

## **The French right wing.**

Some time that morning, general Exelmans wrote his report for Grouchy. It reads:

*Monsieur le Maréchal,*

*J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que dans l'affaire qui a eu lieu hier sous nos yeux, la brigade du Gal.Vincent a eu deux officiers de blessés, avec une vingtaine de dragons, et sept de tués. Cette brigade a parfaitement fait son devoir, conduite par le brave Gal.Vincent, qui joint à une grande expérience la fermeté et le sang-froid les plus rares. J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de demander pour le Gal.Vincent la grade [here the rank is left out] dans la Légion d'honneur.*

*Le colonel Briqueville (du 20e) s'est très bien conduit, ainsi que le chef d'escadron Guibourg (du 15e) qui commandait le 1er escadron avec la plus grande vigueur; comme cet officier est très ancien, je demande pour lui le grade de major.*

*Les militaires ci-après désignés sont ceux qui se sont particulièrement distingués dans la petite affaire d'hier;*

*du 20e dragons:*

*Mrs.les capitaines Marguiannes et Rancorette;le Lt.Ibry; l'adjudant Barrie; le sous-lt.Warin;les Maux des logis Marcey, blessé, et Rey; et le grenadier Piné, qui a ramené 27 prisonniers.*

*Dans mon Etat-major, le Colonel Ferroussat s'est conduit au mieux; cet officier est digne de commander un régiment. Le chef d'escadron Sencier, mon aide de camp, s'est conduit également avec une bravoure extraordinaire.*

*Le Capitaine Fanchon, attaché à mon Etat-major, ancien officier de grenadiers, ne le cède en rien aux plus intrépides; je demande pour lui le grade de chef de bataillon.*

*Je demande la croix de la Légion pour Mr.Dibon, mon aide-de-camp, et pour Mr.Sénarmont lieutenant du 1er de chasseurs, qui se sont conduits au mieux; ce dernier est assez dangeureusement blessé; il est attaché à mon Etat-major.*

*Le Lt.Gal.Ct. (signé)*

*Exelmans <sup>1</sup>*

Grouchy spent the night at Campinaire and it was here, as the commander of the reserve cavalry, that he wrote his report for Soult:

*Campinaire, le 16 juin 1815 à 5 heures du matin*

*Monsieur le maréchal,*

*Les quatre corps de cavalerie sont placés de la manière suivante:*

*Le 1er a une de ses divisions à l'ambusart [sic], et la seconde sur la route de Gilly à Fleurus en avant de l'embranchement de Capinaire [sic]. Le 2e corps a une de ses divisions à l'ambusart*

*[sic] et l'autre en arrière du défilé de Ronchamp.*

*Le 4e corps a raillé [sic] sa seconde division et est au village de St.Francois et censes environnantes.*

*Le 3e corps doit se trouver entre Charleroi et le point où nous avons chargé les carrés de l'infanterie prussienne. Le général Kellerman ne m'a point envoyé de Charleroi, son emplacement; mais il est de ce coté-ci.*

*Je n'ai point encore le rapport des pertes qu'on fait les 1er et 2e corps dans la journée d'aujourd'hui. Je l'ai demandé et le remettrai d'en qu'il me sera parvenu. Ci-joint copie de celui que j'adressai hier à l'Empereur.*

*Le total des prisonniers faits par la cavalerie dans la journée d'hier est de huit à neuf cents hommes.*

*Agréez, Monsieur le maréchal, l'assurance de ma haute considération.*

*Le maréchal commandant la cavalerie  
Comte de Grouchy*

*P.S. Le premier hussards fesant [sic] parti du 1er corps en a été détaché par Vos Ordres, et je désire que vous lui fesiez [sic] rallier la division Soult, d'en qu'il sera possible.<sup>2</sup>*

Grouchy must have received Soult's letter of 8 a.m. around 9 a.m. In reading Grouchy's report of 5 a.m. one can assume that he had already taken his precautions for the concentration of his troops.

Immediately, Grouchy issued march orders for the cavalry of Pajol, Exelmans and Milhaud. It remains unclear in what way Grouchy communicated to Vandamme and Gérard and vice versa. The letter which was carried from Napoleon by the aide de camp Labédoyère must have been delivered to Grouchy shortly after or perhaps even before 9 a.m.

It is in this connection that I here give the reports which would have been written by Grouchy for the emperor around the same time. They are:

*Au bivouac près Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815, 5 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*En faisant la tournée de mes avant-postes, je viens d'apercevoir de fortes colonnes ennemies se dirigeant vers Bry, Saint Amand et autres villages environnants; elles paraissent venir par la route de Namur.*

*Le général Girard, dont la division d'infanterie, placée sur ma gauche, occupe un plateau plus élevé que ceux où se trouvent les troupes que je commande, vient me de confirmer l'arrivée incessante, depuis le point du jour, de corps prussiens.*

*Je ne perds donc pas un instant à transmettre à Votre Majesté ces renseignements importants et positifs. Je réunis en ce moment mes troupes pour effectuer le mouvement que vous avez*

*ordonné vers Sombreffe.*

*Je suis etc..*

*Le maréchal Grouchy* <sup>3</sup>

And another report reads:

*Le 16 juin 1815, 6 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*Je viens d'être informé par le général Girard que l'ennemi continue à se porter en force par Sombreffe sur les hauteurs qui environnent le moulin de Brie [sic]. Je m'empresse de transmettre à Votre Majesté ce nouvel avis conformatif de celui que je lui ai fait parvenir il y a une heure.*

*Le maréchal Grouchy* <sup>4</sup>

I have seen no originals of these reports as printed copies were made available for the archives in Paris, and therefore a complete verification has not been possible. But apart from that I do not believe that they actually were written the moment they claim to have been written, as they simply could not have been written then.

First of all, there is the original report from 5 a.m. which Grouchy wrote as commander of the reserve cavalry and he would never have written such reports, certainly not at the same time but also not one to Soult and the other to Napoleon. The reason for the difference is that in my idea he wrote the one of 5 a.m. for Soult as then he was in command of the reserve cavalry, while he wrote the others for Napoleon as the time he wrote them he was commander of the right wing.

What he writes is also something which doesn't match the situation between 5 and 6 a.m. First of all, there were no Prussian movements coming from the Namur road through Sombreffe by that time (Pirch I started to arrive towards 10 a.m.) and secondly, and what is even more important, is that at that moment Grouchy had no instructions to collect his troops and march towards Sombreffe.

I therefore believe that the hours given are incorrect and that both reports very probably date from between 10 and 11 a.m.; the second one would then have been written just before the moment Grouchy and Napoleon would actually meet in Fleurus. <sup>5</sup>

According to Napoleons orders the right wing had to move to Sombreffe without halting. At 8 a.m. Napoleon wrote to Grouchy: " Rendez - vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe. Faites partir en conséquence, de suite, les corps des généraux Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans et Vandamme, et, sans vous arrêter, continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe ".

Grouchy, however, was forced to halt his movements due to the Prussian presence in the position Saint Amand – Ligny - Sombreffe and the absence of the 4th corps.

Grouchy put the right wing in motion, except for the 3rd and the 4th corps. Both these corps got

their orders directly from the imperial headquarters. Also the reserve, that is the 6th corps and the Imperial guard, got their orders from the emperor.

The units in the right wing must have had the following sequence: Pajol and Domon, Exelmans, Vandamme, Milhaud, Imperial guard and the 6th corps.

It was at 8 a.m. that Grouchy was ordered by Soult to move Pajol (with Domon) and Exelmans to Sombreffe. The distance between the bivouac of both corps and the ground north of Fleurus is about 4 kilometers. In case Grouchy got his orders at 9 a.m. then Pajol and Exelmans could have had their orders about 15 minutes later. <sup>6</sup> During their march both corps must have used the road leading from Charleroi to Point du Jour.

Vandamme had his headquarters in the farm of Fontenelle. That morning, his adjudant, colonel Trezel, sent out the following order to general Berthézène:

*au quartier général à la ferme de Fontenelle sous Farcine [sic] le 16 juin 1815*

*Monsieur le général,*

*Son Excellence le général en chef comte Vandamme ordonne que chaque division d'infanterie du corps d'armée fournisse un détachement de cinquante hommes commandé par un lieutenant pour la garde des parcs et équipages du corps d'armée.*

*Veillez donner vos ordres pour que ce détachement se rende de suite au quartier général de Son Excellence où il sera à la disposition de Monsieur le colonel Voulandteu [?] qui en est le commandant.*

*Agréez, mon général, l'assurance de mon respect,*

*L'adjoind commandant sous chef de l'état major 9e division du 3e corps de l'armée du nord,*

*Trezel* <sup>7</sup>

Similar orders must have been issued to Lefol and Habert.

It must have been around 9 a.m. that Vandamme received the orders to proceed to Sombreffe. One hour later the corps moved out of its positions. <sup>8</sup> The 3rd corps followed both cavalry-corps and marched through Fleurus the moment Napoleon arrived here (11 a.m.). <sup>9</sup>

While Napoleon installed himself at the mill of Naveau and the palace was installed in the Chateau de la Paix at Fleurus, the 3rd corps marched through Fleurus to take up positions at the other side of the village, to the west of the road.

The division Berthézène took up a position there in columns per division so as to observe “les débouchés de Saint Amand et de Mellet”. <sup>10</sup>

The division kept its position until it was relieved there by the one of Girard, of Reille's corps. Then the division moved towards a position in front of Saint Amand, where it chased away some Prussian skirmishers.

The former position occupied by the 11th division can be located through the account of the

surgeon d'Héralde, who was attached to the 12th regiment of light infantry (division of Girard). In his account (<sup>11</sup>) d'Héralde mentions the position his division took up near a mill. In the middle of the 19th century there were two mills on the road which leads from Fleurus to Mellet. One, in ruins, and the other, called Moulin de Barlaimont at 2400 meters east of Mellet and at 1600 meters west of Fleurus respectively. Between both these mills there was about 1400 meters distance.<sup>12</sup>

It was in this position that general Girard learned through an imperial messenger about the situation on the French right wing.<sup>13</sup>

Pajol and Exelmans took up positions east of the road which leads from Fleurus to Gembloux.<sup>14</sup> Exelmans had a position directly to the right of the road and Pajol was on his right flank, occupying the farms of Fajit and La Converterie, and a farm halfway between them.<sup>15</sup> At this time of day, the heat must have been extreme.<sup>16</sup>

The 4th cavalry-corps, of Milhaud, probably followed Vandamme. That morning it stood at St.Francois, a hamlet about two kilometers north east of Châtelet. Which route it has taken to get to the road which leads from Fleurus to Gembloux is not known. Up to 2 p.m. it must have kept a position on this side of Fleurus, together with the Imperial guard, but where exactly is unknown.

During the night of the 15th of June, the major part of the 4th corps of Gérard was south of the Sambre; one division, Hulot, was near Châtelet on the north bank of this river.

Around 9.30 a.m. that morning Gérard got the order to move his corps to Sombreffe, while leaving Fleurus to his left.<sup>17</sup> Half an hour later the first units left their positions.<sup>18</sup>

The column of the corps, coming from Châtelet, climbed the slopes of the valley of the Sambre through Châtelineau and over the road which connects this village to the Bois de Trichehève. From there it continued its march to the right of Fleurus through Wainage and Lambusart towards the windmill of Baulet. Here it halted for some time.

The distance between the brigade of Châtelet and this mill is 9 kilometers. The vanguard of the corps arrived at the Baulet windmill around 1 p.m.<sup>19</sup> This would mean the troops had an average speed of about three kilometers per hour.

General Gérard, escorted by his chief of staff, his aide de camps and a platoon of the 6th regiment hussars (Maurin), had gone ahead of his corps towards Sombreffe. During this reconnaissance, while approaching the Prussian outposts (<sup>20</sup>) three Prussian squadrons of the 6th regiment of uhlans approached them.<sup>21</sup>

The French group fled into a field with high corn and several ditches, and these circumstances made it hard for them to get out again. In this field, Gérard lost his horse as it stumbled over a ditch and threw him off. Now, the group made a firm stand and immediately after, the uhlans were on them. Gérard's aide de camp Lafontaine came to his aid, killed two Prussian lancers, but was himself killed by a pistol-shot; general Saint Rémy got seven lance-wounds and the aide de camp Dupéron wasn't successful either in rescuing Gérard.

Gérard would have been taken prisoner, had not a squadron of the 12th regiment chasseurs à cheval, called up by colonel Rumigny, one of Gérard's aide de camps, intervened and rescued their comrades.<sup>22</sup>

Shortly after these events, Gérard met Napoleon near the mill of Fleurus; it must have been

around 12.30 p.m. They talked, amongst others, about the desertion of Bourmont.<sup>23</sup> Napoleon would have said: " Je vous l'avais bien dit, général, qui est bleu est bleu, qui est blanc est toujours blanc ! " <sup>24</sup>

It must have been some time earlier (probably around 10 a.m.) that a member of Grouchy's staff, colonel count Laderiac, deserted during a reconnaissance of the Prussian front line. He was received by the 6th uhlans, which was in the outposts of the reserve-cavalry of the 1st corps south of Ligny.<sup>25</sup>

The imperial guard had its positions along and on the road, between Charleroi and Gilly. It got the order to move to Fleurus at 8 a.m.<sup>26</sup> It must have left its positions around 9 a.m.<sup>27-28</sup>

Towards 1 p.m. the Imperial guard arrived in the plains in front of Fleurus, between the farm of Martinroux and Fleurus. Taking into account an average speed of about 2.5 km/hour, it would have taken the troops about 3.5 hours to get there. Here the guard halted here for about one hour.<sup>29</sup>

About the formation, De Mauduit writes:

" Toute l'infanterie de la Vieille Garde alla se former en colonnes serrées par divisions de cinquante files, chaque compagnie formant, seule, division, en raison de la force de son effectif, et prit ainsi position à droite de la chaussée et comme toujours, la gauche en tête. Les quatre régiments de la Jeune Garde se formèrent également en colonne serrée, mais sur la gauche de la chaussée et à notre hauteur. Là nous mimas nos armes en faisceaux pour laisser le temps à tous les corps de s'établir à leur place de bataille. " <sup>30</sup>

In general, the infantry of the guard was on both sides of the road.<sup>31</sup>

The first French troops, those of Pajol and Exelmans, came out of Fleurus around 11 a.m.<sup>32</sup> They had orders to advance towards Sombreffe, but they saw their way blocked by a part of the Prussian army. Now, both commanders decided to wait for orders and meanwhile their men took up temporary positions north of Fleurus.

At 11 a.m. Napoleon arrived and by then the infantry of Vandamme was marching through the village as well. The moment the emperor observed the Prussian positions, the 1st Prussian corps was at Saint Amand and Ligny and behind these villages, to Brye. Shortly after, the 2nd Prussian corps was beginning to arrive from Namur, and began taking up positions west of Sombreffe.

Meanwhile, Vandamme deployed north of Fleurus and west of the road to Point du Jour. As both cavalry-corps it took up a temporary position, waiting for more definitive orders to be issued depending on Napoleon's intentions.<sup>33</sup>

The more the French developed their positions, the more the Prussian cavalry of Von Röder retreated from its position near the Tombe de Ligny.

As described above, the corps of Gérard arrived near the windmill of Baulet at around 1 p.m.<sup>34</sup>

The 4th corps had its temporary position here and halted here for quite some time; the moment the 3rd corps got its final position in front of Saint Amand, the 4th corps changed its position too.

It was by 2 p.m. that Napoleon had fully worked out his battle-plan.

Having decided what to do, Napoleon carried out a change of front towards 2 p.m. with Fleurus

as turning-point, to move the right wing forward.<sup>35</sup> Now, the 3rd corps took up positions in front of Saint Amand (<sup>36</sup>).

Now, the division of Girard was taken out from the left wing and pulled from its position west of Fleurus to the left, en potence, of the 3rd corps opposite Sain Amand le Hameau.<sup>37</sup>

The corps of Gérard advanced from its position east of Fleurus and turned to the left, so that it took up a position in front of this village. From here two divisions advanced over the Gembloux-road in column of divisions on whole distance towards a position east of Ligny; the other remaining division, of Hulot, as well as the cavalry division of Maurin advanced further towards a position facing Sombreffe and Tongrenelle.<sup>38</sup> The 1st and 2nd cavalry corps got positions "en potence" facing Boignée and Balâtre.

It was till about 2 p.m. that the corps of Milhaud and the Imperial Guard had kept their positions on the other side of Fleurus; now they got the orders to take up the second line.

The Imperial Guard had halted in front of Fleurus on both sides of the road. After 2 p.m. the troops resumed their march again in one column through Fleurus so as to keep the road open for artillery. Emerging from Fleurus the guard took up new positions again.<sup>39</sup> In this way, the French right wing took up a front of nine kilometers.

Early that morning, Lobau received orders to move his corps halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus and stay there till further notice. At what time the corps left its bivouacs at and around Mont-sur-Marchienne is unknown. In its new position it halted for several hours. In conformity with the orders he had, Lobau had left one bataillon at Charleroi as a garrison; it was the 3rd battalion of the 11th regiment of the line (division Simmer).<sup>40</sup>

Lobau's report most probably reached Napoleon around 3 p.m. At that time the corps was still halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus, waiting for further orders. It was at 3.30 p.m. that Napoleon sent out the order to Lobau to move his corps to Fleurus. The moment, therefore, the battle of Ligny started the corps must have been between Charleroi and Gilly.

In absence of the corps of Lobau, Napoleon had a total force at Ligny of about 65.000 men and 212 guns.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Copy in SHAT, nr.C15 Original in private collection (baron Du Casse)  
Cf. Grouchy. Relation succincte 3<sup>e</sup> série p.16

2.Original in SHAT, nr.C15, nr.5

3. Copy in SHAT. C15, nr.5

The same file contains a very similar version, but dated at 6 a.m. It reads:

*Le 16 juin 1815, 6 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*Je viens d'être informé, et le général Girard me confirme, que l'ennemi débouche en force par Sombreffe sur les hauteurs de St. Amand, paraissant venir par la route de Namur. Je m'empresse de donner cet avis à Votre Majesté; elle peut le regarder comme positif. Je réunis les troupes afin d'effectuer le mouvement que Votre Majesté vient d'ordonner sur Sombreffe.*

*Je suis avec respect, etc.*

*Grouchy*

Also in:

Lachouque, H. Le secret de Waterloo p.121

Piérart, Z.J. Le drame de Waterloo p.147-148

4.Copy in SHAT..C15, nr.5 Also in:

Piérart, Z.J. Le drame de Waterloo p.148

Aerts, W. Etudes etc. p.350

<sup>5</sup> Pollio also sees the impossibility of these reports at the hours mentioned, but doesn't clarify the issue. In: Waterloo p.178

6. Menuau says it was 9.30 for Exelmans' dragoons. Cf. Menuau, H. Historique du 14<sup>me</sup> régiment de dragons p.291

7. Original in SHAT. C15, nr.5

8. At least the 11th division, the one of Berthézène. Cf.his report of the 17th of June, SHAT. C15, nr.5

Here he mentions a position of Farciennes from where his troops left.

Ph.Gerbet (officer of the 37rd regiment line, division Lefol) adds that the troops left at 10 a.m.

though they were ready to march by daybreak. In: Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs etc. p.10

9.Lieutenant Putigny (33rd regiment, division Berthézène) In: Putigny, B. Le grognard Putigny baron d'Empire p.169

10.Berthézènes report of the 17th of June. In: SHAT. C15, nr.5

The fact that the corps took up positions to the left of the road leading to Gembloux is confirmed by Ph.Gerbet (37rd regiment line, division Lefol). In: Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs p.10  
Lieutenant Putigny (33rd regiment, division Berthézène) mentions a position in front of Fleurus.  
See: Putigny. B. Le grognard Putigny baron d'Empire p.169

11.Delloye, S. Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

12.Vandermaelen (map). Both mills have been demolished. According to d'Héralde the Prussians were visible, but out of musket-reach. The distance between Girard and St.Amand la Haye was almost three kilometers. In: Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

13.Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

14.Siborne gives a wrong impression of the advance of the French right wing. According to him the French advanced in two columns, one on the road and one to the right of it. Pajol and Exelmans took up positions in two lines on a short distance from Fleurus; Pajol and Exelmans to the right, Vandamme to the left and the corps of Gérard in the centre. The guard and Milhaud were in second line.

However, the 3rd corps followed the cavalry and the 4th corps took another route, fully separate of the other troops. There was no deployment in front of Fleurus either. In: Siborne, W. History of the war etc. Vol.I p.177

According to Menuau, Exelmans initially marched in rear of Pajol but gradually shifted to a position to the right and left of the road of Fleurus. Cf. Menuau, H. Historique du 14me régiment de dragons p.291

15. This intermediate farm is now called the "ferme de Quirini". In former times it was called the " ferme de Keumiée ".

Von Reiche mentions the march around noon of a French cavalry-corps moving from Fleurus towards Wanfercée and which then turned to the left, towards Tongrenelle. These troops must have been those of Exelmans. In: Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.189

16. Mauduit, H.de. Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.40

17. Gérard, E.M. Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.2

Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.262  
Captain Francois (30th regiment line) claims the division of Pécheux left Chatelet at 4 a.m., but this must be an error. In: Journal du capitaine Francois etc. p.879

18.Hulot. Documents militaires etc. p.21  
Kaisin, J. Annales historiques etc. p.386

19. Gérard, E.M. Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo p.48  
Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.262  
Colonel de Bloqueville. In: SHAT. He says it was 12 o'clock  
Marshal Grouchy says at 1 p.m the troops took up their positions in the frontline. In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.148  
Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.161  
Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.146.  
According to captain Francois (30th regiment line, division Pécheux) the troops arrived at Fleurus at noon. Additionally he says the divisions took different routes, but doesn't give any details. In: Francois. Journal du capitaine etc. p.879  
According to captain Forget, of the general staff of the corps, it arrived on the battlefield by 2 p.m. In: Chuquet, A. Lettres de 1815 p.308

20.According to Houssaye Gérard was then looking for Napoleon. In: Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.161

21.Cf.report of colonel De Grouchy of the 12th regiment chasseurs à cheval (SHAT). The 6th regiment uhlands was a part of the cavalry of Von Röder, of the 1st Prussian corps.  
According to De Bloqueville general Gérard took a group of Prussian cavalry for the staff of Napoleon. Yet, it is hard to imagine that a man like Gérard would make that kind of mistake. In: Colonel de Bloqueville. In: SHAT.

22. Gérard, E.M. Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.2-3  
Report of colonel A.de Grouchy, 17th June (SHAT) This colonel was a son of the marshal Grouchy. His regiment formed part of the division of Domon (Vandamme's corps).  
Colonel Rumigny (aide de camp of Gérard). Cf. Rumigny, M.T.G. Souvenirs etc. p.99-100

23.Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.161  
Napoleon was already informed about the desertion as Gérard had written to Soult earlier.  
According to colonel Rumigny Gérard met the emperor before he went out to reconnoitre the position, but this is an error. Cf. Rumigny, M.T.G. Souvenirs etc. p.99  
Maes thinks the meeting was between 2 and 3 p.m., but this is too late. In: Le premier corps etc. In: 8me cahier documentaire ABN, 1993 p.16

24. Gérard, E.M. Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.4  
Account of De Bloqueville (SHAT). Also see the account of baron Gourgaud (archive LMB,

nr.AS 2448) and the account of baron Petiet. Petiet would have been an eye-witness of the meeting. The words he cites are different, but have basically the same meaning. In: Petiet, A, Souvenirs militaires etc. p.195

The account of colonel de Rumigny, aide de camp of Gérard, confirms the fact that Napoleon wasn't surprised to hear about the desertion of Bourmont. Cf. Souvenirs du général comte de Rumigny p.99

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the account of an officer of this regiment. In: Minerva, 1840 p.192,198 In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Der Verrat etc. p.385

Laderiac would have asked to be brought to Ghent, and was accordingly brought to Wellington by Sir H.Hardinge, who, while bringing him to Quatre Bras, met Wellington during his ride to Blücher and then joined him. Cf. Memoirs of prince Von Thurn und Taxis, Bavarian plenipotentiary at the headquarters of Blücher. In: Aus drei Feldzügen etc. p.321-322

26. Mauduit, H.de. Les derniers jours de la grande armée. Vol.II p.38

This conforms to the idea that the order would have been sent out between 7 and 8 a.m. that morning from Charleroi.

27. Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.38

Petit. Generals Petits account etc. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII. 1903 p.323  
Fraint, J.F. Vie militaire etc. p.383

28.For the march of the guard I have focused on the accounts of Petit (commander of the 1st regiment of grenadiers) and sergeant H.de Mauduit (2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of grenadiers)

In: Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II

Petit. Generals Petits account etc. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII. 1903

<sup>29</sup> Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.40

According to Petit the guard arrived in front of Fleurus at 2 p.m. In: In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

Cf. J.F.Friant. Vie militaire etc. p.383

<sup>30</sup> Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.40

According to Petit, the guard was first "en colonne sur bataillons déployé" en then in "régiment déployé." In" In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

De Mauduit adds that it was custom in the Old Guard to march "la gauche en tête", i.e. the chasseurs preceding the grenadiers and the last regiments in front: 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 1st chasseurs and then the 4th, 3rd, 2nd and 1st grenadiers.

For a fight, both types of infantry usually joined, the 4th of each weapon first and the 1st last.

In a march-column of both divisions (for instance "en route" or on a battlefield), the 4th

chasseurs would be in front, then the 3rd and then the 2nd. The same as for the grenadiers. The reserve would move in the following sequence: sappers and miners, and then the 1st chasseurs and 1st grenadiers. In: *Les derniers jours etc.* Vol.I p.448-449

<sup>31</sup>. According to J.F.Friant the chasseurs were in the first line and the grenadiers to the left. His description is far from clear however. In: *Vie militaire etc* p.383

<sup>32</sup> Von Zieten. Cf. his report of the 8th July 1815. In: Reiche, L.von *Memoiren etc.* p.417  
*Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps.* In: Pflugk Hartung, J.von *Die Schlacht bei Ligny* p.23

Cf. Hafner, D. "Hans Carl Ernst Graf von Zieten, Königlich Preussischer Generalfeldmarschall. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Preussens in den Jahren 1792-1815 p.259

Colonel Biot, aide de camp of general Pajol, states how Pajol's cavalry arrived in front of the enemy around 1 p.m. In: Biot, H.F. *Campagnes et garnisons etc.* p.239

33.Cf.the initial role of the 11th division, that is an observer's role in stead of an offensive one. Captain Von Bismarck, of the 1st battalion of the 29th regiment, in position in the outer gardens of Saint Amand la Haye, saw the French debouching from Fleurus around noon in two masses he estimates at 4000 men and 10.000 men. Cf. His diary from the former *Kriegsarchiv.* In: Wellmann, R. *Geschichte etc.* p.627

34.With this position it was, conform Grouchy's orders, "à portée du 3e corps" and able to "concourir à l'attaque de Sombreffe". Cf. the order to Grouchy of that morning.

35.Cf. the French report written on the 20th of June at Laon. In: Bas, F.de *La campagne de 1815* Vol.III p.455

Also see: Grouchy, G.de *Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy.* Vol.IV p.9

*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc.* p.

Gourgaud. *La campagne de 1815* p.47

Gerbet, Ph. *Souvenirs etc.* p.10

Francois, captain *Journal du capitaine Francois etc.* p.

Reiche, L.von *Memoiren etc.* p.183

*Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments.* In: *Special ABN, nr.65* p.20

36. Report of general Berthézène of the 17th of June. In: SHAT. C15, nr.5

Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.*Waterloo* p.163

Mauduit, H.de *Les derniers jours de la grande armée* Vol.II p.49

Gerbet, Ph. *Souvenirs etc.* p.10

37.Cf.the French report written on the 20th of June at Laon. In: Bas, F.de *La campagne de 1815* Vol.III p.455

Also in: Berthézène, P. *Souvenirs militaires etc.* p.363

De Mauduit's statements about this division are contradictory. On the one hand he states it was taken from Wangenies by 2 p.m. to a position to the left of Vandamme, while on the other he asserts that the division spent the night at Heppignies, was ordered in the early morning towards Wangenies and that it was ordered from there by 3.30 p.m. to Saint Amand le Hameau to attack it.

In: Les derniers jours et. Vol.II p.50, 56, 63,70-71

38.Mauduit,H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.50

Hulot, E. Documents militaires etc. p.21

Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.163

Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.189

Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny. P.23 In this document it is being asserted that the 4th corps moved this way the moment the 3rd French corps attacked St.Amand. In: Haffner, D. Hans Carl Ernst etc. p.259 According to Berthézène the 4th corps had hardly left to take up a position behind the 3rd corps when it got the instruction to take up a position facing Ligny. In: Berthézène, P. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.363

Lieutenant Von Gerlach confirms the initial development of the French forces to their left and later to their right, over the road to Point du Jour as well, opposite Ligny. Cf.Lieutenant Von Gerlach (attached to the general headquarters). In his diary. In: Aus den Jahren Preussischer Not etc. p.147

39.Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.47-48

General Petit. In: In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

Colonel Duuring (1st regiment of chasseurs). In: L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.115

<sup>40</sup> Corporal Delroeux (3rd battalion, 11th regiment of the line). In: Fleischman, Th. L'épopée impériale p.521

41. This total force comprises:

3rd corps: 17379 men and 46 guns. 4th corps: 15249 men and 38 guns. Division Girard: 3890 men and 8 guns. Pajol's corps (excluding the 1st regiment of hussars): 2359 men and 12 guns. Exelmans' corps: 3000 men and 12 guns. Milhaud's corps: 3516 men and 12 guns. Imperial guard: 20826 men and 104 guns. Total (including some losses on the 15th of June): about 66.000 men and 232 guns. In: SHAT. C15, nrs.35 and 36