

The duke of Wellington's ideas and orders on the 15th of June.

The orders Wellington issued on the 15th of June have been touched upon, but what was their background ?

It has been shown that Wellington must have learned about hostilities, in a general way though, around 3 p.m. However, at that moment, Wellington must have seen no reason yet to take measures himself right away and to wait for further information. He must have reassured the prince, who, in his turn, ordered all of his troops of the 1st corps to return to their cantonments, unless new information would ask for it *not* to do so. ¹

By the time the prince of Orange wrote this more information came in through Berkeley. It is hard to determine what impact this information had upon Wellington, as it was not long afterwards that Zieten's report reached the duke and which prompted him to issue his first set of orders. These orders overtook those of the prince to Constant Rebecque written about one hour before.

By the time the duke of Wellington issued his first orders, he had the reports coming from the Dutch sector, as well as the one from Zieten. They all dated from the morning and must have given Wellington the following impression:

- Thuin had fallen to the French and they were advancing on *both* banks of the Sambre towards Charleroi, so in an eastward direction ²
- at the same time there was no enemy's presence in front of Binche, Mons, Braine le Comte and in front of the cavalry brigade of Van Merlen
- Zieten would fall back towards Fleurus step by step
- at the same time, Zieten asked Wellington to concentrate his army in and around Nivelles.

For Wellington it was until then unclear whether the offensive might be a feint and that the real attack would follow further west, even though the situation at the frontline there remained quiet. And although he had the request from Zieten, there was no news yet from the Prussian headquarters itself, so therefore he issued the orders as described above.

His strategical goal in this context was to maintain the defense of Brussels and Ghent, presuming the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels was still in Prussian hands. For that reason he changed his frontline from Menin – Frasnes (through Tournai and Mons) to the one stretching from Audenarde to Nivelles (through Ath and Braine le Comte).

In this situation Ghent was still covered by one and half division, while the following roads towards Brussels were covered: Tournai – Ath – Enghien – Brussels; Mons – Braine le Comte – Brussels; Binche – Nivelles – Brussels. The one from Charleroi, through Quatre Bras, to Brussels would be in the Prussian sector.

Two divisions were stationed on the first road, one on the second and two on the third. The reserve as well as the cavalry, were stationed behind all these troops.

In this position, which was basically a triangle, Wellington felt he would be able to defend Brussels from all possible roads, while at the same time he covered Ghent to his extreme right; on his extreme left, access to Brussels would still be covered by the Prussians. The reserve, in and around Brussels, would be available to be committed wherever necessary. ³

The letter written by Von Müffling of 7 p.m. is of an immense importance as it is in fact a synthesis of the way how Wellington looked upon the situation in general, his own situation

in particular and – last but not least – upon a possible cooperation with Blücher. It contained a promise of support, though be it a *conditional* one (see below), which was issued shortly after Ziethen’s information had dropped in and subsequent concentration orders had been given.⁴

It was within the context of the concept as laid down in this document that the duke acted methodically and carefully. This becomes clear for instance in the way he handled the intelligence he received during the afternoon and evening of the 15th of June about the French attack. For him, the information as he got it around 3 p.m. was far too general to act upon; Wellington even urged the prince of Orange to stay with him in Brussels and he must have reassured him about the situation.⁵ The information which came in two hours later didn’t change the duke’s attitude, even though it seemed to indicate that no enemy was to be seen in front of Mons and Braine le Comte that morning. The situation changed shortly after that when the first intelligence came in from the Prussians themselves (Ziethen).

It alerted him to order a general concentration for the whole army, one which allowed Wellington to move in whatever direction he wanted. This measure was in the same line as it had been designed by the duke late April in the scenario in which the French would attack between the Scheldt and the Sambre rivers.⁶

The importance and most of the content of the letter as written by Von Müffling at 7 p.m. has been highly overlooked by historians. The main cause for this is that its content is usually interpreted as a full promise of the duke to come to the assistance of the Prussians in the battle of Ligny – period.

I will, however, go through the document and elucidate the elements it contains.

I already referred to the first line, as being a reference to the message of Zieten which had come in towards 6 p.m. while the second line refers to the concentration orders as drafted by Wellington between 6 and 7 p.m. While the first line is a statement of a neutral fact, the text starting in the line is the Von Müffling writing on behalf of the duke.

What follows then is the core of the way how the duke saw the strategical situation. This view centres around the fact that, for the duke, *a French attack through Charleroi could not be an action on its own*. In this, there were two options.

The first one was that Charleroi was a point through which a column passed which was to meet to the east with another column as coming from Givet, both aiming at an offensive near Namur, so in the very heart of the Prussian sector.

The other option in Wellington’s mind was that Napoleon would strike through Charleroi towards Fleurus, as a parallel attack to one on Wellington through Nivelles, and from there to Brussels. Von Müffling doesn’t describe it in this way, but the impression is given as if this last attack would then be the main attack – through Nivelles upon Brussels - while the one towards Fleurus would be a feint one.⁷

This difference between a main and a feint, or secondary attack, can be traced back in a former statement which has been taken from the report of either Gneisenau or Blücher from the 17th of June for prince Schwarzenberg, as: “Zwischen mir un dem Herzog von Wellington war festgestellt, dass diejenige Armee, gegen welche der Hauptangriff erfolge, sich vertheidigen solle, während die andere, auf welche dafür der Scheinangriff stattgehabt, die Offensive ergreifen sollte.”⁸

In this sense, the scenarios as described by Wellington – through Von Müffling - were not a surprise for the Prussian general staff as both focused upon sectors which had been for both commanders points of extra attention in relation to possible French attacks already for a long time.

The second passage of the letter contains a promise of support, stated as: “[..] wenn der Feind nicht bei Nivelles zugleich angriff, so wird der Herzog morgen mit seiner ganzen Macht in der Gegend von Nivelles sein, um Euer Durchlaucht zu unterstützen, oder, im Fall der Feind höchst-

dieselben bereits angegriffen hätte, nach einer zu nehmenden Abrede, gerade in seiner Flanke oder in seinen Rücken zu gehen.”

Before entering into any observations on this particular passage, it should be stressed that by the time Von Müffling wrote this letter, Wellington was *not* aware of a concrete intention of the Prussian leadership to accept a battle around Sombreffe as this was reported to the duke almost three hours later. In fact, by the time this letter was written this was still a mere intention of the Prussians as no orders for the concentration of the army in this position had then be issued.

Apart from that, there is a most significant element in this passage and that is “wenn der Feind nicht bei Nivelles zugleich angriff.” The word “zugleich” as being underlined by Von Müffling had a reason: any concentration around Nivelles, as a basis for support, would not materialize as long as it would not be sure that the enemy would not attack through Mons towards Nivelles as well.⁹

So, the promise was a *conditional* one and left the duke time to make sure whether such an attack would take place, and this would, at least according to this letter, dependent on the news of the prince of Orange as having Mons and Nivelles in his sector, but an actual time-frame is not given. It is most important to note this conditional element in the promise as stated in this letter, as it meant that as long as the duke did not have the conviction that Napoleon would not attack on his sector as well, he would not concentrate his army around Nivelles as a basis for support to the Prussian army.

The document doesn't say so explicitly, but this meant that as long as Wellington did not exclude the possibility of a main French attack upon him through Mons and Nivelles, that the Prussian army was supposed to move in *his* support– and the Prussian leadership knew this. In that sense, a concentration around Nivelles was for Wellington the point from where he could give *and accept* support.¹⁰

As has been stated, the letter is too often been solely used as a promise of support to the Prussians in the position of Sombreffe. However, there is much more to be gained from the letter when taking a closer look at its strategical content.

By using the scenarios as sketched, it would be logical to assume that Wellington would concentrate his army around Nivelles in case the French would attack the Prussian sector around Namur, as Fleurus was in Wellington's mind in combination with his own sector. As has become clear from the preambles of the campaign, the Prussian concentration area was in that case east of Fleurus, to Gembloux and beyond, towards Hannut.

It had also been Zieten in his report which led Von Müffling to write the letter at 7 p.m. who had stated that he would carry out “a slow retreat towards Fleurus, to gain time for the army to concentrate.” Whether Zieten was clear on where this concentration exactly would take place, it was clear to Wellington that it would be east of Fleurus.

As I have indicated before, it was Zieten who referred to a similar promise of support in case he would be attacked through Charleroi in his report to Blücher of 8.15 a.m. Yet, in my opinion, this promise should be seen within the strategical framework of the letter of 7 p.m., i.e. that this could only have been a conditional one.

Taking Von Müffling's (Wellington's) words further, it also meant that Nivelles was the point of concentration for the army in case the French would fall upon Blücher not only possibly around Sombreffe, but also further east towards Gembloux, in case the enemy might move from Givet as well so the distance became even larger.

In the calculation of a concentration of the army around Nivelles, Wellington allowed himself to use the 16th of June to do so. While he doesn't bind himself to a specific calculation, Von Müffling in a way does (see below).

In an actual support to the Prussians, Wellington makes a difference between an actual union of both armies as long as no battle was taking place; in the other case he felt an offensive from his

side would be the best way, and then only after a mutual arrangement on this. I will get back on this subject later, in the context of the meeting of Bussy.

In the last phrase, it is Von Müffling himself again who ends the letter by expressing a somewhat formal optimism, while at the same time he closes the letter in a personal expression in which shines through a sense that the Prussian leadership should take into account that a victory would probably not be feasible on the 16th of June, but for the day after.

In my idea, the letter is built up in a coherent way, though one element remains highly puzzling as it simply is not clear what it means to say and that is the remark that the reserve would march out as soon as the moon would rise. On the 15th of June, the moon rose around 1 p.m. and this basically says nothing in relation to what follows in the text.¹¹

In general, the content of the letter perfectly fits to two of Wellington's axioms: to keep his army together and not to act right away and too prematurely, but to wait till the French movements would be clear enough to determine where the army was to be concentrated. At the same time, Wellington had the strong impression that Napoleon would strike from Maubeuge towards Mons / Nivelles.¹²

The fact that Napoleon advanced along the left bank of the Sambre (which in reality he initially did not, but that was not something Wellington could know at that time) clearly must have influenced the duke in his idea about the French intentions, particularly in relation to Mons, Binche and Nivelles. While the other option would initially drive the French army straight into the Prussian cantonments, the other one left the chance for Napoleon to strike against Wellington as well. Yet, such a strategy was not a typical one for the emperor: normally he used his local maximal superiority in full to destroy the enemy's army, and not by splitting up his own army.

Blücher's letter which reached Wellington between 9.30 and 10 p.m. did in some respects not alter a lot in some elements of the general impression Wellington had, while in others it did:

- it still indicated that the French were advancing along both banks of the Sambre towards Charleroi, so to the east, away from the duke's army
- it told Wellington that Zieten was not supposed to fall back further as Fleurus, which might have given the duke the impression that the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels would then be evacuated, but the moment the letter was written the evacuation of Charleroi and of the Brussels road were no reality so there could then not have been a confirmation of it.
- it informed Wellington of the Prussian intention to concentrate the army the next day near Sombreffe, apparently under cover of the 1st corps and to have a battle there, but at the same time it wasn't specified when this battle was expected, either still on the 16th or on the 17th of June
- at the same time, Blücher asked Wellington about his decisions and about the concentration of his army

The overall impression he then had, led Wellington to issue his so-called "after-orders".¹³ With these orders he made a shift with his forces to the left, but without actually approaching Blücher. What Wellington basically did is tightening his front-line even more, but within the same defensive sector he already had. He pulled it in on the line Enghien – Braine le Comte – Nivelles, and a few hours later he pulled the (reinforced) reserve in the second line, in a flexible position, to be directed to the extreme left or to the centre. Again, the position was again a triangle, covering the same roads.

In this position the wings were relatively strong. To the left were the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the Netherlands, as well as its cavalry. In addition there was the division of Alten. In the centre was the 1st British division, while to the right were the 2nd and 4th British division, as well as the cavalry and the units of prince Frederik.

The only thing which Wellington gave a lower priority in this position was Ghent, which was now only covered by 500 men of prince Frederik.¹⁴

In this sense, Wellington's measures perfectly match the element of the *conditional* support to the Prussians as phrased in the letter mentioned above. This support could only materialize - and as coming from the area around Nivelles - as long as it would be sure that the main French force would not fall upon the sector around Mons.¹⁵

At the same time, the situation also points to the elements which were of vital importance to the duke and upon which his defence system was built: to keep his army assembled, not to make any false movement and to protect the capital of Belgium as well as Ghent, the seat of Louis XVIII.¹⁶

Within this picture fits the fear of the general command of the army of the Netherlands for the safety of Nivelles. Obviously, it was in their sector, and on the connection leading from Maubeuge straight down to Brussels (through Binche, Nivelles and Mont Saint Jean).

In taking the concentration and after-orders together as such, it becomes clear that, apart from the huge delay as caused by the Prussian communication system, they were issued late as most of them left Brussels between 7 and 10.30 p.m.

For instance, at Braine le Comte they arrived by 11.30 p.m. while the distance between Braine le Comte and Brussels is about 20 kilometers which can be covered in about 2 hours; this would have meant the actual orders for the 2nd and 3rd Dutch division left Brussels by 9 p.m. Cooke got his first orders at Enghien by 1 a.m. and this would have meant that these orders would have left Brussels towards 10 p.m.

Alten, at Soignies - which is about 40 kilometers from Brussels - got his orders by 1 a.m. as well, so his orders would then have been issued towards 9 p.m.

Overall, it should be taken into account, however, that the 1st corps had a head-start in comparison to the remainder of the army, thanks to the initiative of Constant Rebecque.

While for the 2nd and 4th British division data are not so complete as to be able to draw conclusions from them, they are for the units led by prince Frederik of the Netherlands. Lord Hill, his superior, received the first set of orders by 2 a.m. and it was by late morning that Frederik had completed his concentration at Sotteghem while the order itself said "... to occupy Audenarde with 500 men and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries and the Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning *at daylight.*" (italics are mine).

The situation with the reserve in and around Brussels is - in view of the distances involved - even more striking.

Picton got his first orders between 9 and 10 p.m. while general headquarters was not 1 kilometer away of his. And even though the Brunswick headquarters was at Laecken (which is about 5 kilometers from the center of Brussels), it was not until 11 p.m. that the duke of Brunswick got his first orders.

Von Kruse, at Woluwe (which is about the same distance as Laecken), got them as well about 11 p.m. It cannot have taken more than half an hour to cover this distance, so that would mean that in both cases these orders were actually issued towards 10 p.m.

For the cavalry and in particular for the Royal Horse Artillery the picture becomes more obscure, but what we do know is that Ponsonby - at Ninove, which is about 25 kilometers from Brussels - got his first orders by 1.45 a.m. and this would have meant that they had left

Brussels towards 11 p.m. While Somerset, near Ninove, got his before daybreak, so probably his may have left Brussels towards midnight.

For the “after-orders” the situation is unclear as in most cases it is not clear when they reached their destination and whether they have been kept somewhere waiting for the unit to come up. Yet, as for the headquarters of the 1st corps, at Braine le Comte, the situation is that they got there by 2.30 a.m. which means that they left the capital towards midnight.

Major general Cooke got his orders by 3.30 a.m. which also means that these would have been issued at the same time.

Although the British cavalry was ordered as a whole to concentrate at Ninove, before leaving for Enghien later, the brigades of Grant and Vivian at least must have gone to Enghien right away; how this could have happened is unclear, but what it did was preventing these units from moving north and then moving south again. The same took place for those of Von Arentschildt and Von Dörnberg.

Of course, the fact that the first orders were issued in the evening and reached most units well into the night didn't facilitate the transmission of orders and the resulting movements. Further, these movements were prolonged each time further east which made the marches more demanding and strenuous.

It resulted in a situation in which units reached their destinations, which it eventually did not appear to be; in some cases this must have been known while going there, in other after having reached that place. This all had to with an initial gradual shift of the entire army towards the east.

It also led to certain roads being used extensively, while others were not. Due to the former positions of several divisions, which were related to the concentration of the main part of the army in the area around Nivelles, the road between Enghien, Braine le Comte, Nivelles and Quatre Bras was frequently used. This would have its impact upon the quality of the road, but on the other hand, it could have been worse in case units would have converged on this road at the same time. In the current situation this was not the case as often as it could have been. For instance, between Enghien and Braine le Comte, Cooke passed in the early morning, while the division of Clinton did so in the afternoon and the evening, while later, during the night, Colville did so.

Between Braine le Comte and Nivelles, it was Alten's division which had stepped in from the south and taking the lead. It had done so in the early morning, after which Cooke followed in his wake. Yet, it was the division of Chassé which came from Fayt, from the south, to take up a position north-west of Nivelles, which caused an obstruction as at that time Alten was just arriving at Nivelles as well.

By the end of the 15th of June, when the news reached Wellington about a French presence at Frasnes, the duke decided to send his reserve to Mont Saint Jean. It was a measure which in my ideas should be seen as a compromise for two situations: it was stationed there either to be sent from there towards Genappe and beyond to thwart any French advance along that road, or towards Nivelles in case the French still might show from there.

What I want to say is that by that time Wellington still must have taken a possible French offensive through the sector Mons – Binche towards Brussels into a serious consideration. Linking this to the principle of the arrangement as set between both allied commanders long before the campaign this meant that, in this scenario, he still considered the Prussians then in an *offensive* role as coming from the area around Sombreffe.

As I have stressed before, the support as done in the letter of 7 p.m. was a conditional one. The condition was that support – as coming from the area around Nivelles - only would materialize as soon as it would be certain that the French were falling in strength upon Blücher and not upon Wellington himself. The central question, however, was how much time

the duke allowed himself to make sure that Napoleon was (or was not) directing his main offensive upon him.

In the letter itself is stated: “[..] der Prinz von Oranien soll ihm berichten, ob Colonnen auf Nivelles gerichtet sind [..]”. The moment this was written, the prince himself was kept at Brussels by the duke. The words should be understood in the sense of intelligence as coming from the corps under his command, that is as coming from Braine le Comte and / or Mons. It is also phrased as if the duke gave the prince the instruction to do this, but due to the fact that he kept him in Brussels, I think it should be understood as the expectation from the duke that if there would be any French activity in front of Mons – Binche, that the first information should come from this sector.

Despite the fact that Wellington apparently expected a parallel advance (in time) towards Nivelles and Fleurus by the use of the word “zugleich” he must have clung to this concept much longer as by the time he learned through Zieten of the French advance this had already started about 14 hours earlier.¹⁷

Blücher’s letter which reached the duke towards 10 p.m. informed him of the Prussian intention to concentrate their army in the vicinity of Sombrefe; at the same time this information fitted in well in his own concept in case he might be the one to bear the brunt of the French attack, as it could be from there that they could support *him* in that case.

The mere report from Braine le Comte as carried by lieutenant Webster about the situation in front of Quatre Bras was yet also a signal that apparently no enemy was in front of Nivelles.

As long as there was no sign of the enemy being in front of Mons or Binche, while the duke kept his forces between this sector and Brussels, the question comes up as what must have been his thoughts about the presence of the bulk of the French army.

In combining the information as carried by Webster and the former intelligence he had about an apparent French absence in the sector Mons – Binche, Wellington may have understood that the French were moving along both banks of the Sambre to the east (Fleurus) so as to attack the Prussian army, and that the forces which were at Frasnes were part of a screen to the French left. In that sense, Wellington must have come to the conclusion that Charleroi had most probably fallen and that the French were on the road which leads from this place to Brussels. The fact was that this could not be read from Blücher’s letter which he had written at noon, nor had Zieten reported about the evacuation of this road back to Wellington as he did to Blücher.¹⁸

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¹ These words prove that the prince wrote his letter before the report of Von Zieten reached Brussels.

² By midnight on the 15th of June, baron Van der Capellen reported to the king that he had spoken to Wellington and the prince and that they believed the French were moving on both banks of the river Sambre. In: NA, 2.02.01 nr.6585 (cf. relevant chapter).

³ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI, nr.II.12 p.107, Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Quatre Bras p.214

In another study, Von Pflugk Harttungs understand these orders, in criticizing them, too much in the sense of the later events, as that they should have been issued more towards the east. In: Vorgeschichte etc. p.117-118

⁴ It should be noted that Von Müffling (Wellington), after having received the intelligence from Ziethen, sent the reaction to this news to Blücher. From then on, the exchange of information was on that level, whereby Ziethen would hear back from his superior.

⁵ In fact, the prince wrote at 5 p.m.: “À moins que vous ayez des nouvelles depuis ce matin qui puissent vous faire croire nécessaire de tenir les troupes dehors toute la nuit, je vous prie de leur envoyer l'ordre en mon nom de se rendre à leurs cantonnements [..]. Basically, this meant that the alert as initiated by the prince was pulled in, as long as there would be no new information.

⁶ In the presumption that Wellington heard at 9 a.m. about the hostilities for the first time, the following question is asked about the scenario in which he would have heard about it in the late afternoon: “If Wellington really did not hear that news until 5 p.m. then why did he not do the obvious and enquire of his outposts that morning as to the state of affairs at the front ?” The question somehow supposes that Wellington would have got a sense of war having started, but that it was a matter of verifying through the outposts.

The basic issue arises where outposts are for. In my mind to inform their commander in chief about what is going on in front. The principle asked for in this question is in my mind the same as to ask from the owner of a watch-dog to rise early, wake up the dog and have him check whether there could be any alarm.

In: Hofschröder, P. Yet another reply etc. p.224

⁷ This parallel element can also be found in Wellington's concentration orders, issued just before the letter involved was written. It states:

“The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2nd and 3rd division of the army of the Low Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3rd division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as collected.

This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.” [italics are mine]

⁸ Lehmann, M. Zur Geschichte des Jahres etc. p.284

Unfortunately I do not have the full copy of the document involved.

⁹ This focus upon the sector around Nivelles is already apparent in the concentrations orders which were issued a short time before the letter was written and in which it is stated: “The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2nd and 3rd division of the army of the

Low Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3rd division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as collected.

This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.”

Lord FitzRoy Somerset also confirms that the duke was waiting for further intelligence about the French offensive after having given his set of orders around 6 p.m. In: NAM, nr.6507-1

For this conditional element, cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: GSA, VPH-HA,VI, nr.II.12 p.99

“In der Gegend von Nivelles” should in my idea be understood as the area covering a radius of roughly 10 kilometers around Nivelles (Seneffe, Hautain le Val, Ophain,Ronquières), though Wellington seems to take it wider in his report of the 16th, 10.30 a.m. (as far as Braine le Comte to the west and Quatre Bras and Genappe to the east).

Von Pflugk Harttung asserts Wellington did not make a promise of support towards Blücher for a battle near Sombreffe, as Nivelles is mentioned and not Ligny, but here Von Pflugk Harttung fails to see that the area around Nivelles was Wellington’s base for support for an action further east in general. In: Vorgeschichte etc. p.225

¹⁰ Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Vorgeschichte etc. p.44

¹¹ For this hour, see: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Vorgeschichte etc. p.58

He believes that what is meant is an hour somewhere in the night. In: Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Quatre Bras p.510

Hussey draws the same conclusion, and this might be a plausible one: that it is meant to be an hour at which there would be enough light to march (by 2 a.m.). In: The Frasnes letter, a reconsideration etc. p.14

¹² Cf. for instance the letter of general Van Reede of the morning of the 15th of June.

¹³ An author who also sees a direct relation between the arrival of Blücher’s letter and Wellington’s so-called “after orders” is Von Lettow Vorbeck. In: Napoleons Untergang p.290

¹⁴ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.II.12 p.109-110
Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Quatre Bras p.215

¹⁵ As Pollio completely fails to understand the background of Wellington’s ideas, he has great trouble explaining his orders of the 15th of June. He writes: “il n’est pas facile de découvrir de quelle conception découlaient les ordres donnés par le duc, et quel devait être le déploiement de l’armée,” In: Waterloo p.151

¹⁶ On the evening of the 15th of June Wellington would have spoken to lord FitzRoy Somerset who would have said about the French: “No doubt we shall be able to manage these fellows.” Wellington would then have replied: “There was little doubt of that provided he did not make a false movement”. Cf. Somerset’s account. In: NAM: 6507.1

¹⁷ Hofschröder translates the crucial word “zugleich” incorrectly. He uses the word “immediately” while it should be “at the same time”. In: 1815. The Waterloo campaign. Wellington etc. p.212
And in: Wellington’s smallest victory p.256

¹⁸ According to Petrie, the moment he went to the ball of Richmond, Wellington was completely in the dark as to his adversary's movements. In: Wellington, a reassessment p.196