was installed commemorating the place where the Duke expired, the Maison Nimal (which is not the actual place, see below).

After the ceremony near the monument itself, a ball was given in the evening in the salon of Emile Taburiaux, hotel owner on the Place de l'Empereur in Genappe. Cf. Gilson. Genappe à travers les âges p.143

The monument itself is formed by a nine meter high granite foot, having the Belgian lion on top. This lion measures three meters in height. It holds the emblem of Brunswick under one of its claws.

On the west-side of the monument there is a médaillon, holding the portrait of the Duke and the family-weapons. The inscription reads (French translation):

"Frédéric-Guillaume, duc de Brunswick et Lunebourg, est tombé non loin de cette place en combattant à la tête de ses troupes, le 16 juin 1815."

On the opposite side it reads: "A la mémoire du héros et de ses guerriers tombés avec lui pour l'Allemagne. La patrie reconnaissante.MDCCCLXXX" Cf.Speeckaert, G.P. Les 135 vestiges etc. p.46

<sup>33</sup> That day, the Duke wore a small cap and the interim dress of the hussars, and over this dress he had a long dark coat. This dress consisted of a waistcoat which was lined with velvet facings. He also wore a black trousers and black boots. Around his middle he had a sash with silk, yellow buttons and cords. The duke rode a white horse, with a saddle-cloth which was

decorated with a skull supported by two crossed bones on each side. Cf. Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.445

According to colonel Von Reiche, Wellington wore on the 16th of June a simple blue cloak, a cocked hat with two black cockades and two red ones, plus a white plume, which was bent down towards the edges of the hat – all in all, according to Von Reiche, the duke was plainly dressed. In: Memoiren etc. p.183

<sup>34</sup> Von Wachholz situates this incident further north, i.e. north of the Namur-road and east of the Brussels road, so before reaching La Baraque. In: Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.30 + plan

<sup>35</sup> Report of colonel Von Olfermann, dated 16th June 1815. In: VPH-LBA, nr.9  
Letter of Von Olfermann to the duchess of Brunswick. In: Schneidawind, Der letzte Feldzug etc. Annex.XII p.155

<sup>36</sup> The Duke was hit by a musket-ball in his right-wrist, entering the right side of his body, to leave it again on the other side. Cf. Reports of colonel Von Olfermann.  
Corporal Külbel (Leibbattalion). In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.6  
Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.30-31  
Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.11

The same evening, and the day after, his body was brought to Laeken.

Waterloo the day after the battle. By an eyewitness. In: With fife and drum p.13

Colonel Von Olfermann to the duchess of Brunswick. In: Cf. his letter to the duchess of Brunswick. In: Schneidawind. Der letzte Feldzug etc. Annex XIII p.155

From there it was brought to Antwerp, to the Hôtel du Grand Laboureur, Place de Meir. From there it was transferred to Braunschweig where it arrived on the 22nd of June. Cf.

Cf. Colonel Von Olfermann's letter to the duchess of Brunswick. In: Schneidawind. Der letzte Feldzug etc. Annex XIII p.155

The body was escorted all the time by major Von Grone and major Von Marenholz. Cf. Report of colonel Von Olfermann of the 16th of June.

The duke was buried in the crypt of the St.Blasius cathedral in Braunschweig on the 3rd of July. Cf. Traupe, C. Le corps de Brunswick etc. In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes (1989) no.10 p.15

It is being asserted that the Duke was lied in state in the inn of Le roi d'Espagne at Genappe during the night of the 16th of June. Cf. Scheltema, J. In: Verhaal van een reisje langs de slagvelden van Belle Alliance etc. In: Vad. Letteroefeningen, 1815 II p.591

It is not known when the body arrived in Laeken, but lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment) records that he saw the bier just north of Genappe on the 17th of June. In: Letters from Portugal etc. p.239

Lieutenant general Van der Plaat, commander at Antwerp, also confirms that the duke's body arrived in Antwerp on the 17th of June; that night it was to be transported further to Brunswick, through Breda. Cf. his report to baron Tindal, 17th of June. In: NA, 2.02.01 nr.6585

Tarliers and Wauters have a rather bizarre version of the facts. They claim the duke was buried on the southern border of the Namur-road, about 400 meters west of Quatre Bras. The site would initially have been covered with a stone slab holding an english and a latin inscription; later this one was replaced by another, flat, square, blue stone which was fixed on a 30 cm high brickwork. A small footpath lined with hedges would have led to the spot. Cf. Tarliers, J. en A. Wauters. Géographie et histoire des communes Belges. Province de Brabant. Canton de Genappe p.38

<sup>37</sup> Van Noeyen denies the claim of the maison Nimal at La Baraque as being the house where the duke expired.

Detailed research on the local conditions revealed that the ground where the house was built was bought in 1828, which resulted in the building of the house in 1830.

He states the real place was the Cabaret de la Baraque, which was still in existence in 1890 and in the possession of a man called Paquet. It stood to the west of the Brussels-road and had a thatched roof until early in the 20th century. According to van Noeyen it is the only contemporary building which matches the site of the Cabaret as indicated by Capitaine. Cf. Noeyen, J. van Le duc de Brunswick aux Quatre Bras. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, 1953 nr.10 p.25

Actually, corporal Külbel of the Leib-battalion, and who accompanied the duke there, confirms the duke expired in the farm of La Baraque. In: Die letzte Augenblicke etc. p.7 + plan

Cf. Navez, L. La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.57

The building has been torn down.

38. Wellington did so as the Duke of Brunswick had ever told him that Von Olfermann was next to him in seniority. In fact, colonel Von Herzberg was senior officer, but Wellington followed the Duke's wish. After the fall of Von Olfermann, Von Herzberg was given the command of the Brunswick corps. Cf. Wellington's letter dated 20th June 1815 to Von Herzberg. In: WD p.490-491

<sup>39</sup> Mauduit, H. de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.150

<sup>40</sup> Siborne, W. History of the war etc. Vol.I p.117

Sergeant Langenstrassen, of the 4th company of Brunswick hussars, however, claims in a letter dated 2nd of August 1815 that his regiment maintained its position that day. Though it was charged by some French cuirassiers, they did not dare venture from close to the large coppice. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: NSA, nr.249 AN 190

41. Major O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.70 p.322-324  
Sergeant McEween (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.70 p.455-456  
Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

<sup>42</sup> Major O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324  
Sergeant McEween (42nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456  
Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44th). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

43. In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington's men p.292  
Cf. Sergeant McEween and major O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456 and 34.706 p.322-324

44. Sir W. Gomm. In diary. In: Gomm, W.M. Letters and journals p.355.  
Lieutenant McEween (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456  
Captain Campbell (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.451-454  
Lieutenant Malcom mentions the presence of "an immense number of the enemy's lancers" but in case only two squadrons of them were engaged these could not have exceeded 250 horsemen; this against a combined force of 1200 men of the 42nd-44th cannot be regarded as immense. Malcolm confirms the 42nd wasn't in square the moment the lancers approached from the rear, but it would have succeeded in forming one of wings; at the same time he admits the French were repulsed not without sustaining some loss. In: BWRA, nr.220

45. Sergeant Anton (42nd). In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington's men p.292  
Private J.Gunn (42nd). In: JSAHR, Vol.49 p.115  
According to Dalton, the four men carrying Macara off the field would have been surrounded by the French cavalry and sabred. In: Dalton, Ch. The Waterloo roll call p.158

46. Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Fitchett, W.H. Wellington's men p.292-293

47. Cf. Siborne, W. History of the war etc. Vol.I p.455 The battalion counted 616 men.

48. Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment) mentions his impression that they were Belgian cavalry. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297  
Major O'Malley (44th regiment) says they were seen as Brunswick cavalry. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

49. Major O'Malley (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324  
Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

50. The 44th wasn't broken as Houssaye claims it was. Cf. Houssaye, H. -1815. Waterloo p.203

51.Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.152

<sup>52</sup> Reports of major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nrs.7 and 8  
Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4  
Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.151

In contradiction, Houssaye believes “a Hannoverian battalion” [Verden] was then dispersed.  
Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.204

This is being confirmed by the “Notizen vom General Commando, MSS, as mentioned by Beamish. This document claims the battalion was cut down or captured after the French cavalry had charged the 42nd. In: History etc. Vol.II p.330

<sup>53</sup> Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.49  
Captain Ross-Lewin (32nd regiment). In: With the 32nd etc. p.258  
Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment). In: Letters from Portugal etc. p.227  
Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.65

At this moment, Siborne depicts a scene in which the head of the French cavalry column dashed into the group of buildings of Quatre Bras, some even penetrating to the north of them and into the yard of the farm of this hamlet, but I have found no documents to support this version of the events. In: History of the war etc. pVol.I p.123

54.Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.  
336-337

And in: Letters from Portugal etc. p.229

Some historians claim that the charge took place right after the retreat of the cuirassiers, but it didn't.

Cf. Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.65 and 66

Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.68

Sergeant Robertson (92nd regiment) on the one hand states the French infantry approached immediately after the incident with the Brunswick hussars, but on the other hand states the 92nd advanced when the brigade of C.Halkett arrived. Cf. Sergeant Robertson (92nd regiment). The journal etc. p.148

Cf. Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.148-149

<sup>55</sup> Clerk, A. Memoir of colonel John Cameron p.79-80

Gardyne, C.G. The life of a regiment etc. p.431

According to Clerk, Cameron was buried on the 17th of June near the road to Ghent. He was re-interred in april 1816 in his homeland. In: Memoir of colonel John Cameron p.80

56.Shortly after, Mitchell also gout wounded; the command then devolved upon major

McDonald. Cf. Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706.65

According to another source, McDonald was not present at Quatre Bras; when Mitchell got wounded, the command would have gone to captain Holmes. Cf. Dalton, Ch. The Waterloo roll call p.194

Yet, there is a short report of major McDonald written on the evening of the 16th of June and which reads:

“... *the 92nd repulsed repeated attacks of cavalry, and by a rapid movement charged a column of the enemy and drove them to the extremity of the wood on our right.*” In: Gardyne, C.G. The life of a regiment etc. p.434

57.Lieutenant J.Hope (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703.5 and in : Letters from Portugal etc. p.229-232

Sergeant Robertson (92nd regiment). In: The journal of sergeant D.Robertson p.148

Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.68

Plan of private Kay (92nd regiment). In: BL.Add.ms.34.706.59

Kay asserts the battalion was relieved by the Brunswickers but it was earlier.

Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706.65 and 707.3 Winchester says the cavalry were lancers amongst others.

Cf. Gardyne, C.G. The life of a regiment etc. p.431-434

58.Sergeant Robertson. In: Zie: The journal of sergeant D.Robertson p.148-149

<sup>59</sup> Reports of the major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nrs.7 and 8

60. Reille. In : Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc. p.59

<sup>61</sup> In this figure, again, the reserve-artillery has not been included but it may have been present, making the total number of guns to 38.

<sup>62</sup> There is the account of chef de bataillon Jolyet (1st regiment of light infantry, brigade Bauduin) but he doesn't throw much light on the subject. Initially, his batallion traversed the wood and emerged on its eastern side to link up with another regiment further to its right. In this plain he used a farm (probably the one of Grand Pierrepont) as a support and kept it until the evening, in cooperation with two companies of the 3rd battalion of his regiment. All in all, at least his battalion doesn't seem to have seen much action. Account in: Souvenirs et correspondance etc. p.75-76

Captain Bourdon de Vatry, aide de camp of general Jérôme Bonaparte confirms that the division attacked the wood and met there the Nassau and Brunswick troops. In: Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.101

Von Müffling adds that by 4 p.m. the French had taken the southern part of the wood. In: CvW - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.11

<sup>63</sup> He was struck on the left hip by a musket ball, but the ball first hit the massive gold scabbard of his sword and did not penetrate. Cf. Captain Bourdon de Vatry (his aide de camp). In: Brett James, A. The hundred days p.64  
Ney in his report to Soult, dated 16th of June 1815.  
Martinet, A. Jérôme Napoleon, roi de Westphalie p.273

<sup>64</sup> Several accounts mention the presence of the units in the wood, but without detailing any actions. Cf.

J.P.Leonhard (1st battalion Nassau). In: private collection.

Sergeant Döring (1st battalion Orange-Nassau). In: Heimatblätter etc. 1988 nr. 11

Major Von Sattler. In: VPH-LBA, nr.18

Major general Von Kruse. In: VPH nr.17

Private Holighaus (1st battalion 1st battalion Orange-Nasau). His account is extremely brief and unclear; it even does not become clear that he fought in the wood. In:  
[www.widerhallderzeit.de](http://www.widerhallderzeit.de)

Captain Bergman, commander of the detachment of Nassau volunteers, says his unit fought until dusk in connection with the 2nd regiment Nassau, but doesn't enter into any detail either. In: Nassau Heimatblätter, 1915 nr.1+2 p.19

The 2nd Nassau battalion was at the start of the action immediately southwest of Quatre Bras; before that time, it had detached the company led by captain Wirths plus the 4th and the flanker-companies to the Bois de Bossu, in which border they took up positions. According to Wirths, when he was ordered to evacuate the wood, he went back to the battalion which was then immediately north-west of Quatre Bras. This would mean that this battalion didn't join in with the retreat to the west. Cf. Captain Wirths (2nd battalion of Nassau). In: Nassovia, 1905 p.143-144

Colonel van Zuylen van Nijeveld's account is in all kind of ways not being corroborated by other testimonies and is, especially in relation to the action in the wood, extremely confusing about units and times. For instance, he mentions an attack (possibly around 4 p.m.) by the 2nd battalion Nassau. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 etc. Vol.III p.318

<sup>65</sup> Colonel De Jongh (8th battalion of national militia). In: Nagelaten papieren etc. 1866

Colonel van Zuylen van Nijeveld confirms the battalion had to yield for the French pressure and took up a position in rear of the wood. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 etc. Vol.III p.314

66. Prince Bernhard van Saksen Weimar in:

Diary. In: THW, Grossherzogliches Hausarchiv, A.XXIV 30, p.192

Letter dated 29th august 1841 to captain Van Löben Sels. In: VLS, nr.II.3.nr.5

His letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 Vol.III.

p.566

J.P.Leonhard (1st battalion Nassau) states his battalion took up a position north of Hautain-le-Val. Account in private collection.

Major Van Opstal confirms the section of captain Winssinger pulled back towards Nivelles. In: VLS, nr.II.4.nr.1

Houssaye believes one battalion was left in the wood by Saksen Weimar, but doesn't specify which one and why. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.202

Siborne, on the contrary, believes that by far the greater portion of the Netherlands units which left the wood then did so as fugitives in disorder. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.135

<sup>67</sup> Cf. His accounts mentioned. J.P.Leonhard (1st battalion Nassau) claims his battalion stopped manoeuvring at 4.30 p.m. In: private collection.

Ensign Macready (30th regiment) claims his battalion met Nassau troops before he actually reached the wood. In: Brett James, A. The hundred days p.62

68.Cf. for the same hour: Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.453

Heymès confirms – though at another hour - that Delcambre arrived shortly after the imperial messenger. In: Relation etc. In: Documents inédits p.9

Germain believes that the imperial messenger who in his mind would have turned the 1st corps never rode to Ney. In: J.B.Drouet d'Erlon p.164

Siborne asserts as if Ney would have received the order from 2 p.m., the pencilled note and Delcambre *after* the charge of the cuirassiers, but this is incorrect. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.145-146

In learning the news about the turn of the 1st corps two anecdotes have ever since passed by: Baron Petiet, member of the staff of Soult, cites colonel Laurent as Ney would have said, after he had received Soult's orders: "L'empereur est sur sa chaise, il ne peut voir ce qui se passe ici, les anglais sont devant moi et je vais les battre." In: Souvenirs militaires p.198

The other anecdote is that he would have said: "Voyez-vous ces boulets ? Je voudrais qu'ils m'entrassent tous dans le ventre". Cf. Fleury de Chaboulon, M. Mémoires pour servir etc. Vol.II p.115